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Abstract 
 
Consumers are not as rational as assumed by conventional economic theories.  The 
present thesis reports three studies of consumers’ bounded rationality.  It has three chapters.  
In Chapter 1, I investigate the effects of a range of different types of anchor on WTP and 
WTA valuations of familiar consumer products, elicited through individuals’ buying or 
selling decisions at given prices.  I find anchoring effects only when the anchor value is 
framed as a plausible price for the good for which the individual is a potential buyer or seller.  
Anchoring effects are stronger for WTA than for WTP.  I conclude that anchoring effects can 
affect market behaviour, but that not all anchors are equally effective.  In Chapter 2, I 
demonstrate a set of three experiments and find that consumers are likely to stick to defaults 
and achieve suboptimal outcomes.  I unpack two key psychological reasons why they do this 
- complexity (in terms of non-linearity, number and bundling of tariffs) and consumer 
inattention.  The complexity induced by product bundling, non-linearity and number of tariffs 
has an important role, but this is overstated if the explanatory power of inattention is 
neglected.  I show that a ‘smart nudge’ policy of automatically switching default tariffs can 
be used to exploit inattention-based consumer inertia to achieve better consumer outcomes.  
In Chapter 3, I report an experiment in which participants faced purchasing decisions 
involving complexity and common standards.  The majority of participants employed the 
"dominance editing" (DE) heuristic.  However, for cognitively constrained participants, the 
DE heuristic is less efficient than an alternative shortlisting heuristic - the "largest common 
standard" (LCS).  
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
Perfect rationality is one of the essential assumptions employed in conventional 
economic theories.  In consumer theory, perfectly rational consumers are commonly endowed 
with features such as stable preferences and unlimited cognitive abilities.  Perfectly rational 
consumers value product variety and can respond optimally and maximise their utilities even 
when facing complex decision problems.  In a competitive market, rational consumers are 
able to reap benefits from competition and will never be lazy or misjudge prices.  Firms can 
never harm outcomes for consumers by deliberately making product comparisons and price 
search harder. 
However, the perfectly rational consumers described in economic theories are not 
always like the real consumers in our daily life. In the real world, we can observe that 
consumers queuing for Christmas discounts may buy products they will never use; consumers 
purchasing the “3 for 2” food deal may end up putting the redundant food into waste bins; 
consumers who care about changes in the price of potatoes may not try to save money by 
switching their suboptimal default energy tariffs. 
There is now a substantial body of evidence showing that consumers are not as 
rational as assumed by conventional economic theories.  Consumers’ bounded rationality is 
widely discussed by a large number of psychologists and experimental/behavioural 
economists empirically and theoretically.  There is evidence that in some environments 
individuals’ preferences and economic behaviour systemically violate the assumption of 
rationality (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  For example, 
consumer preferences are unstable and context dependent (Tversky  & Simonson,  1993; 
Koszegi & Rabin, 2006; Loomes et al., 2003; Tufano, 2010; Isoni et al., 2011; OFT, 2010) ; 
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) may be affected by 
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non-informative numerical cues (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Mussweiler, 2002; Ariely et 
al., 2003); individuals’ willingness to participate in a market and satisfaction with the chosen 
options may decrease when the choice set is too large (Iyengar & Lepper 2000; Boatwright & 
Nunes 2001); some consumers are cognitively constrained and respond suboptimally when 
facing complex options (Jamasb & Pollitt, 2005; OFT, 2008; DG Sanco, 2010); and 
consumers use simplifying heuristics to deal with complex decision problems (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Hauser et al., 2010; Mazini & Mariotti, 2007; Gaudeul & Sugden, 2012).  
These findings raise questions about the workings of retail markets that need to be 
considered both by researchers and by policy makers – for example, how one can identify 
retail markets in which consumers are subject to bounded rationality; whether boundedly 
rational consumers' behaviour can affect both themselves and rational consumers; and what 
can be done to help these consumers.  Some orthodox economists believe that, excluding 
cases of negative externalities and market power, governmental intervention would only dull 
the efficiency of the market, because under the control of the “invisible hand”, rational 
consumers could always respond optimally in terms of maximising their material payoffs.  
However, many behavioural and experimental economists hold a different opinion: in the 
presence of behaviourally biased consumers, markets cannot always be expected to self-
correct (OFT, 2011).  Regulators are beginning to take account of the existence of bounded 
rationality in policy making (OFT, 2010, Ofgem, 2011, 2012). 
OFT (2011) classified consumers' bounded rationality into six categories: willingness 
to pay and reference point effects; willingness to pay and misperception of future demand 
quantities; search and inertia; search and misjudgement of prices; quality and misperception 
of desired product attributes and quality; and misjudgement of vertical quality.  They state 
that although intensifying competition through increasing the number of firms may improve 
outcomes for some consumers, it is not a panacea.  When cognitively constrained or lazy 
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consumers misjudge the quality of goods, misjudge prices, or display inertia, increasing the 
number of firms may not help consumers; rather, in some situations it harms them (Carlin, 
2009; Spiegler, 2006).  At the same time, without governmental intervention, firms may have 
little incentive to educate boundedly rational consumers.  On the contrary, profit-maximising 
firms may have an incentive to exploit consumers’ bounded rationality (Gabaix & Laibson, 
2006). 
The present thesis contains three chapters and sheds light on the following questions:  
1. How can consumers’ bounded rationality affect their economic behaviour? 
2. How far is the behaviour of boundedly rational consumers suboptimal, relative 
to that of perfectly rational consumers? 
3. Which heuristics do consumers employ to make economic decisions in 
specific complex environments? 
4. Are these heuristics optimal for consumers, given the consumers’ cognitive 
constrains?   
In answering these questions, I shall consider policy implications as appropriate. 
The thesis employs an experimental methodology for two reasons: first, trading 
contexts can be controlled in well-designed lab experiments so, in comparison with field data, 
experimental data allow me to isolate the effects of particular variables; second, lab 
experiments are able to capture variables which are hard to observe in the field but which 
may be crucial for the study of consumers’ bounded rationality.  
The first chapter of the thesis is based on Sugden, Zheng and Zizzo (2013)1.  It reports 
an incentivized experiment which investigates the effects of a variety of different anchors (i.e. 
non-informative numerical cues), on consumers’ purchasing and selling decisions.  Previous 
                                                          
1The chapter is not the same as the published paper.  I have added more text, tables and figures both to the main 
text and to the appendices, to ensure integration with the hypotheses of this thesis. I have made significant 
contributions to the paper on which this chapter is based.  The original research idea was mine.  Under the 
guidance of my supervisors Robert Sugden and Daniel Zizzo, I was primarily responsible for the experimental 
design, experimental implementation and data analysis, and I wrote the first draft of the paper. 
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anchoring studies have found salient and robust anchoring effects in various domains, such as 
the numerical estimation of general knowledge (Blankenship et al., 2008; Epley & Gliovich, 
2001,2005; McElroy & Dowd, 2007; Mussweiler & Englich, 2005; Mussweiler & Strack, 
1999, 2001; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), probability estimates (Plous, 1989; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), legal judgment (Campman & Bornstein, 1996; Englich & Mussweiler, 
2001; Englich & Soder, 2009; Englich et al., 2005, 2006), willingness to pay and willingness 
to accept (e.g. Ariely et al., 2003; Fudenberg et al., 2012) and forecasting (Critcher & 
Gilovich, 2008).  If anchoring effects occur in markets, profit maximising firms may be able 
to exploit boundedly rational consumers by manipulating the presentation of information 
about prices.  This kind of manipulation might attenuate the efficiency of retail markets and 
blunt the effectiveness of policies which rely on consumers’ price sensitivity.  
While it is useful to ask whether or not anchors have effects on consumers’ valuations 
of goods, this question is too general.  Anchors can be classified into different types and the 
relative strengths of anchoring effects for different types of anchor may be different between 
consumers’ purchasing and selling decisions.  Although some researchers (Jacowitz & 
Kahneman, 1995; Wilson et al., 1996) have explored a limited number of anchor types in 
ordinary social situations, it is important to investigate, in incentivized settings in which 
individuals buy or sell familiar consumer goods, the strength of the effects induced by 
different types of anchor, and whether the effects of given anchor types are equally strong for 
buying and selling decisions.  The results of this investigation are relevant for the design of 
policies aimed at consumer protection or the maintenance of competition.  After all it is 
possible that consumers may behave more rationally when facing familiar economic decision 
problems than when responding to the non-economic judgement tasks that psychologists have 
usually studied.   
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Anchoring effects are not the only effects which could lead to price insensitivity of 
consumers.  Chapter 22 tries to give answers to three real problems that policy makers face 
today: First, do consumers behave suboptimally in the retail markets involving homogenous 
goods with complex tariffs used in UK electricity and gas retail markets?  Second, if the 
answer to question one is positive, then why do consumers respond suboptimally?  Is it 
because of complexity or inattention?  Third, what can we do to help these consumers?  
According to conventional economic theories, when a homogeneous good is sold by 
competing firms and when there are no monetary switching costs, perfectly rational 
consumers will always purchase the good at the lowest price.  However, researchers find that 
in some retail markets, for example the energy market, even if there is no monetary switching 
cost, many consumers do not switch service providers even though the tariffs on which they 
are buying are suboptimal (Jamasb & Pollitt, 2005; OFT, 2008; DG Sanco, 2010; Lunn, 
2013).  One prevalent explanation as to the suboptimal response is complexity exploitation. 
Since some consumers are cognitively constrained, spurious complexity may hamper 
consumers’ utility maximising behaviour. Since cognitively constrained consumers cannot 
find out the optimal tariff in a complex environment, some of them would rather keep the 
defaults while some others switch to sub-optimal tariffs.  Some policy makers believe that 
firms deliberately use complex tariffs to perplex boundedly rational consumers, and have 
proposed policies aimed at simplifying tariffs.  These policies normally aim at two main 
dimensions - reducing the number of available tariffs and facilitating comparisons (BBC, 
2012; Ofgem, 2011, 2012). 
However, given the fact that price ranking services for homogeneous products (such 
as electricity and gas) are pervasively provided online, it is sensible for me to ask the 
                                                          
2 Chapter 2 is based on the working paper Sitzia, Zheng and Zizzo (2012).  I have made significant contributions 
to this working paper.  These include having the original research idea and working on the experimental design, 
experimental implementation, data analysis and writing up.  I have rewritten several sections of the working 
paper to insure integration with the hypotheses of this thesis.  
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following question: Is complexity exploitation the only reason why consumers respond 
suboptimally in retail markets involving spurious complexity and default tariffs?  If tariffs 
can be simply ranked online according to one’s consumption using a search engine, spurious 
complexity would not be a problem to those who are able to use the price ranking services.  
In this case, firms are not able to employ complex tariffs to exploit these consumers.  In fact, 
there might be another potential reason why consumers keep suboptimal defaults - inattention. 
Inattention implies that the real world consumers may simply not pay attention to saving 
money from switching service supplier: their routine activities in their everyday life are more 
prominent.  There is not a point in time in the day, the week, the month or even the year when, 
as a routine, subjects are required to pay attention to the task of choosing a service supplier, 
as there is anyway a default service supplier.  Chapter 2 presents an experiment based on the 
UK energy market and experimentally tests these two potential explanations – complexity 
and inattention - on consumers’ default keeping and suboptimal switching behaviour.  This 
chapter also considers the effectiveness of two nudges – a warning nudge and a best default 
nudge – which may potentially make consumers’ behaviour optimal.  This is obviously 
relevant for policy. 
Although many policy makers now treat consumers’ bounded rationality as one 
important element when proposing policies, it is still unclear whether or not consumers can 
be fully protected by these policies and if they can, how and why these policies work and 
whether or not better policies can be proposed.  To answer these questions, it is essential for 
me to know how consumers make decisions in an environment involving complexity that 
might be spurious.  Previous studies show that people use heuristics to simplify complex 
decision problems (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Hauser et al., 2010).  Gaudeul and Sugden 
(2012) introduced two psychologically grounded heuristics - “Largest common standard” and 
“Dominance editing” which may be potentially employed by consumers to tackle complex 
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decision problems such as choosing the cheapest tariff among a large set of complex tariffs.3  
Consumers who use the largest common standard heuristic only look at and choose from 
among tariffs which are easily comparable, whereas consumers who use the dominance 
editing heuristic first find the cheapest tariff from among those that are easily comparable and 
then compare this with the other tariffs.  If consumers employ the largest common standard 
heuristic, even if there is no regulatory intervention from the government, in the long run 
profit maximising retail firms will be unwilling to offer tariffs which are difficult to compare 
with those of their competitors.  However, if consumers employ the dominance editing 
heuristic, firms have an incentive to offer tariffs which are not easily comparable with their 
competitors’.  The two heuristics have opposite implications about firms’ behaviour based on 
which, researchers would present different advice about consumer protection policy.   
However, Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) did not test empirically which heuristic 
consumers would employ to deal with complex decision problems.  Chapter 3 sheds light on 
this question.  Moreover, it is important for me to know whether or not the heuristic 
employed by the majority of consumers is efficient; if not, are we able to nudge these 
consumers to employ other, more efficient heuristics?  Knowing the answer to these 
questions may help policy makers propose better consumer protection policies and help with 
our understanding of consumers’ bounded rationality. 
  
                                                          
3 They also introduced a psychologically ungrounded heuristic - the signal first (SF) heuristic. More details can 
be found in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 There is now a substantial body of experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that individuals’ reported valuations of goods can be affected by anchors – that is, non-
informative numerical cues (e.g., Ariely et al., 2003; Mazar et al., 2010; Tufano, 2010; Alevy 
et al., 2011; Fudenberg et al., 2012).  In a typical experiment, each subject is first asked 
whether she would buy (or sell) a specific good at a stated price that is clearly arbitrary, and 
then is asked to state her maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) or minimum willingness-to-
accept (WTA) for that good; the usual finding is that valuations are positively correlated with 
the arbitrary ‘anchor’ price.  Taken at face value, these findings may have important 
implications for the efficiency of retail markets, for two reasons.  First, if individuals’ 
purchasing decisions can be influenced by irrelevant anchors, firms may be able to use 
related mechanisms to manipulate those decisions to the detriment of consumers.  Second, 
many policies aimed at ensuring the competitiveness of retail markets rely on consumers’ 
ability to find the lowest prices; the existence of anchoring effects raises doubts about the 
effectiveness of this mechanism. 
 However, most of the evidence of anchoring effects on economic valuations has been 
derived from a narrow class of experimental designs which may not be representative of real-
world interactions between firms and consumers.  With a few exceptions, these experiments 
have investigated only one type of anchor, and this type may not be the best model of the 
opportunities for manipulation that are open to firms.  Theory and evidence from psychology 
suggest that anchoring effects – and hence the scope for failures of price competition – might 
be much more general than those on which economists have focused.  Furthermore, most 
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experiments have used an ‘open-ended’ method of eliciting valuations which is not typical of 
retail markets and which may be particularly susceptible to anchoring effects.   
 In this chapter I report an experiment which investigates the effects of a range of 
different types of anchor on WTP and WTA valuations, elicited through individuals’ buying 
or selling decisions at given prices.  A further feature of my experiment is that it allows me to 
compare the strength of anchoring effects on buyers and sellers.  Since consumers act as 
buyers in most retail markets, differences between the susceptibility of buyers and sellers to 
anchoring effects are relevant in assessing the impact of these effects on competition and 
consumer welfare.  To date, there have been few such direct comparisons, and these have 
generated conflicting results.   
 Section 2 reviews the existing evidence of anchoring effects on economic valuations, 
drawing attention to some of its limitations.  Section 3 identifies four dimensions on which 
anchors can vary, and discusses theoretical reasons for expecting variation along these 
dimensions to affect the strength of anchoring effects.  Section 4 describes the experimental 
design I use to investigate these forms of variation.  My results are presented in Section 5.  
Their implications are discussed in Section 6. 
1.2  Anchoring effects for valuations: existing evidence  
 The hypothesis that judgements can be subject to anchoring effects was proposed by 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) as an explanation of ‘preference reversal’ between choices 
and relative valuations.  It was later used by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in a more general 
account of heuristics and biases in judgements under uncertainty.  (Viewed in a psychological 
perspective, valuation is a special case of judgement.)  The first direct experimental 
investigation of anchoring effects on valuations of commodities was by Johnson and Schkade 
(1989), who studied the effects of anchors on certainty-equivalent valuations of lotteries.  
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That experiment was not incentivized, but in other respects it pioneered what is now the most 
widely-used experimental design for investigating anchoring effects on valuations.  
 This canonical design has been used in relation to both WTP and WTA; for simplicity, 
I will describe the WTP version.  Each subject first faces an anchoring task in which she is 
asked whether she would buy a specific commodity at a stated price.  Usually, this price is 
fixed by some mechanism that is clearly arbitrary (for example, it is constructed from the 
digits of the subject’s social security number, or set by a random device), but in some 
experiments the price is simply stated with no explanation of its origin.  The subject then 
faces a valuation task which elicits the highest price at which she would buy the same 
commodity.  Usually the elicitation mechanism is open-ended (i.e. the subject simply states 
her highest price), but sometimes it uses multiple binary choice (i.e. the subject states 
whether she would buy at each of a set of alternative prices, and her WTP valuation is 
inferred from those choices).  The valuation task is incentivized, either by the Becker–
DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism or by treating subjects’ responses as bids in a 
Vickrey auction.  Usually, but not always, the anchoring task is also incentivized.  This 
design has been used with many different commodities, including standard consumer 
products, lotteries, sportscards, and unpleasant sounds and tastes (e.g. Ariely et al., 2003; 
Bateman et al., 2006; Bergman et al., 2010; Mazar et al., 2010; Tufano, 2010; Alevy et al., 
2011; Fudenberg et al., 2012).  Many but not all implementations of the canonical design 
have found significant positive relationships between reported valuations and anchor prices 
(the experiments of Bateman et al., Tufano, and Fudenberg et al. are exceptions). 
 In a variant design, the anchor is framed as a price expectation.  In an experiment 
reported by Isoni, Brooks, Loomes, and Sugden (2011), the valuation task is incentivized by a 
median-price Vickrey auction; the anchoring task asks subjects to predict the price that will 
emerge in this auction, and different questionnaire designs are used to prompt high or low 
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predictions.  Mazar et al. (2010) report an experiment in which the anchoring manipulation is 
to tell subjects the distribution of prices that will be used in the BDM mechanism that 
incentivizes the valuation task; left-skewed and right-skewed distributions respectively 
generate low and high price expectations.  Both experiments find significant anchoring 
effects.  Anchoring effects induced by the manipulation of price expectations are closely 
related to shaping effects – the tendency for bids and asks in repeated incentive-compatible 
auctions to be positively correlated with previously-observed prices (Loomes et al., 2003; 
Tufano, 2010; Isoni et al., 2011). 
A few studies have investigated factors which might influence the strength of 
anchoring effects.  It has been found that anchoring effects are weaker for individuals with 
higher cognitive ability (Bergman et al., 2011) and for individuals with more experience of 
trading the relevant good (Alevy et al., 2011).  Mazar et al. (2010) find that anchoring is 
stronger when the elicitation method is open-ended than when it uses multiple binary choice.  
However, there has been little systematic investigation of the relative strength of the effects 
of different types of anchors on incentivized valuations.  Almost all of the existing evidence 
comes from experiments in which the anchor was a price (or an expectation of a price) for the 
same commodity that appears in the valuation task, though Ariely et al. (2003, Experiment 5) 
find that anchor tasks relating to one type of unpleasant noise influence subjects’ WTA for 
experiencing other types.  In contrast, psychologists investigating judgement tasks in general 
have considered many other types of anchor, at least some of which are potentially relevant in 
economic contexts. 
 Another under-investigated issue is whether the strength of anchoring effects differs 
according to whether valuations are elicited from buyers or sellers.  Simonson and Drolet 
(2004, Study 1) report a non-incentivized experiment in which anchoring effects were 
stronger in buying tasks.  Fudenberg et al. (2012) use a design that allows comparisons 
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between buying and selling.  In almost all the cases they investigate, anchoring effects are not 
significant, but the summary statistics suggest (contrary to Simonson and Drolet’s findings) 
that if anchoring does occur, its effects are stronger in selling tasks. 
1.3  Anchoring effects for valuations: issues to be investigated  
My experiment was designed to investigate, in incentivized valuation tasks, the 
relative strengths of anchoring effects for different types of anchor, and between buying and 
selling tasks.  I focus on four specific dimensions of anchoring: the plausibility of anchor 
values, the relevance of the anchor task to the valuation task, the subject’s engagement in the 
anchoring task, and whether the valuation task was one of buying or selling.  In this Section, I 
consider theoretical arguments from psychology and economics concerning the effects of 
variation along these dimensions.  I must emphasize, however, that it is not the purpose of my 
experiment to discriminate between the theories I will discuss.  With respect to the issues I 
am investigating, the predictions of those theories often overlap. 
1.3.1  Plausibility  
 It is natural to ask whether anchors are more effective, the more plausible they are as 
answers to the corresponding judgement tasks.  One reason for thinking that this might be the 
case is provided by the hypothesis that experimental subjects are influenced by the 
conversational norms that apply in ordinary social situations and by the inferences that those 
norms license (Grice, 1975; Schwarz, 1994).  Consciously or unconsciously, subjects may 
assume that the experimenter would not have presented an anchor unless it was informative, 
and so treat it as such.  Thus, for example, the anchor question ‘Would you buy good A at 
price £x?’ is interpreted as implying that £x is a normal or reasonable price for A.  It seems 
unlikely that that inference would be made if the supposition of an £x price was wholly 
implausible.   
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 A related mechanism is implied by the hypothesis of bad-deal aversion (Thaler, 1985; 
Isoni, 2011).  An individual who is bad-deal averse uses prices as reference points, and 
derives disutility (respectively: utility) from trading at prices that are less (more) favourable 
to her than those reference points.  Preferences of this kind induce anchoring effects if 
anchors are treated as reference prices for the good used in the valuation task.  One might 
expect this mechanism to depend on the plausibility of the anchor price. 
A different reason for expecting more plausible anchors to have stronger effects is 
offered by the psychological theory of selective accessibility (Mussweiler and Strack, 1999, 
2001).  This theory proposes that an anchor task activates items of knowledge that are 
relevant for that task; if immediately afterwards the subject faces a judgement task, those 
items are particularly accessible and so have a disproportionate effect on her response.  A 
similar hypothesis was previously proposed by Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) to explain the 
observation that responses to dichotomous judgement tasks (e.g. ‘Is the height of Mount 
Everest more than 10,000 metres?’) are biased by the anchors provided by those tasks 
(10,000 metres in the example).  One apparent implication is that the more obvious the 
answer to the anchor task is, and so the less need there is to access knowledge in answering it, 
the less effect the anchor will have on the subsequent valuation task.  Thus, implausibly high 
or implausibly low anchor prices should have relatively weak effects. 
1.3.2  Relevance 
 In the canonical design, the anchoring task requires the subject to consider an 
arbitrary buying or selling price for the same commodity as is featured in the valuation task.  
An obvious question is whether this condition is necessary for anchoring effects to occur or, 
more generally, whether the strength of anchoring effects is affected by the relevance of the 
anchor task to the valuation task.   
14 
 
 The explanations of anchoring considered in the previous subsection also provide 
reasons why anchoring effects should be stronger when anchors are more relevant.  If the 
anchor question is about buying good A at a price of £x but the valuation task is about WTP 
for good B, conversational norms do not give obvious support to the inference that £x is a 
normal, reasonable or reference price for good B.  If this inference is not made, bad-deal 
aversion also does not come into play.  The selective accessibility hypothesis implies that the 
strength of anchoring effects will depend on the degree of overlap between the knowledge 
requirements of the anchor and valuation tasks.  Thus, one might expect anchoring effects to 
be stronger, the greater the relevance of the anchoring task to the judgement task.   
However, some striking evidence suggesting that wholly irrelevant cues can work as 
anchors comes from the basic anchoring effects reported by Wilson et al. (1996).  In a typical 
design, the anchoring task requires student subjects to copy five pages of numbers (framed as 
a handwriting test); they are then asked to make judgements about the number of fellow-
students who will get cancer in the near future.  Subjects who have copied larger numbers 
tend to give larger numbers as judgements.  Wilson et al. speculate that this effect may be due 
to backward priming: the need to give a numerical answer to a question triggers a search for 
possible answers, and numbers in short-term memory, even if unrelated to the task at hand, 
are then retrieved.  A similar hypothesis was earlier proposed by Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1968) as an explanation of anchoring effects in preference reversal tasks; Slovic and 
Lichtenstein’s hypothesis is that the money value of the prize in a lottery acts as an anchor for 
a task which elicits a valuation of that lottery.   
1.3.3  Engagement 
 The selective accessibility and backward priming hypotheses explain anchoring as a 
side-effect of psychological processes for storing and retrieving items in memory.  In the 
performance of the anchor task, particular pieces of knowledge are accessed, or particular 
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numbers are stored in short-term memory.  These items are then selectively retrieved in the 
valuation task.  So, if either of these hypotheses were correct, it would be natural to expect 
the strength of anchoring effects to depend on the extent of the subject’s engagement with the 
anchor task (Wilson et al., 1996). 
For example, if incentivization of a task increases subjects’ engagement with it, 
memories associated with the anchor task might be more retrievable in designs in which that 
task is incentivized.  Another possibility is that the memory of the anchor value might be 
more retrievable, the more the subject had been involved in the process (however arbitrary) in 
which that value was determined.  For example, a subject has more mental engagement with 
an anchor value that she is required to construct from certain digits of her social security 
number than with one that is simply stated by the experimenter. 
1.3.4  Buying or selling 
 The possibility of anchoring effects seems to depend on some degree of imprecision 
in subjects’ ‘true’ valuations.  One might therefore conjecture that anchoring effects would be 
weaker, the more experience subjects had had in making judgements similar to those elicited 
in the valuation task.  Most people have much more experience of buying low-value 
consumer goods, such as those used in my experiment, than of selling them.  Thus, a typical 
subject comes to the laboratory with a firmer sense of how to respond to given prices when 
acting as a buyer than when acting as a seller; as a result, WTP might be subject to less 
imprecision than is WTA, and less susceptible to the effects of arbitrary cues.   
The results reported by Simonson and Drolet (2004, Study 1), referred to in Section 2 
above, may seem to provide evidence against this conjecture.  However, the framing of 
Simonson and Drolet’s non-incentivized WTA task asked subjects ‘to assume that they had 
received new products as gifts and had decided to sell them’.  Since this frame suggests that 
the products are unwanted and that the subject has already decided to dispose of them, it 
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seems unlikely to induce the sense of endowment typical of incentivized WTA tasks (which 
may explain the very unusual result that WTA was less than WTP).  If the subject can assume 
that the products are unwanted, she has no need to consider what they are ‘really’ worth to 
her, and so the problem of preference imprecision does not arise. 
1.4  Experimental Design 
1.4.1  Overview 
The experiment had separate buying and selling treatments, faced by different 
subjects.  The buying treatment elicited WTP valuations for a range of consumption goods 
and lotteries (the trading commodities); the selling treatment elicited WTA valuations for the 
same commodities.  In each treatment, each subject faced eleven tasks in random order, 
presented on a computer screen.  Ten of these tasks had the two-part structure of the 
canonical design.  The first part of such a task was a question that was framed to provide a 
potential anchor value.  Different tasks used different types of anchor, differentiated in terms 
of plausibility, relevance and engagement.  The eleventh task, used as a control, differed from 
the others in that its first part was a ‘filler’ question with no anchoring significance.  The 
second part of each task elicited the relevant valuation. 
 The ten non-control tasks faced by any given subject can be grouped into five pairs.  
(This pairing was not described explicitly to subjects; because of randomization, the two 
tasks in a pair were usually not adjacent to one another.)  In any given pair, the two tasks 
were identical except that one task provided a relatively low anchor value while the other 
provided a relatively high one.  Thus, my design allows within-subject tests of the existence 
and size of anchoring effects, in both buying and selling, for each anchor type. 
 Because I wanted to investigate more than five anchor types but did not want to 
overload subjects or make the experiment last too long, the subjects in each treatment (i.e. 
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buying and selling) were randomly divided into two groups, A and B.  These groups faced 
different (but overlapping) sets of tasks, involving nine anchor types in all (in addition to the 
control task).   To minimize learning and across-tasks effects, and to ensure that my results 
were not dependent on the use of any specific commodity, I used six different trading 
commodities, each with a market value of approximately £5.  Each subject’s eleven tasks 
involved all six commodities (one for each pair of non-control tasks and one for the control 
task.)  To ensure that effects due to differences between anchor types were not confounded 
with effects due to differences between commodities, anchor types and commodities were 
counterbalanced. 
Because each subject faced eleven tasks rather than just one, I was able to collect a 
rich body of data and to use within-subject tests.  The downside of this design strategy is that 
the anchor used in one task might influence the valuations reported by subjects in later tasks.  
If such contamination were to occur, it would add noise to the data.  However, because the 
order of tasks was randomized, it would not impart systematic biases to my tests. 
1.4.2  Anchor types 
 The first part of each non-control task was a comparative question relating to an 
anchor commodity.  Depending on the anchor type, this might or might not be the same as the 
trading commodity.  Using A to denote the anchor commodity and £x to denote an amount of 
money, the comparative question took the form ‘If you had A, would you sell your A if we 
offered you £x?’ (in the selling mode) or ‘If you had £12, would you buy A if you had to pay 
£x?’ (in the buying mode).  Thus, the subject was prompted to focus on the anchor value x.  
In the control task, the comparative question ‘Do you like dogs more than cats?’ was used as 
a filler.  I will say that the control task had the no lab anchor type.  (I use this term to signal 
that the ‘anchor value’ provided by the experiment is not the only value that a subject might 
retrieve from memory when reporting her valuation of the trading commodity.)  
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Table 1.1: Anchor types 
 
 
 
Anchor type Process to set 
anchor value 
Relation of 
anchor 
commodity to 
trading 
commodity 
Low anchor 
value 
High anchor 
value 
Incentives Subject groups facing 
task 
Baseline None Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No A and B 
Implausible price None Same £0.01 £1000 No A 
Similar good None Similar £1–£2 £10–£12 No A 
Dissimilar good None Dissimilar £1–£2 £10–£12 No B 
Incentivized None Same £1–£2 £10–£12 Yes B 
Passive number search Computer finds number Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No A 
Passive price search Computer finds price Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No B 
Active number search Subject finds number Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No B 
Active price search Subject finds price Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No A 
No lab anchor  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A A and B 
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 The anchor types used in the experiment, and the subject groups to which they were 
assigned, are described in Table 1.1.  The first row of this table describes the baseline anchor 
type, which is similar to that of the canonical design.  When this anchor type was used, the 
subject’s first exposure to the anchor value was when it appeared in the comparative question 
(indicated by ‘none’ in the ‘process to set anchor value’ column).  The anchor commodity 
was the same as the trading commodity.  The low anchor value was drawn at random from 
the interval from £1 to £2; the high anchor value was drawn at random from the interval from 
£10 to £12.  High and low anchor values were both intended to be perceived as plausible 
prices or valuations.  The baseline comparative question was not incentivized.  This was for 
reasons of external validity.  Outside the lab, an anchoring manipulation is typically a way of 
framing a given decision problem (as when a supermarket prices a product at £6.95, with the 
label ‘Special offer!  Normal price £9.95’); the frame does not have an incentive structure 
independent of that problem.  The entry in the final column indicates that the baseline anchor 
type was faced by both subject groups.  By making two anchor types common to both groups, 
I was able to check that the randomization was effective and that the particular assignment of 
anchor types to groups was not inducing systematic effects.  In fact, there was no significant 
difference in WTA or WTP valuations for the common tasks between the two groups. 
 The other anchor types differed from the baseline in the following ways.   
 The implausible price anchor type was used to investigate the effect of variation along 
the dimension of plausibility.  In this anchor type, the low anchor value was £0.01 and the 
high anchor value was £1000.  I assumed that such extreme values would not be perceived as 
providing information about (or reference points for) responses to the trading questions in 
part 2.   
The similar good and dissimilar good anchor types were used to investigate the effect 
of variation along the dimension of relevance.  In these anchor types, the anchor commodity 
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was not the same as the trading commodity, but was approximately equal in market value.  In 
the similar good case, the two goods were chosen so that individuals’ ‘true’ valuations of the 
commodities were likely to be positively correlated.  In the dissimilar good case, the two 
commodities were unrelated to one another (see Section 4.4 below). 
The incentivized anchor type was used to investigate the effect of one form of 
engagement.  In this anchor type, the comparative question was incentivized in the same way 
as the trading questions (see Section 4.5 below).   
The final four non-control anchor types were used to investigate a different form of 
engagement – involvement in the determination of the anchor value.  In each of these anchor 
types, the comparative task was preceded by a matrix problem, whose solution determined 
the anchor value.  In the two price search anchor types, the subject was shown an 88 matrix 
of monetary values, described as ‘prices’.  These values were determined randomly, subject 
to the constraint that the lowest value was in the range from £1 to £2 (for low anchor tasks) or 
from £10 to £12 (for high anchor tasks).  In the two number search anchor types, the only 
difference was that the entries in the matrix were dimensionless numbers.  (Thus, for example, 
the ‘number’ 1.45 was shown instead of the ‘price’ £1.45.)  In the two active anchor types, 
the subject was asked to find the lowest price (or number) in the matrix and to type it into a 
blank space on the screen.  (If the response was incorrect, the subject was prompted to try 
again.)  This (or the corresponding) price then became the anchor value for the comparative 
question. 
The final row of Table 1.1 describes the no lab anchor control, which was faced by 
both subject groups. 
1.4.3.  The elicitation of WTA and WTP 
 The second part of each task began with a screen telling the subject ‘You are endowed 
with T and you have an opportunity to sell T’ (in the selling mode) or ‘You are endowed with 
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£12 and you have an opportunity to buy T’ (in the buying context).  Here T denotes the name 
of the trading commodity.  The subject was then asked to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to each of 25 
trading questions of the form ‘If I am offered £y for T, I will sell’ (in the selling mode) or ‘If 
the price of T is £y, I will buy’ (in the buying mode). The trading questions used 25 different 
prices: y = 0.01, 0.50, 1.00, 1.50, .... 12.00.  Thus, a subject’s responses to these questions 
located her WTA or WTP within a £0.50 band (or revealed that valuation to be less than 
£0.01 or greater than £12.00).4   
 Notice that this design elicits valuations by multiple binary choices rather than by a 
single open-ended question.  I used this elicitation method for three reasons.  First, ‘Would 
you pay £x for T?’ is cognitively simpler than ‘What is the highest price you would pay for 
T?’ and so less likely to induce confusion.  Second, the multiple binary choice format can be 
linked to the BDM mechanism by telling subjects that one binary choice will be selected at 
random to be ‘real’.  This presentation makes the incentive-compatibility of the mechanism 
more transparent than when valuations are open-ended.  Third, most retail transactions take 
place at take-it-or-leave-it prices; cases (such as sealed-bid auctions) in which consumers 
record open-ended valuations or bids are much rarer.  Thus, in the context of retail markets, 
the multiple binary choice format has greater external validity.  
As I noted in Section 2, there is some evidence that anchoring effects are weaker when 
valuations are elicited by binary choices.  One possible explanation is that the greater 
transparency of this method allows subjects to be more confident in their responses and so 
less susceptible to irrelevant cues.  An alternative explanation is compatible with the 
hypothesis of backward priming.  Binary choice questions require yes/no answers while 
                                                          
4 The software was designed so that the subject did not need to click ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to every question.  For 
example, in the selling mode, if a subject clicked ‘yes’ (respectively ‘no’) to an offer of x, ‘yes’ (‘no’) was 
automatically entered for every offer greater than (less than) x.  Thus only two clicks were needed to answer all 
25 questions.  This procedure prevented subjects from making inconsistent responses. 
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open-ended valuation questions require numerical answers.  Thus, numbers in memory are 
more likely to be accessed when subjects are dealing with open-ended questions. 
1.4.4  Trading and anchor commodities 
 Six different trading commodities were used in the experiment: a lottery which all the 
prizes were positive, which I called a ‘win-win gamble’; five National Lottery scratch cards; 
two bottles of Chinese sauce; a box of chocolates; a bath towel; and a luxury pen.  The win-
win gamble gave the prizes £15.53, £3.08 and £0.01 with probabilities 0.3, 0.5 and 0.2 
respectively; its expected value was £6.20.  The other commodities had market prices in the 
range from £4.50 to £5.10.  (Multiple items, such as five scratch cards, are treated as a single 
commodity.)  In the ‘similar good’ tasks, the corresponding anchor commodities were 
respectively: a different win-win gamble with approximately the same expected value; five 
National Lottery scratch cards of a different type; three bottles of Thai sauce; a box of a 
different type of chocolates produced by the same firm; five face cloths; and a different type 
of pen.  In the ‘dissimilar good’ tasks, the anchor commodity was an iTune coupon.  
1.4.5  Incentives 
 At the end of the experiment the computer picked one of the eleven tasks at random.  
If the anchor type of that task was not ‘incentivized’, the computer then picked one of the 25 
trading questions for that task.  What the subject took away from the experiment was 
determined by her response to that task.  In a selling task, if the subject had declared her 
willingness to sell the trading commodity at the £x price of the relevant trading question, she 
received £x; otherwise, she received the commodity.  In a buying task, if the subject had 
declared her willingness to buy at the £x price, she received the commodity and £(12 – x); 
otherwise, she received £12.  If the subject received a win-win gamble, it was resolved by the 
computer, using a random-number generator.  If the anchor type of the task picked was 
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‘incentivized’, the computer then randomly picked either the first or second part of that task.  
Depending on which part was picked, the subject’s earnings were determined either by her 
response to the comparative question or by her response to one of the 25 trading questions. 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1  Summary statistics and aggregated tests  
 The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social 
Science (CBESS) Laboratory at the University of East Anglia in Spring 2011.  Subjects were 
recruited using a campus-wide online system.  There were 228 subjects, 108 in the selling 
treatment and 120 in the buying treatment.  Most of the subjects were students, from a wide 
range of academic disciplines and with an age range from 19 to 47.  The experiment lasted 
around 45 minutes with an average payment of £10.73 per person, in addition to commodities 
that subjects took away from the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: WTA and WTP means and standard errors 
Note: 108 observations for WTA, 120 observations for WTP.   
Valuations are in £.   
Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
Table 1.2 reports means and standard errors of WTA and WTP, averaging over all 
anchor types and all commodities, broken down according to whether there was no lab 
anchor, a low value anchor or a high value anchor.5  In calculating standard errors, I treat 
                                                          
5 A subject’s WTA is recorded as the highest value of x at which she answered ‘Yes’ to the question asking if 
she would sell at the price £x.  A subject’s WTP is recorded as the lowest value of x at which she answered ‘No’ 
to the question asking if she would buy at the price £x.  If a subject was not willing to sell (was willing to buy) 
 No lab anchor 
 
Low anchor 
 
High anchor 
 
WTA 
 
5.01 
(0.31) 
4.91 
(0.23) 
5.43 
(0.25) 
WTP 
 
1.62 
(0.18) 
1.45 
(0.11) 
1.56 
(0.12) 
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subjects as the units of observation; for each subject, I observe the mean of WTA or WTP 
across the relevant tasks.  Recall that each subject reported five ‘low anchor’ and five ‘high 
anchor’ valuations, but only one ‘no lab anchor’ valuation.  Thus, there is more noise in the 
data for ‘no lab anchor’ data than in those for high or low anchors. 
In both selling and buying contexts, high-anchor valuations are greater than low-anchor 
valuations.  The relative (and still more, the absolute) magnitude of the anchoring effect is 
greater in the selling context, where high-anchor valuations are 11 per cent greater than low-
anchor valuations, than in the buying context, where the corresponding measure is 7 per cent.  
To test for the significance of these differences, I use Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, applied to 
‘observations’ as defined above.  (Throughout the chapter, all within-subject tests are of this 
type.  For between-subject comparisons I use Mann-Whitney tests.)  In both cases, the 
anchoring effect is significant (z = –5.28, p < 0.001 for WTA, z = –2.02,  p = 0.04 for WTP).   
In the selling context, mean low-anchor and high-anchor WTA (£4.91 and £5.43 
respectively) are well above the range of low anchor values (the highest of which was £2) and 
well below the range of high anchor values (the lowest of which was £10).  The implication is 
that, in general, WTA was pulled up by high anchors and/or pulled down by low anchors.  
This is consistent with the observation that the mean of ‘no lab anchor’ WTA (£5.01) lies 
between the high- and low-anchor means.  ‘No lab anchor’ WTA valuations are significantly 
less than high-anchor valuations (z = –2.13, p = 0.03), but not significantly different from 
low-anchor ones (z = –0.35, p = 0.73).  It should be borne in mind that my Wilcoxon tests are 
less powerful when comparisons involve ‘no lab anchor’ valuations, because of the greater 
noise in those data.  Nevertheless, my findings give some indication that the tendency for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
at the highest price of £12, her WTA (WTP) is recorded as £12.50.  In fact, there were only 7 (out of a possible 
1188) observations of WTA greater than £12.00, and no observations of WTP greater than £12.00.  If a subject 
was not willing to sell (was willing to buy) at the lowest price of £0.01, her WTA (WTP) is recorded as £0.00.  
Notice that, because of these conventions, our measures of WTA and WTP are not directly comparable.  (For 
example, a subject whose minimum selling price is £9.75 is recorded as having a WTA of £10, while a subject 
whose maximum buying price is £9.75 is recorded as having a WTP of £9.50.)  However, our focus is on the 
differential effects of low and high anchor values, holding the valuation mode constant.   
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WTA valuations to be pulled up by high anchors may be stronger than the tendency for them 
to be pulled down by low ones – an asymmetry that has also been observed for shaping 
effects, and that is consistent with bad-deal aversion (Isoni et al., 2011).   
 In the buying context, mean low-anchor and high-anchor WTP (£1.45 and £1.56) both 
lie within the range of low anchor values, implying that there was little scope for WTP to be 
pulled down by low anchors, and hence that the observed anchoring effect was primarily due 
to the effect of high anchors.  ‘No lab anchor’ WTP valuations are not significantly different 
either from high-anchor valuations (z = –0.48, p = 0.64) or from low-anchor ones (z = –0.007, 
p = 0.995)  In the light of these high p-values, the apparently surprising observation that ‘no 
lab anchor’ valuations have a higher mean (£1.62) than high-anchor valuations may 
reasonably be attributed to sampling error. 
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Table 1.3: WTA and WTP means and standard errors by commodity 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 WTA  WTP  
Commodity Low anchor 
(90 observations) 
High anchor 
(90 observations) 
Low anchor 
(100 observations) 
High anchor 
(100 observations) 
Win-win gamble 
 
5.91 
(0.31) 
6.30 
(0.34) 
2.15 
(0.22) 
2.22 
(0.21) 
Two bottles of Chinese 
sauce 
3.82 
(0.30) 
4.51 
(0.34) 
0.82 
(0.11) 
0.98 
(0.12) 
Box of chocolate 5.56 
(0.31) 
6.19 
(0.32) 
1.58 
(0.14) 
1.76 
(0.16) 
Towel 4.84 
(0.30) 
5.24 
(0.31) 
1.57 
(0.19) 
1.61 
(0.20) 
Pen 3.37 
(0.31) 
3.95 
(0.35) 
0.54 
(0.08) 
0.58 
(0.10) 
Five National Lottery 
scratch cards 
5.96 
(0.34) 
6.41 
(0.35) 
2.04 
(0.21) 
2.19 
(0.23) 
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Figure 1.1 Willingness to accept (WTA) and to pay (WTP) for different commodity 
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 Table 1.3 reports mean WTA and WTP valuations for high and low anchors, broken 
down by commodity but aggregated across anchor types.  (I do not report ‘no lab anchor’ 
valuations at this level of disaggregation because sample sizes are small.  For each 
commodity, there are only 18 observations of ‘no lab anchor’ WTA and only 20 of ‘no lab 
anchor’ WTP.) 
Standard errors are calculated using subjects as units of observation.  For each 
commodity and for each valuation mode, the high-anchor mean is greater than the low-anchor 
mean, suggesting that anchoring effects are robust across different commodities. 
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Table 1.4: WTA and WTP means and standard errors by anchor type 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
 WTA WTP 
Anchor type  Low anchor  High anchor  Low anchor  High anchor 
Group A Group B  Group A Group B  Group A Group B  Group A Group B 
Baseline 
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) 
4.61 
(0.45) 
4.98 
(0.41) 
 5.42 
(0.50) 
5.58 
(0.44) 
 1.64 
(0.22) 
1.34 
(0.23) 
 1.68 
(0.23) 
1.54 
(0.25) 
Implausible price 
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) 
5.29 
(0.40) 
  5.55 
(0.43) 
  1.48 
( 0.28) 
  1.58 
(0.29) 
 
Similar good  
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) 
4.74 
(0.41) 
  4.94 
(0.43) 
  1.50 
(0.25) 
  1.56 
( 0.22) 
 
Dissimilar good  
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) 
 4.81 
(0.45) 
  4.76 
(0.48) 
  1.14 
(0.18) 
  1.27 
( 0.20) 
Incentivized 
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) 
 4.86 
(0.46) 
  5.51 
(0.49) 
  1.39 
( 0.17) 
  1.57 
(0.20) 
Passive number search  
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) 
4.78 
(0.38) 
  5.67 
(0.42) 
  1.43 
(0.24) 
  1.54 
(0.26) 
 
Passive price search  
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) 
 4.94 
(0.42) 
  5.48 
(0.44) 
  1.21 
( 0.16) 
  1.44 
(0.22) 
Active number search  
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) 
 5.26 
(0.46) 
  5.93 
(0.47) 
  1.90 
( 0.34) 
  1.81 
(0.30) 
Active price search  
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) 
4.83 
(0.41) 
  5.48 
(0.40) 
  1.47   
( 0.20) 
  1.57 
(0.22) 
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Figure 1.2 Willingness to accept (WTA) and to pay (WTP) for different anchor types 
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Table 1.4 reports mean WTA and WTP valuations for high and low anchors, broken 
down by anchor type but aggregated across commodities.  Again, standard errors are 
calculated at the subject level.  Figure 1.1 shows box plots of WTA and WTP, using the same 
disaggregations.  In the selling context, mean high-anchor WTA is higher than mean low-
anchor WTA for eight of the nine anchor types (the exception being ‘dissimilar good’).  In 
the buying context, mean high-anchor WTP is higher than mean low-anchor WTP for eight of 
the nine anchor types (the exception being ‘active number search’).   
Unsurprisingly, WTA is consistently higher than WTP.  Averaging over all 
commodities, all anchor types and all anchor values, WTA is £5.16 and WTP is £1.51.  In 
interpreting these data, I must allow for the fact that £0.50 of the difference between my 
WTA and WTP measures is attributable to my elicitation procedure and accounting 
conventions (see footnote 2).  However, after the measures have been made comparable by 
subtracting £0.25 from WTA and adding £0.25 to WTP, the ratio of WTA to WTP is 2.8, and 
the difference between the two is strongly significant (z = 10.30, p < 0.001).  This finding 
agrees with many previous findings of WTA–WTP disparities (e.g. Coursey, Hovis, & 
Schulze, 1987; Horowitz and McConnell, 2002).  
1.5.2  Regression analysis 
 Table 1.5 reports how valuations are affected by each commodity when regressions 
are run to verify their effects.6  In each regression equation, the commodity is fixed and the 
dependent variable is either WTA or WTP.  Each of the reported coefficients is the key 
coefficient for an ‘anchor value’ dummy variable (equal to 1 when the anchor value is high 
and 0 when it is low) in a regression that also contained a period variable (between 1 and 11) 
to pick up any trends in responses over the course of the experiment.   
                                                          
6 The appendix C contains the full regression results. 
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Table 1.5: Commodity Coefficients in Regressions on WTA and WTP 
Note:  Each coefficient is the ‘anchor type’ dummy coefficient in a regression controlling also for period.  Each 
dummy is equal to 1 when there is a high anchor, 0 with a low anchor.  Numbers in brackets are standard errors.  
Clusters or random effects control for non-independence of observations at the subject level.  * = p<0.1, ** =  
p<0.05 and *** = p<0.01. 
 
The results reported in the first two columns of Table 1.5 control for the potential 
non-independence of observations at the subject level by employing OLS regressions with 
error clustering.  The results of using an alternative method of control, that of random effects 
regressions, are reported in the third and fourth columns.7  The results of the two sets of 
regressions are very similar.  In the rest of this section, I will refer to the OLS results.   
In the selling context, participants were affected by anchoring effects in most 
commodities.  There is no evidence showing that subjects’ WTA can be affected by 
anchoring when the trading commodity is a Win-win gamble. However, in the buying context, 
the anchoring effects are relatively weaker.  That said, I still have strong evidence that 
participants can be affected by anchoring effects in relation to two bottles of Chinese sauce, 
                                                          
7 As a further robustness check, to allow for the truncation of reported valuations at £12, we also used Tobit 
regressions with cluster with the upper bound £12.  Unsurprisingly, given the very small number of valuations 
above this bound (see footnote 2), the results of these regressions are in line with the others.  
 OLS with error clustering  Random effects 
Commodity WTA WTP WTA WTP 
Win-win gamble 
(WTA 180 observations; WTP 200 observations) 
0.384  
(.239) 
0.099 
(.117) 
0.392 
(.238) 
0.096 
(.121) 
Two bottles of Chinese sauce 
(WTA 180 observations; WTP 200 observations) 
0.596*** 
(.206) 
0.163*** 
(.055) 
0.625*** 
(.205) 
0.161*** 
(.054) 
Box of chocolate   
(WTA 180 observations; WTP 200 observations) 
0.607*** 
(.190) 
0.157* 
(.084) 
0.663*** 
(.171) 
0.141 
(.087) 
Towel 
(WTA 180 observations; WTP 200 observations) 
0.402** 
(.161) 
0.037 
(.071) 
0.400** 
(.159) 
0.044 
(.070) 
Pen 
(WTA 180 observations; WTP 200 observations) 
0.494** 
(.216) 
0.045 
(.054) 
0.563*** 
(.196) 
0.044 
(.054) 
Five National Lottery scratch cards   
(WTA 180 observations; WTP 200 observations) 
0.445* 
(.262) 
 0.170* 
(.092) 
0.434* 
(.260) 
0.158* 
(.083) 
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and mild evidence that they can be affected by anchoring effects in relation to five national 
lottery cards. 
Result 1:  Anchors are less effective in the buying context than in the selling context.  
In the selling context, participants’ WTA can be affected by anchoring effects in relation to 
most goods.  In the buying context, anchors have different anchoring effects on participants 
WTP when trading commodities are different.   
Table 1.6 reports how valuations are affected by each anchor type when regressions 
are run to verify their effects.8  In each regression equation, the commodity is fixed. The 
dependent variables and independent variables are the same as the regression equations used 
in Table 1.5, except that I also controlled for the commodity type.  There was no significant 
trend in any of the WTA regressions.  In a few of the WTP regressions, there was a 
significant downward trend in valuations.  I tried adding a variable to pick up interaction 
between ‘anchor value’ and ‘period’, but this was not significant for either WTA or WTP.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Appendix C contains the full regression results. 
34 
 
 
Table 1.6: Anchor Type Coefficients in Regressions on WTA and WTP 
Note: Each coefficient is the ‘anchor type’ dummy coefficient in a regression controlling also for period and 
commodity type.  Each dummy is equal to 1 when there is a high anchor, 0 with a low anchor.  Numbers in 
brackets are standard errors.  Clusters or random effects control for non-independence of observations at the 
subject level.  * = p<0.1, ** =  p<0.05 and *** = p<0.01. 
 
In the selling context, there is clear evidence of an anchoring effect for the baseline 
anchor (t = 4.24, p < 0.001).  Using the high anchor value rather than the low one increases 
WTA by £0.76 (approximately 15 per cent of the overall mean WTA).  As explained in 
Section 4.2, five of the anchor types can be interpreted as adding some additional element of 
engagement to the baseline task.  The anchoring effect is statistically significant at least at the 
10 per cent level in all of these cases (‘incentivized’ t = 2.31, p = 0.03; ‘passive number 
search’ t = 4.74, p < 0.001; ‘passive price search’ t = 1.74, p = 0.09; ‘active number search’ t 
= 2.83, p = 0.01; ‘active price search’ t = 2.57,  p = 0.01).  However, there is no evidence that 
engagement systematically increases (or decreases) the size of the anchoring effect relative to 
the baseline case.  There is no significant anchoring effect when anchor values are 
implausible, or when the anchor commodity is not the same as the trading commodity. 
 OLS with error clustering  Random effects 
Anchor type WTA WTP WTA WTP 
Baseline 
(WTA 216 observations; WTP 240 observations) 
0.764***   
(.180) 
0.078  
(.067) 
0.675*** 
(.176) 
0.093  
(.067) 
Implausible price 
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) 
0.284  
(.283) 
0.073  
(.081) 
0.292 
(.275) 
0.090  
(.081) 
Similar good  
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) 
0.188  
(.326) 
0.050  
(.103) 
0.231 
(.308) 
0.070  
(.092) 
Dissimilar good 
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) 
-0.048  
(.290) 
0.129  
(.080) 
-0.048  
(.283) 
0.126*  
(.072) 
Incentivized 
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) 
0.685** 
(.297) 
0.163 
(.113) 
0.676** 
(.288) 
0.188* 
(.107) 
Passive number search  
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) 
0.933***  
(.197) 
0.058 
(.095) 
0.916*** 
(.179) 
0.092 
(.085) 
Passive price search  
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) 
0.590* 
(.340) 
0.253* 
(.142) 
0.577* 
(.341) 
0.257* 
(.135) 
Active number search 
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) 
0.711 ***  
(.251) 
0.000 
(.185) 
0.647*** 
(.242) 
0.007 
(.184) 
Active price search  
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) 
0.745** 
(.290) 
0.187** 
(.086) 
0.721*** 
(.257) 
0.150** 
(.075) 
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Result 2:  In the selling context, anchors are effective in distorting behaviour if and 
only if the anchor takes the form of a plausible price for the trading commodity. 
In the buying context, there is no significant anchoring effect in the baseline case.  
Given this result, it is unsurprising that there is also no significant effect when anchor values 
are implausible or when the anchor and trading commodities are different.  The only anchor 
type that is significant at the 5 per cent level is ‘active price search’ (t = 2.18, p = 0.03).  In 
this case, using the high anchor value rather than the low one increases WTP by £0.19 
(approximately 12 per cent of the overall mean WTP).  ‘Passive price search’ is significant at 
the 10 per cent level (t = 1.79, p = 0.08).  One possible interpretation of these results is that 
there are anchoring effects for WTP when the degree of engagement with anchor values is 
sufficiently great.  An alternative interpretation is that the crucial property of ‘price search’ is 
not so much engagement by the subject in the construction of the anchor, as that the anchor 
value is framed as the lowest of an array of prices.  Since ‘lowest’ is a salient feature of price 
for buyers, this framing draws attention to the anchor value as a price, and so is particularly 
likely to prime conversational norms and/or bad-deal aversion.  But however one interprets 
the significant coefficient for ‘active price search’, it is clear that anchoring effects are 
weaker for WTP than for WTA. 
Result 3: There is some evidence that, in the buying context, anchoring effects occur 
when subjects are engaged with the construction of the anchor value and when that value is 
framed as a price of the trading commodity.  
1.6  Discussion and Conclusion 
 I conclude that anchoring effects can affect individual behaviour in incentivized tasks 
involving familiar consumer goods, but that not all anchors are effective.   
 For some readers, the most striking feature of my results may be that the anchoring 
effects I find are relatively small.  They are much smaller, for example, than those reported 
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by Ariely et al. (2003); and, as a glance at Figure 1.1 shows, valuation disparities due to 
anchoring are far smaller than disparities between WTA and WTP.  In this respect, however, 
my results are not outliers: as noted in Section 1, several comparable studies have found 
anchoring effects to be small or even non-existent.   But it should be remembered that my 
experiment was designed to allow controlled investigations of the relative effectiveness of 
different types of anchor and of the relative effectiveness of anchors in selling and buying 
contexts – not of the absolute effectiveness of anchors in general.  In my experiment, each 
subject faced eleven tasks, each with its own set of trading questions and its own anchor.  It 
would not be surprising if this feature of my design had some tendency to dampen the 
specific effects of individual anchors.  Further, as explained in Section 1.2, my method of 
eliciting valuations through binary choices is likely to induce weaker anchoring effects than 
the more usual (but, I have argued, less externally valid) method of open-ended questions.  
But these considerations do not affect the validity of comparisons across anchor types and 
across valuation modes. 
 The sharpest result of my experiment is that anchoring effects are stronger in the 
context of selling than in the context of buying.  This result is consistent with the tentative 
finding of Fudenberg et al. (2011).  One important implication of this result is that 
experiments that study anchoring effects in selling contexts are likely to overstate the 
significance of such effects in retail markets.   
A second general finding is that anchoring effects are strongest when the anchor value 
is framed as a plausible price for the good for which the individual is a potential buyer or 
seller.  In an incentivized design investigating trading decisions about familiar consumer 
products, I found no evidence of the ‘basic’ anchoring effects that have been observed for 
various kinds of non-economic judgements, and only weak evidence that the strength of 
anchoring effects is influenced by the extent of individuals’ engagement with the process by 
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which arbitrary anchor values are constructed.  This suggests that, in economic contexts, 
anchoring effects work primarily by suggesting that the (plausible) prices that are presented 
as anchors are in some way reasonable or normal, despite their arbitrariness.  The implication 
is that consumers’ preferences are somewhat less labile than the psychological literature 
might suggest.  Nevertheless, that still leaves plenty of scope for firms to try to manipulate 
consumers’ perceptions of reasonable prices.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Chapter 2 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This Chapter presents a set of three experiments trying to identify whether, in markets 
for services, consumers are likely to stick to defaults and achieve suboptimal outcomes, why 
they do this and what can be done about it.  In order for consumers to reap benefits from 
competition, they have to be actively engaged in spotting the best deal that is available to 
them.  This is true both in the tautological sense that they are worse off if they go for a 
suboptimal choice and in the less obvious sense that firms may be under less competitive 
pressure if they do so (Giulietti et al., 2005).  It is a stylized fact however that, in a number of 
services markets where choice is possible, consumers do not switch service providers even 
though the tariffs they are holding are suboptimal (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; OFT, 2008; DG 
Sanco, 2010; Lunn, 2011); furthermore, when choices are made, there is a question mark 
about whether they are necessarily optimal (Joskow, 2008; Wilson and Waddams Price, 
2010).  Relevant services markets include both ones that have always been in the hands of the 
private sector, such as bank account, mobile telephony and internet services, and ones that 
have been opened up to competition in many countries, such as consumer electricity and gas 
services, fixed telephony and multichannel TV services. 9   Market models that have 
introduced these and other deterrents to change supplier by postulating switching costs have 
shown the distortions that this produces for competition, for example in terms of market entry 
and prices (e.g., Klemperer, 1995; NERA, 2003).   
Undoubtedly, financial switching costs can act as a partial deterrent to changing 
services supplier in some cases.  Identifying the role of different kinds of switching costs can 
be hard with field data, though important attempts have been made with survey data (Wilson 
                                                          
9 Vulnerable consumers (older, less educated and more disadvantaged consumers) are likely to be especially 
affected (see DG Sanco, 2009, for some across Europe evidence). 
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and Waddams Price, 2010) and very little switching, compared to the savings opportunities 
available, is observed even in markets, such as the U.K. retail electricity and gas markets, 
where financial switching costs are minimal.  Attempts have been made to use survey data to 
infer non-financial reasons for not switching: the role of complexity in the tariffs employed 
and in the number of the tariffs employed has been highlighted (e.g., Lambrecht and Skiera, 
2006; OFT, 2008; Garrod et al., 2009; DG Sanco, 2009; Lunn, 2011) and driven policy 
recommendations (e.g., Joskow, 2008; Xavier and Ypsilanti, 2008; Ofgem, 2009, 2011; 
Independent Commission on Banking, 2011).  For example, it has been brought as a good 
reason for why the drive for liberalization of consumer energy markets has halted in USA 
(Joskow, 2008) and for envisaging requiring tariffs to be simpler in the UK (Ofgem, 2011).  
Carlin (2009), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Spiegler (2006) and Ellison and Ellison (2009) 
provide models explaining how complexity and confusion inducing strategies may be 
desirable for firms.   
The potential role of inattention in explaining suboptimal consumer outcomes has 
been mentioned, but is, in comparison, somewhat understated.10  Yet, I suspect that, as with 
the inattentive agents of Sims (2003) and Reis (2006), although perhaps not necessarily due 
to a rational allocation of cognitive effort, real life time constrained consumers may simply 
not pay attention to tasks regarding the choices of services.  Putting it simply, it may not be in 
their minds in the way in which saving 20 cents at a supermarket buying groceries is.11  A 
key contribution of this chapter is to build on this intuition.   
                                                          
10 Using survey data, Giuletti and Waddams Price (2005) claimed lack of awareness did not play a big role in 
lack of switching in U.K. energy markets, whereas, using more recent survey data, Wilson and Waddams Price 
(2010) could not reject that it did, though their evidence is not unequivocal on what did. Oftel (2000) noted 
inertia/lack of interest and lack of awareness of alternatives as two out of four reasons for not switching supplier 
in a survey on the telecoms market. 
11 As supermarket shopping becomes increasingly an online shopping experience with default consumer baskets 
from previous purchases, supermarket shopping might arguably itself become more sensitive to inattention 
problems.  There are a number of other models of economic behaviour incorporating inattention, such as Hong 
and Stein (1999), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Gabaix (2011) and Woodford (2012); Della Vigna (2009) 
contains a review of some of the implications. The usual interpretation of inattention is in terms of lack of 
consideration of some features of a product.  Inattention could however be in relation to a whole task.   
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While survey data are insightful and important as they directly refer to real life 
choices, when it comes to understand the psychological motivations behind behavioural 
choices, they obviously suffer from potential limitations12 such a difficulty to draw clear 
conclusions because of a range of alternative and undeclared factors,13  forgetfulness and 
selectivity in recall,14 the unconscious nature of many of the choices that people make,15 
and/or the need to self-justify past choices towards those conducting the survey or indeed to 
engage in self-deception to rationalize possibly suboptimal choices that one has done in the 
past.16  A specific problem lies with the fact that, if a significant part of the suboptimality of 
consumer behaviour is because consumers do not pay attention, drawing attention of survey 
responders to issues they have not thought themselves of before may not be the best way to 
identify the extent to which inattention is a problem, as ex post rationalizations may then be 
unavoidable and survey responses may underestimate the role of inattention.  A further 
problem is that it is difficult to see in most surveys whether, as suggested in the context of the 
number of binary lotteries and of available US 401(k) retirement plans by Iyengar and 
Kamenica (2010), and more broadly by Beshears et al. (2008), it is the case that complexity 
may interact with a status quo bias, in the sense that consumers may be less likely to want to 
take a decision if faced with a more complex decision problem.  More seriously, unless 
                                                          
12 Different studies are obviously affected by specific limitations to different degrees, depending on how the 
surveys are devised. 
13 For example, Coombs and Shaharudin (2011) criticize survey studies on the suboptimality of banking services 
supplier choices because of their inability to control for enough alternative explanations. A key reason is that 
surveys simply do not control enough for the possibility that, given their preferences, consumers may be getting 
a good deal. In a contingent valuation study with US survey data on electricity supply, Hartman et al. (1991) 
find a significant status quo bias in terms of stated valuations. 
14 Li (2013) reviews evidence on selectivity in memory recall and presents an experiment this taking place 
significantly within just six weeks, if in a different setup. 
15 That there is a split between conscious, explicit knowledge and subconscious, implicit knowledge is a well 
known stylized fact in psychology (e.g., Shanks and St. John, 1994).  Sub-thalamic brain activity takes place 
when subjects stick with the default, whereas heightened pre-frontal activity takes place when such default is 
overridden (Fleming et al., 2010), suggesting that, whereas rejecting the default may require a conscious effort, 
sticking with the default does not. Zizzo (2003) show a dissociation between learning to provide optimal verbal 
responses and learning to make the optimal behavioural choices. 
16 Psychologists label the tendency for survey responders to provide the responses that they see as putting them 
in as good light as possible with the researchers the social desirability bias (e.g., Crowne and Marlowe, 1960; 
Stober, 2001), which can be connected to the desire to receive respect (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007) 
and both self-image and self-deception as two dimensions of it (Paulhus, 1984). 
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natural experiments are possible or ex ante and ex post surveys have been done when 
structural policy breaks have taken place, it is difficult to test the effects of policy changes 
with field data.  
My chapter addresses these issues by using an experimental methodology.  My first 
goal is to verify whether, in the absence of financial switching costs and using the stylized 
environment of the U.K. electricity and gas markets as a benchmark, I can identify a lack of 
switching and suboptimal outcomes when switching does take place.17  The second goal is to 
get a better understanding of why suboptimal outcomes take place.  I test the role of 
complexity, which I decompose as complexity in the relationship between prices and quantity 
(linear vs. non-linear tariffs), in the presence or absence of bundling (single product vs. dual 
products tariffs), and in the number of tariffs.18  I also test the role of consumer inattention by 
suitably developing a methodology used by Lei et al. (2001) based on the presence of an 
alternative task, and I consider two possible alternative tasks across different treatments.   
Learning why suboptimal choices take place helps me achieve the third goal, which is 
to test the effectiveness of policies designed to improve consumer outcomes.  I am able to 
evaluate policies putting limits on the number and type of tariffs such as the regulatory 
constraints on complex tariffs recently proposed by the UK regulator Ofgem (2011).  I also 
test two nudge manipulations that may help outcomes without reducing the consumer’s 
freedom to choose.  The first is a simple awareness raising manipulation by which subjects 
are advised of the existence of a better tariff when they have made a suboptimal choice.  This 
                                                          
17 Cason et al. (2003) describes a market experiment considering the implications of financial switching costs 
for market structure.  Our experiment does not have financial switching costs but rather lets insufficient 
switching emerge endogenously from consumer decisions (or failures to decide). 
18 Kalayci and Potters (2011) have an interesting experiment where sellers choose product complexity, in terms 
of number of attributes of an abstract product, and find some evidence of consumer exploitability, though 
subject to consumers having to make decisions within 15 seconds; in an experiment again on product 
complexity (with products modeled as abstract lotteries) but no time constraints, Sitzia and Zizzo (2011) find 
some qualified (though only qualified) evidence of consumer exploitability.  Unlike these experiments, we 
consider tariff complexity, number of tariffs and product bundling, and we employ tariffs mapped up from a real 
world markets.  Also, in treatments with time constraints subjects do have anyway plenty of time to decide (2 
minutes), as verified against a control treatment without such time constraint. 
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can be connected to Ofgem’s (2012) consideration to trial out a ‘market cheapest deal’ 
warning scheme, by which companies would be required warn consumers of the existence of 
a better deal in the market.   
The second turns the power of defaults on its head by making it work to achieve better 
rather than worse consumer outcomes: a ‘smart nudge’ is employed which automatically 
identifies the best tariff and uses this as the default choice.  This may be connected to the U.K. 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s recent suggestion of forcing energy companies to offer the 
cheapest of their tariffs (BBC, 2012a; Waddams, 2012), but, while these proposals are 
company specific, my nudge would work in terms of the best tariff in the market as opposed 
to by a specific company.19   
My key finding is that tariff complexity and the number of tariffs matter, but that 
inattention matters as well.  Regulatory measures to reduce complexity are likely, therefore, 
to be of only partial value.  By using smart nudges and making the power of default work for 
instead against consumer welfare, I can obtain optimal outcomes around 85% of the times.20   
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides some background 
on the specific markets that my experiments use as model and on the existing evidence on 
insufficient switching and suboptimal choices.  Section 3 describes some common features of 
the experiment.  Sections 4, 5 and 6 are on Experiment 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  Section 7 
provides a discussion and section 8 concludes.   
2.2  The Institutional Background 
The institutional setup on which I model my experiments primarily is the UK 
electricity and gas markets.  These are mature markets which have been liberalized since 
1996-1999 and which are comparatively simple in terms of the product they offer (energy).  
                                                          
19 The relationship between our proposal and David Cameron’s suggestion will be discussed further in Section 7. 
20 A growing literature is emerging testing and discussing nudging and optimal defaults in a number of other 
contexts: they include among others Choi et al. (2003), Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008), Carroll et al. (2009), 
O’Neill (2007), Kooreman and Prast (2010), Beshears et al. (2013) and Downs et al. (2009). 
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They are also comparatively transparent markets with a wide availability of online search and 
switching websites.21  These websites enable both the identification of the best tariffs for any 
given level of consumption and easy switching of service provider at the click of a mouse. 
One element of complication is that tariffs can be either for electricity only, or for gas only, 
or they can be dual tariffs bundling together both electricity and gas; my experiment will 
focus on electricity only and dual tariffs.22  As a further complication, the number of tariffs in 
the market is large: as an illustration, when I collected data for my experiment, I found as 
many as 72 electricity and 80 dual tariffs in the London, UK, energy market using an online 
website.23 70% of consumers found the number of available tariffs confusing in a UK Ofgem 
regulator survey (Ofgem, 2008).   
Consumers tend to stick to their status quo in terms of energy supplier (NERA, 2003; 
Ofgem, 2009, 2011; Behavioural Insights Team, 2011): this acts as their default choice. For 
example, only 18% of all respondents to an Ofgem consumer survey switched electricity 
supplier in 2009, and only 17% switched gas supplier (Ofgem, 2010).  While 2009 was a year 
where average prices fell slightly (by 6%), even in a year such as 2008 where average prices 
went up considerably (by 37%) and so one would have imagined a push to shop around for 
better deals, only 19% and 20% of gas and electricity customers respectively switched 
supplier (Ofgem, 2010). In a recent U.K. energy market survey, DECC (2012) reports that 
only 5% of consumers planned to switch in the next 12 months with just 26% of consumers 
treating switching as a possibility.  While internet penetration and so the access to search and 
switching engines has increased with time, Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) reported fairly 
comparable switching figures of just 22% from domestic and small commercial figures in 
2002/2003.  
                                                          
21  Examples include http://www.which.co.uk/switch/, http://www.uswitch.com/, http://www.gocompare.com/ 
gas-and-electricity/ and http://www.confused.com/gas-electricity.  
22 A positive correlation between switching electricity and gas has been found (Giuletti et al., 2005). 
23 Ofgem (2012) contains estimates, as do earlier Ofgem retail market reviews. 
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Furthermore, when switching takes place, the best (cheapest) tariff is often not chosen. 
Using data from 2005 and 2000 surveys, Wilson and Waddams Price (2010) estimated that 
only 8 to 20% of consumers opted for the best tariff given their annual consumption levels.  
Only around 2/3 of consumers stated that they felt they got a better deal by switching 
suppliers in 2008 and 2009 (Ofgem, 2010).   
While I model key stylized features from the UK electricity and gas markets, I believe 
that the key issues that I identify and help address are more general. Joskow (2008) discusses 
the US experience with electricity market liberalization where again there is evidence of 
consumers failing to switch suppliers with the assumption of the consumers’ ability “to shop 
intelligently” being called into question (pp. 34-35) and being one source of the apparent 
failure of US consumers to reap much benefits from liberalization. Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) 
report and discuss limited consumer switching in all EU countries where switching is 
possible, with the UK actually being the lead with its 22%, and Nunez (2011) notes the 
failure of ensuring effective competition due to, among other things, the lack of transparency 
and problems with price setting.  An EU DG Sanco study found that electricity switching 
rates are above 10% in only seven EU countries, with just 32% of EU consumers having 
compared offers from different suppliers and with average savings to be obtained € 100 per 
year (DG Sanco, 2010).   
Going beyond the energy sector, other services sectors have similar recognized 
stylized features: the existence of a default option, the potential complexity of the associated 
tariffs and costs, the limited switching and a significant likelihood of suboptimal switching.  
Ofcom (2009) reports switching rates roughly equivalent or lower than for electricity and gas 
in relation to bank account, internet, fixed and mobile telephony services, and multichannel 
TV services. In a study on bank users, OFT (2008) found that 47% of surveyed consumers 
had not even considered switching bank account. International evidence on limited switching 
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in telecommunications services is discussed by Xavier and Ypsilanti (2008) and Lunn (2011).  
This is notwithstanding the fact that online search engines may also be available for such 
services.24   
2.3  Experimental Design: Some Common Features 
The experiments were run at the University of East Anglia in 2011 and 2012.  Before 
the beginning of the experiment, subjects had to read instructions and complete a 
questionnaire with the purpose of checking they had understood what the tasks involved.  If 
they had any doubts they could ask for clarification.  Once questionnaires were collected and 
doubts clarified the experiment started.  All experiments involved individual choices where 
subjects had repeated opportunities to choose among a set of tariffs.  The experimental 
instructions and details on all tariff tasks are in the appendix D.   
The tariffs.  In February 2011, I collected all the electricity and gas tariffs available in 
the UK market as available to a London consumer using the “Which?” website.  The tariffs 
ranged from simple ones with one tier (i.e., a single marginal price) to more complicated ones 
with two tiers and a ceiling (i.e. a marginal price and, once consumption exceeds a ceiling, a 
second and lower marginal prices) or a standing charge and one tier (i.e. a fixed price plus a 
single marginal price).  The tariffs in my experiment were partly real tariffs collected in this 
way and partly derived by me using the same structure as the real ones (derived tariffs in 
what follows).  The process of selection and derivation of all tariffs, as well as the full list, is 
described in detail in the appendix E. I employed 144 tariffs.  Two thirds of the tariffs were 
real and one third was derived. The real tariffs were half for a single service (these are 
electricity tariffs) and the other half were dual tariffs (both gas and electricity).  The derived 
                                                          
24 For example, in relation to internet services, http://broadband-comparison.net/ is a price comparator for USA, 
http://www.comparebroadband.com.au/ is one for Australia and http://www.uswitch.com/broadband/ is one for 
the UK.  
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tariffs were all dual ones.  Subjects were only told that the tariffs related either to one good or 
to two goods (labeled as good A and good B). Table 2.1 shows a sample of tariffs used.   
 
Table 2.1:  Sample of Tariffs 
 
The tariff tasks.  The tasks were 36 overall.  At the beginning of each task, in most 
treatments, subjects were assigned a default tariff, the details of which will be discussed later.  
They could either stick to the default or look at other available tariffs and then decide which 
one they wanted.  After choosing the tariff, they selected how much they wanted to consume 
out of 5 possible consumption levels: 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 and 5000.25 
The consumption level determined the revenue while the cost depended on the tariff 
chosen and amount consumed.  The revenue was maximized when the optimal consumption 
level was 4000.26  After subjects chose their consumption, they were told their earnings, 
which was determined as revenue minus cost.  At the end of the experiment, one of the 36 
tasks was chosen randomly and subjects were paid according to the choice made in that 
task.27  Average earnings were around 20 pounds. 
                                                          
25 Actual consumers of course do not have pre-defined possible levels of consumption.  By having only 5 levels, 
we wished to keep things as simple as possible in this part of the experiment, however, bearing in mind that 
actual consumers do have past consumption as a guide to future consumption, and so the level of consumption is 
not that much of an issue.  
26 The average yearly household electricity consumption in the UK is around 4000 kwh.  The gas consumption 
is approximately 4 times this amount; in the experiment, we scaled this down by a factor of 4 for simplicity. 
27 In all treatments, subjects could use a calculator on the computer screen to help them with their choices of 
tariffs and consumption levels.  The calculator had 4 boxes for inputting consumption levels and the values of 
tier 1, tier 2, ceiling and standing charge of the tariff they wanted to check the cost of. 
  Good A Good B 
Tariff 
Standing 
charge 
Tier 1 Ceiling Tier 2 
Standing 
charge 
Tier 1  Ceiling Tier 2 
1 - 16.259 - - - - - - 
2 - 19.467 728 8.432 - - - - 
3 12.957 12.128 - - - - - - 
4 - 13.398 - -   4.516     
5 - 19.992 900 12.19 
 
5.878 670 5.521 
6 13.23 12.338 - - 9.569 7.269     
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The default tariff.  The default tariff was always a derived tariff designed in such a 
way that it was never the best to maximize earnings (except in two treatments, discussed 
later).  The difference between the default tariff and the best tariff was usually at least around 
6 pounds.  
Nature of the tariffs employed in each task.  The order of the 36 tasks was 
randomized.  Half of them involved 4 tariffs and the other half 24. For both sets of tasks, 1/3 
of the tariffs were single tariffs (all real), 1/3 real dual ones and 1/3 derived dual ones.  For 
each of this subset of tasks, 2 tasks involved a choice among all simple tariffs (only one tier), 
2 tasks a choice among all complex tariffs (two tiers plus ceiling, or standing charge plus one 
tier), and 4 tasks a choice among a mix of tariffs, with half of the tariffs being simple and the 
other half complex.28 
2.4  Experiment 1 – Product Complexity 
Experiment 1 tests for the effect of complexity – in terms of tariff complexity, number 
of tariffs and bundled nature of products - on consumer outcomes.  It also acts as a control for 
key features present in the other experiments: specifically, the effect of having a search 
engine, of having two minutes to make a decision and of having a default tariff as I have 
implemented it. It has 5 treatments (DE, mDE, D, DF and F). Figure 2.1 shows the 
relationships between these treatments and those in the other experiments. 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 These four tasks differed depending on the combination of default tariff (simple or complex) and best tariff 
(again, simple or complex). 
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Figure 2.1: Map of Experimental Treatments 
 
2.4.1 The Treatments 
Treatment DE (Default tariff and search Engine). This treatment had a default tariff 
and a search engine. In each task subjects were shown the default tariff in a first screen; from 
this screen subjects could either stick to the default tariff or go to a second screen where they 
could see all the tariffs involved with the default tariff highlighted (see Figure 2.2).   
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Figure 2.2: The Tariff Task in Treatment DE (screenshot) 
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For each task, if subjects did not make a choice within two minutes, they were 
assigned the default tariff.29  When deciding the tariff to select, subjects could use a search 
engine, which was a stylized version of internet search engines: subjects provided the default 
tariff details and a consumption level; the search engine then gave the entire list of tariffs 
with the difference in earnings relative to the default tariff.   
Treatment mDE (minimal Default tariff and search Engine).  This treatment also had 
the search engine, but the default tariff was implemented more mildly.  Specifically, there 
was no first screen with just the default tariff; rather, in each task I simply showed subjects 
the screen with all tariffs, with the default one highlighted.   
Treatment D (Default tariff).  This is the same as treatment DE but does not 
implement a search engine.  It therefore allows me to control for the effect of having a search 
engine. 
Treatment DF (Default tariff and Forced choice).  This treatment is the same as 
treatment D but removes another feature of the market services: namely, the idea that, if you 
do not make a decision, you are simply stuck with the default.  In the previous treatments 
subjects that did not make a choice within 2 minutes would stick automatically to the default.  
Treatment DF does not allow for this: subjects do not go ahead until they choose a tariff.   
Treatment F (Forced choice).  This treatment makes a final step relative to the DF 
treatment: unlike the DF treatment, there is no default tariff.   
2.4.2 Results 
2.4.2.1 Overview 
Subjects can end up in two ways with a less good a deal than if they had chosen the 
best tariff: either by sticking with the default tariff (in treatments other than F) or by 
                                                          
29 Based on other treatments without this time cutoff, we knew that subjects take around 1 minute to make a 
choice. We then fixed the 2 minutes cutoff so that we are comfortable that any difference in behaviour cannot be 
attributed to subjects simply not having the time to take a decision. 
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switching to another suboptimal tariff.  Define the default rate as the percentage of times 
subjects stick to the default tariff, and the suboptimal switching rate as the percentage of 
times subjects switch to a suboptimal tariff.  In Experiment 1 (and 2, discussed later), the 
suboptimal outcome rate is then defined as the sum of the default rate and suboptimal 
switching rate.   
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3 present default rates, suboptimal switching rates and 
suboptimal choices for the 5 treatments.  In treatment DE the default rate is around 14%.  
Have a milder default does not make a difference (Mann-Whitney p = 0.89).30   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 All p values in this chapter are two tailed. For all bivariate tests, unless specified otherwise, tests are run at the 
subject level to control for any within-subject non independence of observations. In the DE and mDE treatments, 
the search engine was used 25% and 32% of the times respectively. 
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Type of Market Complexity of Task 
Number of Tariffs per 
Task Overall 
Treatme
nt 
Single 
Market 
Dual 
Market 
All 
Simple 
All 
Complex 
Mixed  4 tariffs 24 Tariffs 
  
Panel a - Default Rates               
DE 0.114 0.160 0.117 0.178 0.143 0.146 0.143 0.144 
mDE 0.128 0.154 0.144 0.161 0.142 0.180 0.111 0.145 
D 0.347 0.422 0.400 0.423 0.389 0.386 0.408 0.397 
DF 0.155 0.166 0.157 0.207 0.153 0.161 0.163 0.162 
F N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average 0.202 0.242 0.223 0.260 0.223 0.232 0.226 0.229 
Panel b - Suboptimal Switching 
Rates 
            
DE 0.275 0.297 0.167 0.339 0.308 0.185 0.394 0.290 
mDE 0.281 0.338 0.217 0.306 0.347 0.204 0.433 0.319 
D 0.237 0.263 0.153 0.337 0.259 0.151 0.358 0.254 
DF 0.253 0.289 0.153 0.360 0.288 0.158 0.397 0.277 
F 0.368 0.432 0.253 0.517 0.423 0.274 0.547 0.411 
Average 0.283 0.324 0.189 0.372 0.325 0.194 0.426 0.310 
Panel c - Suboptimal Outcome 
Rates 
            
DE 0.389 0.457 0.283 0.517 0.451 0.331 0.537 0.434 
mDE 0.408 0.492 0.361 0.467 0.489 0.383 0.544 0.464 
D 0.583 0.685 0.553 0.760 0.648 0.537 0.766 0.651 
DF 0.408 0.455 0.310 0.567 0.440 0.319 0.560 0.439 
F 0.368 0.432 0.253 0.517 0.423 0.274 0.547 0.411 
Average 0.438 0.510 0.412 0.632 0.548 0.426 0.652 0.539 
Panel d - First half and Second half             
  Default Choice Rates Suboptimal Switching Rates 
Suboptimal Choice 
Rates 
  
First half 
Second 
Half   First half 
Second 
Half   First half 
Second 
Half 
DE 0.204 0.085   0.306 0.274   0.509 0.359 
mDE 0.180 0.111   0.300 0.337   0.480 0.448 
D 0.432 0.361   0.249 0.260   0.681 0.621 
DF 0.193 0.131   0.293 0.261   0.487 0.392 
F 0.036 0.028   0.398 0.360   0.433 0.388 
Average 0.212 0.152   0.310 0.297   0.522 0.449 
 
Table 2.2: Experiment 1 – Average Performance 
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Figure 2.3: Suboptimal Outcome Rates in Experiment 1 
 
Result 1:  The search engine is effective in reducing consumer inertia and this 
translates into more optimal consumer outcomes.   
Support: While making no difference in terms of suboptimal switching rate (p = 0.28), 
having a search engine (DE treatment) clearly reduces the default rate relative to the D 
treatment (p =0.004).  Correspondingly, the suboptimal outcome rate goes down (p = 0.002). 
Result 2: When subjects are forced to take action, inertia reduces substantially and 
this implies more optimal outcomes.  Removing a tariff marked as default does not further 
change the proportion of optimal outcomes.   
Support: The default rate in the DF treatment is significantly lower than in the D 
treatment (p < 0.001).  With an unchanged suboptimal switching rate (p = 0.57), this leads to 
a lower suboptimal outcome rate (p = 0.002).  Conversely, Table 2.2 shows that this rate is 
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basically identical between the DF and the F treatment (p = 0.68), though subjects who would 
have stuck with the default rate are replaced by subjects who simply make a wrong choice.31   
2.4.2.2 The Role of Complexity 
Table 2.2 also reports averages of my 3 key variables for different dimensions of 
complexity. 32 
Result 3: Product bundling has a statistically significant effect of about 8% on the 
suboptimal outcome rate, marginally affecting both default rate and suboptimal switching 
rate.  
Support: In Wilcoxon tests, the suboptimal outcome rate is significantly higher for 
dual markets than for single product ones.33  The effects on default and suboptimal switching 
rates are small enough not to be always significant by treatment, though they are so in the 
pooled data.34 
Result 4: Having a mix of tariffs of different complexity is sufficient to increase 
suboptimal outcomes by about 14%, going up to 22% when all tariffs are complex.  The 
result is driven by suboptimal switches rather than by default choices. 
Support: Table 2.2 shows the average performance of subjects according to tariff 
complexity.  Differences in suboptimal outcome rates are significant between the simple and 
mixed tariffs tasks on the one side, and the complex tariffs on the other side, in the pooled 
                                                          
31 In the F treatment there is not, by definition, a default tariff as such.  We can however check for the likelihood 
that the tariff that is the default tariff in the other treatments is chosen, so as to control for the idiosyncratic 
preference for such tariff, i.e. for the extent that, in the other treatments, the default tariff is chosen not because 
it is the default.  This likelihood is listed in Table 2.2 as the ‘default rate’ for the F treatment; it turns out that it 
is only 3% on average.  In Table 2.2 we classify any other suboptimal choice under the heading of ‘suboptimal 
switching rate’; this is purely for comparability with the other treatments, as obviously there is no default tariff 
to switch from as such, and is higher than the suboptimal switching rate in the DF treatment (p = 0.016). 
32 For task simplicity, we constructed all tasks in such a way that the optimal tariff was such for whatever level 
of consumption.  That said, we also checked the data on consumption level; on average subjects choose the 
optimal consumption level 75% of the times. 
33 Wilcoxon p = 0.004, 0.002, < 0.001, = 0.004, 0.01 and p<0.001 respectively for DE, mDE, D, DF, F and the 
pooled data. 
34 For the suboptimal switching rate, Wilcoxon p = 0.17, 0.008, 0.26, 0.03, 0.02 and < 0.001 for treatment DE, 
mDE, D, DF, F and pooled data respectively. For the default rate, Wilcoxon p = 0.01, 0.14, < 0.001, = 0.59, 0.06 
and < 0.001 for treatment DE, mDE, D, DF, F and pooled data respectively. 
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data and for most treatments individually. 35   While not unequivocal, the result is also 
supported by the regression analysis in the appendix F.  It is largely driven by more switches 
being suboptimal36 rather than by changes in default rates, though the latter are significant 
when comparing simple and complex tariffs in the pooled data (Wilcoxon p = 0.01), though 
not when comparing simple and mixed tariffs (Wilcoxon p = 0.25).37   
Result 5: Having a higher number of tariffs increases suboptimal switching and 
consequently suboptimal outcomes by around 23%. This is not purely a random choice effect.   
Support: From a glance at Table 2.2, the default rate is virtually unchanged (23%) 
between 4 tariffs and 24 tariffs tasks, whereas the suboptimal switching rate jumps up and 
consequently the suboptimal outcome rate goes up by around 23% (Wilcoxon p < 0.001 for 
all treatments and the pooled data).  This pattern cannot be explained by observing that, if 
subjects choose at random, they should go for the best tariffs 1/6 less under the 24 tariffs than 
they do under 4 tariffs (a random choice effect).  If this were the case, I would observe the 
default rate too should go down when there are 24 tariffs, which I do not observe.  More 
broadly, I do not observe a random choice of tariffs.38 
2.4.2.3 Other Results 
Earnings.  Subjects sticking to the default tariff gained 56046 points on average.  In 
contrast, on average switchers earned 78804 points (over 6 pounds more) if they got the best 
tariff and 65800 points (around 3 pounds more) if they did not.  Switching was therefore, 
                                                          
35 In relation to mixed vs. simple tariffs, Wilcoxon p = < 0.001, 0.02, < 0.001, < 0.001, < 0.001 and < 0.001 for 
treatment DE, mDE, D, DF, F and pooled data respectively. In relation to complex vs. simple tariffs, Wilcoxon 
p = 0.001, 0.07, < 0.001, < 0.001, < 0.001and < 0.001for treatment DE, mDE, D, DF, F and pooled data 
respectively. 
36 p <0.001 in all treatments and in the pooled data, for complex (mixed) tariffs vs. simple tariffs, except for 
treatment mDE, where p = 0.15 (0.004, respectively) and DE for mixed vs simple (p = 0.002). 
37 In relation to mixed vs. simple tariffs, Wilcoxon p = 0.07, 0.38, 0.68, 0.33, 0.96 and 0.25 for treatment DE, 
mDE, D, DF, F and pooled data respectively. In relation to complex vs. simple tariffs, Wilcoxon p = 0.08, 0.41, 
0.22, 0.09, 0.79 and 0.01 for treatment DE, mDE, D, DF, F and pooled data respectively. 
38 We can test this at the level of individual choices by noting that, if subjects simply randomized their choices 
across outcomes,  each tariff should be chosen ¼ of the times in 4 tariffs tasks and 1/24 of the times in 24 tariffs 
tasks. Both hypotheses are rejected (p < 0.001 in a test of proportions). 
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broadly speaking, a winning strategy, even if the best tariff was not chosen; ‘super 
suboptimal’ choices, i.e. switching choices to tariffs worse than the default, were few.39  The 
appendix H contains a table with earnings by treatment for all three experiments.   
Complexity of default tariff and best tariff.  By looking at mixed tariffs tasks, I can 
isolate whether having a complex default tariff or best tariff as complex makes a difference.  
The only consistent effect I find is one of complexity of the best tariff on the suboptimal 
switching rates (and, consequently, the suboptimal outcome rate): if the best tariff is complex, 
it is harder to spot it and as a result the suboptimal switching rate more than doubles from 
19% to 45% on average (Wilcoxon p < 0.001).  As a large increase applies also to treatments 
with a search engine, this suggests that the search engine is insufficiently used.40   
Learning and use of search engine.  Table 2.2, panel (d), compares performance in the 
first half and the 2nd half of the experiment.41  Unsurprisingly given the picture on earnings, 
the default rate tends to fall in all treatments, but remains close to 36% in treatment D in the 
lack of a search engine, whereas for the DE treatment it goes below 10%.  The fall in 
suboptimal switching rate is less pronounced, with a minimum of about 1 switch out of 4 
remaining sub-optimal in all treatments.  On average 25% and 32% of subjects used the 
search engine in treatment DE and mDE, respectively, with little variation between first half 
and second half of each experiment (see the appendix G for more details).   
2.5  Experiment 2 – Inattention to the Task 
Experiment 2 considers the impact of inattention to the task on consumer behaviour.  
This is very difficult in an experimental setting because there is a natural bias that subjects 
have in coming to the lab to do something; this is different from households not paying 
                                                          
39 Only 3% of switches were ‘super suboptimal’ in 4 tariffs mixes, and only 4% in 24 tariffs mixes. 
40 In the DE (mDE) treatment, the suboptimal switching rates are 0.16 (0.27) and 0.46 (0.42) with simple and 
complex best tariffs, respectively (Wilcoxon p < 0.001 and  p =0.03 respectively).  
41 The regression analysis in the appendix F controls for experimental period. The appendix H also provides 
figures on how performance evolved on a period by period basis for all three experiments. 
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attention to specific tasks, such as choices of services, because it is not part of their weekly or 
monthly or yearly routines.  All treatments are identical to the treatment DE from Experiment 
1 except for the following.  My first treatment (DEAI) adds an alternative task for subjects to 
engage in: specifically, a second computer screen where subjects can browse the internet, 
check email or Facebook, and the like.  My second treatment (DEA) also has an alternative 
(unincentivized) task, but now an unpleasant one employed in the real effort experiment 
literature (e.g., Abeler et al., 2011) to measure psychologically costly real effort, counting 1s 
in a matrix of 0s and 1s.  My third treatment (DEAD) primes subjects to pay attention to this 
alternative task, by having this alternative screen on the first screen of each task.  Figure 2.1 
shows the relationships between Experiment 2 and the others.   
2.5.1  The Treatments 
DEAI (Default with search Engine and Alternative Internet task) treatment.  In this 
control treatment, subjects had the choice either to freely surf the web or to pay attention to 
the tariff tasks on another screen.  In one computer screen they could browse the web; in the 
other one they could perform the tariff tasks.  If they did not make any active choice of tariff 
in any period within two minutes, as in the DE (or mDE) treatments the default tariff was 
selected for them; they were then still required to select their consumption level.   
DEA (Default with search Engine and Alternative task) treatment.  In this other 
control treatment, subjects again had two screens in front of them.  In one they could perform 
the tariff tasks. In the other, they could perform a counting task consisting in counting the 1s 
in 0-1 matrices (see Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4: Alternative Counting Task in DEA, BDEA and WDEA Treatments 
 
This is a task deemed unpleasant enough in the real effort literature (as in Abeler et 
al., 2011) as to be considered a good measure of real effort.  In my experiment, and as made 
clear in the instructions, it was also entirely unincentivized, which means that subjects should 
have ignored the task and focused entirely on the tariff tasks, on which their earnings 
depended exclusively.  By comparing performance in the DEAI and the DEA treatment, I can 
verify whether the nature of the alternative task – and the degree it may be pleasant – matters 
for my results.   
DEAD (Default with search Engine and Alternative Default task) treatment.  This is 
the key treatment of experiment 2.  I employed the same counting task as in DEA, but this 
was now placed on the first screen of each task (see Figure 2.5).   
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Figure 2.5: Counting Task Screen in DEAD, BDEAD and WDEAD Treatments 
 
On the same screen subjects also saw the default tariff and so, if they wished, they 
could choose this tariff in this screen and move straight to the consumption page.  
Alternatively they could opt to see all the tariffs involved in the task and select the tariff of 
their choice as usual.   
Using the language of Zizzo (2010), my experimental manipulation deliberately 
employs a purely cognitive experimenter demand effect as an experimental tool to make 
subjects pay attention as a default to the counting task.42  I would argue that, even with this 
purely cognitive experimenter demand, the tariffs task is likely to be more salient in the 
                                                          
42 Again in the language of that paper, this is akin to a legitimate magnifying glass use of experimenter demand 
effects: namely, one that employs demand effects as an artificial tool to replicate in the laboratory real world 
conditions that would otherwise not be paralleled.  A purely cognitive experimenter demand effect relates to the 
cognitive process by which subjects make sense of an unfamiliar laboratory decision environment, and in this 
case can be seen to underpin treating the counting task as a default.  It does not involve a desire to do what is 
perceived as what an experimenter wishes them to do, which we discuss next.  
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experiment than going to a switching website and changing energy tariffs can ever be for real 
world households. As a result, my inattention manipulation is likely to simply provide lower 
bounds on the kind of effects that inattention may produce in the real world.  The comparison 
between performance in the DEA and the DEAD treatments will be especially useful in 
isolating this effect as the alternative task is the same in the two treatments.  As a result, a 
preference for the alternative task would not be able to explain any differential performance 
between the two treatments.   
In further treatments in Experiment 3, I address the potential criticism that subjects 
may not be inattentive as a result of a purely cognitive experimenter demand effect, but rather 
may simply want to do what they see that the experimenter wants them to do.  This would be 
a form of social experimenter demand effect (Zizzo, 2010), that would be incompatible with 
my inattention interpretation.  To anticipate my conclusion from section 6.2, Experiment 3 
will allow me to reject this interpretation.43   
2.5.2  Results 
2.5.2.1  The Role of Inattention 
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.6 present default rates, suboptimal switching rates and 
suboptimal choices for the 3 treatments of Experiment 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Additional evidence against this interpretation is also available.  During Experiment 2 (and in Experiment 3) 
we found it useful to add a social desirability questionnaire at the end of the experiment, which can be 
interpreted as a measure of sensitivity to social pressure (Stöber, 2001) and has been found as capable of 
predicting behaviour (Zizzo and Fleming, 2011).  Regression analysis on the default rate described in the 
appendix F shows that all of the key effects described below survive controlling for social desirability.   
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Type of Market Complexity of Task 
Number of Tariffs 
per task Overall 
Treatment 
Single 
Market 
Dual 
Market 
All 
Simple 
All 
Complex 
Mixed  4 tariffs 24 Tariffs 
  
Panel a - Default Rates               
DEAD 0.462 0.456 0.447 0.473 0.457 0.438 0.478 0.458 
DEA 0.262 0.298 0.267 0.313 0.284 0.274 0.298 0.286 
DEAI 0.211 0.286 0.261 0.272 0.258 0.274 0.248 0.261 
Average 0.327 0.356 0.335 0.365 0.345 0.337 0.356 0.346 
Panel b - Suboptimal Switching 
Rates 
            
DEAD 0.167 0.176 0.127 0.193 0.179 0.100 0.246 0.173 
DEA 0.215 0.207 0.140 0.237 0.220 0.118 0.301 0.209 
DEAI 0.236 0.239 0.133 0.272 0.256 0.154 0.322 0.238 
Average 0.201 0.202 0.133 0.228 0.213 0.119 0.285 0.202 
Panel c - Suboptimal Outcome 
Rates 
            
DEAD 0.628 0.632 0.573 0.667 0.636 0.538 0.723 0.631 
DEA 0.477 0.505 0.407 0.550 0.504 0.392 0.599 0.496 
DEAI 0.447 0.525 0.394 0.544 0.514 0.428 0.570 0.499 
Average 0.528 0.558 0.468 0.594 0.557 0.456 0.640 0.548 
Panel d - First half and Second half             
  Default Choice Rates 
  
Suboptimal 
Switching Rates   
Suboptimal Choice 
Rates 
  
First half 
Second 
Half   First half 
Second 
Half   First half 
Second 
Half 
DEAD 0.533 0.382   0.170 0.176   0.703 0.558 
DEA 0.340 0.232   0.226 0.193   0.566 0.426 
DEAI 0.289 0.233   0.283 0.193   0.572 0.426 
Average 0.403 0.290   0.218 0.186   0.620 0.476 
 
Table 2.3: Experiment 2 – Average Performance 
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Figure 2.6: Suboptimal Outcome Rates in Experiment 2 
Result 6: The default rate and suboptimal switching rates, and consequently the 
suboptimal outcome rate, is not different between the DEAI and the DEA treatments.  There 
is no support for the nature of the alternative task being different.   
Support: Table 2.3 shows that in both cases suboptimal outcome rates are about 50% 
(Mann-Whitney p = 0.99), roughly equally split between default choice rate and suboptimal 
switching rate (respectively Mann-Whitney p = 0.48 and 0.49).   
Result 7: The default choice rate is significantly higher in the DEAD than in the DEA 
treatment, and three times as large as in DE.  Overall suboptimal outcomes go up by 20% in 
the DEAD treatment relative to DE. Inattention matters.  
Support: Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that that the default choice rate jumps up to 46% in 
the DEAD treatment (Mann-Whitney p < 0.001 and 0.03 relative to DE and DEA).  The 
suboptimal switching rate is value is lower in DEAD though the effect is marginal or 
insignificant (Mann-Whitney p = 0.09 and 0.002 respectively relative to DEA and DE). 
Overall, 63% of outcomes were suboptimal in DEAD, against 43% in DE and 50% in DEA 
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(Mann-Whitney p = 0.05 and 0.08 relative to DEA and DE).  That the DEAD treatment has 
higher default rates and suboptimal outcome rates than DE is also confirmed by the 
regression analysis in the appendix F.  The different default rate between DEAD and DEA 
can be interpreted in terms of inattention.  Further support for the interpretation of the worse 
performance in DEAD in terms of inattention is provided by Result 8.   
Result 8: In the DEAD treatment subjects pay less attention to the tariffs task than in 
the DEA treatment, and there is a strong correlation between engagement with the 
alternative task and higher default rate.   
Support: In the DEA and DEAD treatments I have a measure of engagement with the 
alternative task, specifically the percentage of times each subject has played the counting 
task.  Subjects do 164 counting tasks on average in the DEAD treatment, vs. 51 in the DEA 
treatment (Mann-Whitney p < 0.001). 44   In the DEAD treatment the two variables are 
strongly correlated, unlike in the DEA treatment (Spearman = 0.56, p < 0.001, in DEAD, 
vs. 0.17, p = 0.24 in DEA).   
2.5.2.2  The Role of Complexity 
Result 9: Product bundling no longer matters when inattention to the task is a 
problem.   
Support: As shown by Table 2.3, the 8% difference in suboptimal outcome rate with 
product bundling found in Experiment 1 (Result 3) is almost unchanged with DEAI 
(Wilcoxon p = 0.10) but reduces to just 3% in DEA (Wilcoxon p = 0.001) and disappears 
entirely in the DEAD treatment (Wilcoxon p = 0.79).   
Result 10: There is again a tariff complexity effect driven mainly by suboptimal 
switches, but this appears smaller when inattention is a problem.   
                                                          
44 The proportion of subjects that played the counting task at least once is also greater in the DEAD treatment 
(Mann-Whitney, p < 0.001).   
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Support: Table 2.3 shows that, under DEAD, the Result 4 effect sizes are roughly 
halved, with an increase in suboptimal outcomes of 7% with mixed tariffs and 10% with all 
complex tariffs, relative to having all simple tariffs (Wilcoxon p = 0.09 and 0.09, 
respectively).  The effects in DEA and DEAI are of intermediate size.45 
Result 11: There is again a tariffs number effect driven by suboptimal switching, and 
consequently the suboptimal outcome rates by around 18%. 
Support: As per Table 2.3, Result 5 on the tariffs number effect is replicated quite 
robustly.  Default rates are virtually unchanged with 24 tariffs, but suboptimal switching rates 
and consequently suboptimal outcome rates go up substantially in all treatments, including 
DEAD (Wilcoxon p < 0.001 in all cases).46                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
2.5.2.3  Other Results 
The results on earnings and on the complexity of default and best tariffs from 
Experiment 1 are replicated in Experiment 2.47 Table 2.3, panel (d), compares performance in 
the first half and the 2nd half of the experiment.  As in Experiment 1, the fall in default rate is 
more pronounced than the fall in suboptimal switching rate, which remains virtually 
unchanged in the DEAD treatment.  However, even in the 2nd half of the experiment some 
35% of the subjects stick to the default in the DEAD treatment, with the inattention problem 
basically offsetting the beneficial effect of the search engine in moving from the treatment 
without (D) to the treatment with search engine (DE; see section 4.2.3).  Subjects used the 
search engine in 16%, 28% and 24% of the times in the DEAD, DEAI and DEA treatment 
                                                          
45 For the suboptimal switching rate, Wilcoxon p = 0.05 and 0.002 (all complex vs. all simple tariffs) and 0.005 
and 0.001 (mixed vs. all simple tariffs) for treatments DEA and DEAI respectively; for the default rate, p = 0.09 
and 0.38 (all complex vs. all simple tariffs) and 0.37 and 0.45 (mixed vs. all simple tariffs) for treatments DEA 
and DEAI respectively. 
46 An exercise to check the non-randomness of choices, as we did for Result 5, would yield the same outcome. 
47 Earnings were 55790, 66551 and 78838 points on average for subjects who stuck with the default tariff, 
switched suboptimally or switched optimally. Considering the mixed tariff tasks, the proportion of suboptimal 
switches was again roughly twice as large if the best tariff was complex: e.g. 0.238 vs. 0.120 in DEAD 
(Wilcoxon p < 0.001). 
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respectively.  Worryingly, even in the 2nd half of the experiment only 18% of the subjects 
used the search engine in the DEAD treatment.  If many subjects do not pay attention to the 
tariffs task in the first place, the scope for the search engine is obviously more limited.48   
2.6  Experiment 3 – The Nudges 
Experiment 3 has two objectives, using the DEA and the DEAD treatments from 
Experiment 2 as the benchmark.  First, it aims to test the effect of two nudges versions of 
which could be implemented by policy makers to obtain more consumer optimal outcomes.  
Second, as commented in section 5.1, it aims to test the interpretation of the DEAD treatment 
results in terms of subjects simply wanting to do what they see that the experimenter wants 
them to do, a form of social experimenter demand effect.   
A warning nudge is one where, at the end of each of the 36 tasks, subjects who 
achieved a suboptimal outcome were given a message that they could have earned more 
money had they chosen a different tariff.  This nudge could potentially be useful for policy, 
since policy makers could place as a requirement for companies to specify in energy bills that 
better tariffs could be available, and indeed Ofgem (2012) has been considering trialing this 
out in the U.K. energy market.  The nudge also helps me test for the social experimenter 
demand effect interpretation: if subjects felt that they were supposed not to focus on the 
tariffs task because this was not what I wanted of them, by telling them that they could have 
earned more money by choosing another tariff, and indeed telling them repeatedly and 
insistently that this was the case if they kept ignoring the tariffs task, I made clear that this 
was not what I wanted at all. In this case in the DEAD treatment I should expect the default 
tariff rate to be comparable to that of the DE treatment.   
                                                          
48 The proportion of times subjects engage in the counting task did decrease as the experiment progressed, from 
43% to 21% in the DEAD. For DEA and DEAI, we do not have that information because subjects played on 
separate screens so the counting tasks and tariff periods cannot be linked.   
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A default nudge is one where the best tariff is selected automatically as the best tariff.  
Subjects are not told that this is the case and can still switch to a different tariff if they so 
wish.  The inattention problem is solved by not requiring subjects to be attentive for 
achieving better outcomes.  The intuition is that, outside the laboratory, if the policy makers 
were to identify a likely best tariff based on either personal or aggregate information (e.g. 
individual past consumption), and review this at intervals, this would enable better outcomes 
while enabling consumers who have a different preference to choose which tariff they 
actually prefer. Inside the laboratory, the welfare analysis is obviously more straightforward 
as the best tariff is always such for all subjects.   
Figure 2.1 shows the relationships between Experiment 3 and the others.   
2.6.1 The Treatments  
WDEAD treatment (Warning Nudge with Default, search Engine and Alternative 
Default task).  This treatment is identical to the DEAD treatment (and so with a prominent 
alternative task: Figure 2.5) with the only difference that I provide warning nudges whenever 
subjects make a suboptimal choice.   
WDEA treatment (Warning Nudge with Default search Engine and Alternative task).  
This treatment is identical to the DEA treatment (and so with an alternative task on a different 
screen: Figure 2.4) with the only difference that I provide warning nudges whenever subjects 
make a suboptimal choice.   
BDEAD treatment (Best Default with search Engine and Alternative Default task).  
This treatment is identical to the DEAD treatment with the only difference that the default 
tariff is now the best one.   
BDEA treatment (Best Default with search Engine and Alternative task).  This 
treatment is identical to the DEA treatment with the only difference that the default tariff is 
now the best one.   
67 
 
2.6.2 Results  
2.6.2.1 Overview 
Table 2.4 and Figure 2.7 describe the consumer performance in Experiment 3.  In 
BDEA and BDEAD, the suboptimal outcome rate now coincides with the suboptimal 
switching rate as sticking to the default tariff is optimal.   
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Type of Market Complexity of Task 
Number of Tariffs 
per task Overall 
Treatment 
Single 
Market 
Dual 
Market 
All 
Simple 
All 
Complex 
Mixed  4 tariffs 24 Tariffs 
  
Panel a - Default Rates               
BDEAD 0.850 0.850 0.878 0.828 0.849 0.878 0.822 0.850 
BDEA 0.861 0.888 0.900 0.872 0.875 0.880 0.878 0.879 
WDEAD 0.367 0.414 0.433 0.439 0.379 0.400 0.396 0.398 
WDEA 0.100 0.136 0.100 0.156 0.122 0.102 0.146 0.124 
Average 0.544 0.572 0.578 0.574 0.556 0.565 0.561 0.563 
Panel b - Suboptimal Switching 
Rates 
            
BDEAD 0.150 0.150 0.122 0.172 0.151 0.122 0.178 0.150 
BDEA 0.139 0.113 0.100 0.128 0.125 0.120 0.122 0.121 
WDEAD 0.214 0.218 0.144 0.233 0.231 0.143 0.291 0.217 
WDEA 0.172 0.207 0.150 0.256 0.192 0.106 0.285 0.195 
Average 0.169 0.172 0.129 0.197 0.175 0.123 0.219 0.171 
Panel c - Suboptimal Outcome 
Rates 
            
BDEAD 0.150 0.150 0.122 0.172 0.151 0.122 0.178 0.150 
BDEA 0.139 0.113 0.100 0.128 0.125 0.120 0.122 0.121 
WDEAD 0.581 0.632 0.578 0.672 0.610 0.543 0.687 0.615 
WDEA 0.272 0.343 0.250 0.411 0.314 0.207 0.431 0.319 
Average 0.285 0.309 0.263 0.346 0.300 0.248 0.355 0.301 
Panel d - First half and Second 
half 
        
    
  Default Choice Rates 
  
Suboptimal 
Switching Rates   
Suboptimal Choice 
Rates 
  
First half 
Second 
Half   First half 
Second 
Half   First half 
Second 
Half 
BDEAD 0.833 0.867   0.167 0.133   0.167 0.133 
BDEA 0.833 0.924   0.167 0.076   0.167 0.076 
WDEAD 0.448 0.348   0.209 0.224   0.657 0.572 
WDEA 0.180 0.069   0.226 0.165   0.406 0.233 
Average 0.574 0.552   0.192 0.150   0.349 0.254 
 
Table 2.4: Experiment 3 – Average Performance 
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Figure 2.7: Suboptimal Outcome Rates in Experiment 3 
 
Result 12: When inattention was a problem, providing a warning nudge did not help.  
There is no evidence for a social experimenter demand effect driving the worse performance 
by subjects in the DEAD treatment.   
Support: Table 2.4 points to a fall in default rate (Mann-Whitney p = 0.063) and 
consequently suboptimal outcome rate in WDEA relative to DEA (Mann-Whitney p = 
0.01). 49   WDEAD’s default rate however is not statistically significantly different than 
DEAD’s default rate (Mann-Whitney p = 0.48), and as the suboptimal switching rate is also 
unchanged (Mann-Whitney p = 0.42) this leads to six subjects out of ten still having 
suboptimal outcome rates in both treatments (Mann-Whitney p = 0.73).  Default rate and 
suboptimal outcome rates are however clearly higher than in the DE treatment (Mann-
Whitney p = 0.001 and 0.03, respectively), a fact confirmed by the regression analysis.  
Subjects, therefore, do not focus on the prominent counting task because they think they are 
                                                          
49 The suboptimal switching rate is virtually unchanged (Mann-Whitney p = 0.64). 
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told not to look at the tariffs task, for even when it is highlighted to them again and again that 
they are making wrong choices, they do not change their behaviour.50   
Result 13: A default nudge is effective in achieving better consumer outcomes.   
Support: Table 2.4 shows that, with a default nudge, just around 15% of outcomes is 
suboptimal, with the large majority of subjects sticking to the default.  The suboptimal 
outcome rate in BDEAD are significantly lower than in DEAD, WDEAD or DE (Mann-
Whitney p ≤ 0.001 in all cases), and those in BDEA are significantly lower than in DEA, 
WDEA or DE (Mann-Whitney p <0.001 in all cases).  This is confirmed by the regression 
analysis.  No other treatment across all three experiments comes as close to an optimal 
outcome as these treatments.   
2.6.2.2 The Role of Complexity 
I first consider the effect of complexity in WDEAD and WDEA, and then move on to 
BDEAD and BDEA.   
Result 14: In the presence of a nudge warning, product bundling matters only 
marginally when inattention to the task is a problem.   
Support: In WDEA, there is a 7% increase in suboptimal outcome rate with product 
bundling roughly in line with DEA and Experiment 1 (Wilcoxon p = 0.02). The WDEAD 
there is 5% increase, a small effect just enough to achieve a marginal significance level 
(Wilcoxon p = 0.06).   
Result 15: In the presence of a nudge warning, there is again a tariff complexity effect 
driven mainly by suboptimal switches, and again this is smaller when inattention is a 
problem.   
                                                          
50 One could argue that, in a social experimenter demand effect interpretation of the prominent alternative task, 
the existence of repeated and insistent warnings should be especially effective in the 2nd half of the experiment, 
when subjects not attending to the tariffs task will have received a number of them.  However, as discussed 
below in section 2.6.2.3, there is no evidence of this.  
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Support: This result simply replicates Result 10. In WDEAD, the increase in 
suboptimal outcomes is only 3% and 9% in tasks with mixed tariffs and in tasks with all 
complex tariffs respectively, in comparison to the case of all simple tariffs (Wilcoxon p = 
0.42 and 0.06, respectively).  The corresponding effects in WDEA are instead 6% and 16%.51 
Result 16: In the presence of a nudge warning, there is again a tariffs number effect 
driven by suboptimal switching, and consequently an increase in the suboptimal outcome rate 
by 14% (in the WDEAD treatment) or 22% (WDEA treatment) as the number of tariffs goes 
from 4  to 24.   
Support: As per Table 2.4, Results 5 and 11 on the tariffs number effect are again 
replicated fairly robustly.  Default rates are similar with 24 tariffs, but suboptimal switching 
rates and consequently suboptimal outcome rates go up substantially in both WDEA and 
WDEAD (Wilcoxon p < 0.001 and p = 0.003 respectively).52   
Result 17: With a nudge default, there is no effect of product bundling or of tariff 
complexity, and at most only a small effect of the number of tariffs.   
Support: Table 2.4 shows that suboptimal switching/outcome rates are virtually 
identical with product bundling in both BDEAD and BDEA.  There is a 3-5% effect in 
moving from all simple to all complex tariffs.53  There is a statistically significant effect in 
BDEAD in moving from 4 to 24 tariffs (Wilcoxon p = 0.004), but a small one (6%) and not 
replicated in BDEA (2%, Wilcoxon p = 0.53).   
 
                                                          
51 For the suboptimal switching rate, Wilcoxon p = 0.04 (all complex vs. all simple tariffs) and 0.02 (mixed vs. 
all simple tariffs)   for WDEAD; p = 0.06 (all complex vs. all simple tariffs) and 0.12 (mixed vs. all simple 
tariffs) for WDEA. For the default rate Wilcoxon p = 0.58 (all complex vs. all simple tariffs) and 0.27 (mixed vs. 
all simple tariffs) for WDEAD; p = 0.24 (all complex vs. all simple tariffs) and 0.36 (mixed vs. all simple tariffs) 
for WDEA. 
52 An exercise to check the non-randomness of choices, as we did for Result 5, would yield the same outcome. 
53 For the suboptimal switching rate, Wilcoxon p = 0.04 and 0.29 (all complex vs. all simple tariffs) and 0.13 
and 0.16 (mixed vs. all simple tariffs) for treatments BDEAD and BDEA respectively; for the default rate, p = 
0.07 and 0.29 (all complex vs. all simple tariffs) and 0.09 and 0.16 (mixed vs. all simple tariffs) for treatments 
BDEAD and BDEA respectively. 
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2.6.2.3 Other Results 
The results on earnings and on the irrelevance of the complexity of default tariffs 
from Experiments 1 and 2 are replicated in Experiment 3.54  As in the earlier experiments, 
there is an effect by which, if the best tariff is simple in a mix of tariffs, this helped subjects, 
but, in the light of the power of the nudge default, in this case the suboptimal outcome rate 
goes down by just 6-8%.55   
Table 2.4, panel (d), compares performance in the first half and the 2nd half of the 
experiment. In WDEAD, the suboptimal outcome rate in the 2nd half of the experiment (57%) 
remains stuck at around the level which I found in the DEAD treatment (or the D treatment 
from Experiment 1).  This confirms the ineffectiveness of the warning nudge and, since 
subjects sticking to the default tariffs will have received a large number of such repeated and 
insistent warnings by then, provides further evidence for the implausibility of the claim that 
subjects simply felt that the experimenter wanted them to ignore the tariffs task.  The use of 
the search engine was also virtually indistinguishable (20%) from that in the DEAD 
treatment.56 
Since the default tariff is the best tariff in BDEAD and BDEA, it is not surprising but 
is nevertheless reassuring that in these two treatments subjects tend to stick to the default 
tariff more with time.57   
 
 
                                                          
54 Earnings were 55759, 65306 and 78613 points on average for subjects who stuck with a suboptimal default 
tariff, switched suboptimally or ended with the best tariff. 
55 Wilcoxon p = 0.27, 0.11, 0.05 and 0.04 for treatments WDEAD, WDEA, BDEAD and BDEA respectively. 
56 In the WDEA, BDEAD and BDEA treatments, the corresponding numbers were 39%, 12% and 18%. Note 
that subjects did an average of 120, 57, 159 and 41 counting tasks in the WDEAD, WDEA, BDEAD and BDEA 
treatments (Mann-Whitney p = 0.04 for WDEAD vs. WDEA and 0.03 for BDEAD vs. BDEA); the proportion 
of subjects that played the counting task at least once is greater in WDEAD than in WDEA (p = 0.01) and 
greater in BDEAD than in BDEA (p < 0.001). The divide between WDEAD and BDEAD on the one side and 
WDEA and BDEA on the other broadly replicates Result 8. 
57 Spearman  (period, default choice rate) = 0.32 (p = 0.06) and 0.54 (p < 0.001) for BDEAD and BDEA 
respectively.  
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2.7.  Discussion 
2.7.1  Institutional Setup 
I began my introduction by noting that my goals were to identify (1) whether, in 
markets for services, consumers are likely to stick to defaults and make suboptimal choices, 
(2) why they do this and (3) what can be done about it.  To explore these questions, I chose 
the U.K. electricity and gas market as the stylized setup for my experiments, as this is a 
mature market in which financial switching costs are already minimal and search engines 
enable finding best deals virtually at the click of a mouse.  In this sense, it represents a good 
model to answer the first question in a controlled laboratory environment in which alternative 
explanations – such as financial switching costs or whether consumers actually made the 
choice that is best for them – can be ruled out.   
I used stylized real world tariffs, or stylized tariffs derived from real world tariffs, and 
I varied the number of tariffs, their linear or non-linear structure, and whether  they are 
bundled up or not, in ways that are realistic and which present issues for tariffs for other 
services and countries, as is apparent for example from Joskow’s (2008) analysis of the US 
consumer energy markets, Lunn’s (2011) review for telecoms markets, European 
Commission (2007) for European wide evidence on banking services, or DG Sanco’s (2009) 
study across a range of services across European markets.  Undoubtedly, further research 
based on other real world institutional setups would be useful.   
2.7.2  Are Outcomes Suboptimal?  
The answer to my first question, emerging already from Experiment 1, is that a 
significant fraction of consumers does tend to make suboptimal choices, either because of 
sticking to a default or because of switching to a suboptimal choice. In my paradigmatic DE 
treatment where there is a default and a search engine but only one activity available, even 
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with just 4 tariffs about 1/3 of the choices are suboptimal, rising to over a half when there are 
24 tariffs (Table 2.2).  Note though that subjects stick to the default in only around 15% of 
cases, which does not seem to fit with real world stylized facts regarding the percentage of 
consumers not switching (e.g, DECC, 2012).  One key reason of difference is that real world 
consumers may simply not pay attention to saving money from switching energy supplier: 
their routine activities in their everyday life are more prominent.  There is not a point in time 
in the day, the week, the month or even the year where, as a routine, subjects are required to 
pay attention to the task of choosing energy supplier, as there is anyway a default energy 
supplier; there is no equivalent of, say, the weekly major supermarket shopping trip that a 
household may do every Saturday morning in order not to run out of food.  Conversely, 
subjects come to the laboratory with an expectation that they need to pay attention and 
engage in a task (see Lei et al., 2001) and it is no surprise that, given the availability of a 
search engine, they use it to get to much better outcomes, as I would expect with real world 
consumers as well.  The question then becomes why, in the real world, consumers do not use 
search engines in an equally effective way.  My intuition is that, because consumers do not 
pay attention, they often do not get to the stage where they are faced with a search engine: the 
problem may be made simple but this is not enough if it is simply not in their minds.   
Experiment 2 enabled me to capture more precisely inattention-to-the-task issues by 
adding either a not prominent task (DEAI, DEA) or a prominent (DEAD) alternative task for 
subjects to engage in while retaining the search engine.  The prominence of the alternative 
task is used as a tool to potentially induce inattention, if much less than what can be expected 
in the real world.58 I tested the alternative interpretation that the prominent alternative task 
may make subjects believe that experimenters want them not to engage in the tariffs task.  
                                                          
58 Given the experimental constraints, the instructions need to be clear about the nature of the tariffs task and 
this remains one of two possible tasks available to subjects. This, together with the natural bias of experimental 
subjects to do things, implies that what we have is just a lower bound to the type of real world inattention 
problem that we are trying to model in the laboratory. 
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The WDEAD treatment provides direct evidence against this interpretation: this treatment 
differed from DEAD in that subjects sticking to the default task would be insistently and 
repeatedly told that they could have made more money by choosing an alternative task, and 
so, if anything, they should be led to believe that they should focus on the tariffs task.  
However, even in the second half of the experiment - after potentially 18+ such warnings -, 
there is no noticeable difference in consumer performance relative to the DEAD treatment 
(Result 12).59   
In my DEAD treatment, as many as around 45% of choices stuck to the default, and 
even with just 4 tariffs over half of the choices are suboptimal.  This is closely connected to 
the degree they pay attention to the alternative task (as per Result 8), which fits with the 
inattention interpretation of my manipulation.  Given the presence of the search engine and 
the unincentivized nature of the alternative task, this is a surprising finding.   
2.7.3  Why Are Outcomes Suboptimal?  
I tackled the second question by aiming to identify the causal role of complexity and 
inattention, as well as their combination, in explaining suboptimal outcomes.  I interpret 
inattention as inattention to a task, as opposed to inattention to some detail of a task.  Of 
course, complexity and inattention – even interpreted as inattention to a task - may be 
connected concepts: an environment which is complex is one where subjects may be more 
put off from bothering with cognitive effort.  I could control for alternative explanations of 
suboptimal outcomes – e.g., financial switching costs or uncertainty of prospects in switching 
– by removing them from the laboratory environment.   
In line with research emphasizing the potential of consumer exploitation due to 
complexity (e.g., DG Sanco, 2009, or Carlin, 2009), I found complexity effects involving 
                                                          
59 Additional evidence against this interpretation is referred to in a footnote in section 5.2.1, where there is also a 
further discussion of the relationship between our design and experimenter demand effects using the conceptual 
distinction between purely cognitive and social experimenter demand effects presented by Zizzo (2010). 
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product bundling, whether the tariff is linear or non-linear, and whether there are 4 or 24 
tariffs.  However, by neglecting the role of inattention, the role of complexity is overstated.  
The effect of product bundling virtually disappears once inattention is a problem (Results 9, 
14).  An effect of tariff complexity remains but is smaller when inattention is a problem 
(Results 10, 15): e.g., moving from a mixed tariffs decision environment like that currently 
present in UK energy markets to one with all simple tariffs – a greater simplification than 
may be possible or indeed desirable once one considers the potential costs that firms may 
incur by having less tariffs – would only reduce the suboptimal outcome rate by around 5% 
(DEAD and WDEAD in Tables 2.3 and 2.4).  The number of tariffs effect is the most robust 
in affecting the choices of switchers, but might again require a complexity reduction (to 4 
tariffs) beyond what may be realistic;  furthermore, if a nudge default remedy is introduced to 
deal with the inattention problem, only a small effect remains (Result 17).  Inattention is a 
problem because it implies that many subjects stick to the default, and this explains most of 
the suboptimal outcomes in treatments with an inattention problem such as DEAD and 
WDEAD, with default rates of the order of 40-45% and suboptimal switching rates of just 
around 15-20% (Tables 2.3 and 2.4).  In essence, complexity matters, but economists and 
policy makers should pay more attention to the role of inattention60 for tasks that do not fit in 
the usual household consumption routines.61   
2.7.4  What Can be Done about Suboptimal Outcomes? 
I can answer this question in terms of direct effects on consumer welfare.  Obviously 
any policy measure would also need to be looked at in terms of its effects on competition.  By 
                                                          
60 Chetty et al. (2009) have noted the connection between salience and attention in terms of features of a task in 
an important paper on consumer responses to taxation.  
61 This last qualification is important.  Our conclusions apply to the use of services with a default choice and 
which are not part of the regular routines of consumers in terms of what they pay attention to. Buying groceries 
at a (physical) supermarket would not qualify.  Equally, buying a car would not qualify because, while not part 
of a usual routine, it does require an active choice (there is not a ‘default car’ which is bought automatically 
unless an action is taken).  The more active choices are taken, the more the potential role of complexity in 
affecting consumer outcomes. 
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unpacking the psychological determinants of switching costs, however, the experimental 
methodology does allow to provide clear-cut messages on the potential effectiveness of 
measures either tackling them or not. Furthermore, the direction in which consumer welfare 
in my experiment is clear, unlike survey studies where, as per Coombs and Shaharudin’s  
(2011) critique, it is not necessarily obvious whether consumers may be getting a good deal 
after all. 
A radical and traditional paternalistic way of answering a large problem of consumer 
choice failure, with its direct and indirect welfare losses, is to remove the choice from the 
consumers by having a regulated monopolist.  This is arguably one reason justifying the 
slowing down or halting of liberalization in consumer energy markets in USA (Joskow, 
2008). This was not the approach considered in this chapter.   
I am able to evaluate milder, if still traditional, paternalistic policy measures 
restricting the number of tariffs, the linear vs. non-linear nature of tariffs, and the bundling of 
tariffs.  The bundling of two tariffs together does not have much effect.  Restricting the 
number of tariffs or forcing them to be linear improves consumer outcomes.  However, even 
restrictive regulatory measures forcing tariffs to be linear and only four – with the potentially 
distorting effects on competition that such restrictions may have – would still only help 
partially, as consumers would need to pay attention to the choice of tariffs and many of them 
simply would not. In this sense, the scope of Ofgem’s (2012) proposal to limit the number of 
tariffs provided by each firm to 4 per fuel, meter and payment type, will be only of partial 
help, as the number of tariffs in the market as a whole is likely to remain above my 
experimental upper number of 24 tariffs.  Equally, while online search engines are useful and 
their use should be encouraged by policy makers in markets where they are not so common, 
their usefulness is limited if consumers do not pay attention to the task and stick to the default 
as a result.   
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Experiment 3 tested two nudge remedies to try to tackle the inattention problem.  The 
first was a warning that there exists a better tariff when a suboptimal tariff is chosen, of the 
kind that could be required of companies to put on the bills.  However, I found no evidence of 
an improvement in consumer outcomes as a result of this nudge when inattention is a 
problem.62  Undoubtedly the nature of the warning may matter, and future research needs to 
look at the effect of differently framed warnings, e.g. providing precise information on the 
amount of money that could have been earned if the best tariff was chosen.   
The second is a ‘smart nudge’ which automatically identifies the best tariff and uses 
this as the default choice: rather than requiring consumers to be attentive, it provides them 
with an optimal default if they are inattentive, while leaving consumers with the freedom to 
choose an alternative tariff were they to so wish.  This was sufficient to achieve optimal 
consumer outcomes 86% of the times.63 The idea of a nudge default for consumer tariffs is in 
line with research on optimal defaults as developed in the context of retirement plans, such as 
Choi et al. (2003) and O’Neill (2007), and in my view can strike an appropriate compromise 
between limited regulator knowledge and need to achieve better consumer outcomes.  Again, 
future research may be desirable, for example on the likely response of firms to the 
introduction of a policy based on this.   
The results of my experiment can inform practical policy measures being proposed.  
For example, Ofgem’s (2012) recent proposals require all tariffs to be of the form of a 
standing charge and unit price (both determined by firms), which would make them complex 
from my viewpoint though Ofgem thinks of them as a simplification.  On the same line, the 
                                                          
62 Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) discuss the Swedish experience of encouraging active decisions for retirement 
plans, a policy that backfired and was abandoned in the light of suboptimal choices being made as a result. 
63 While giving the freedom to make suboptimal choices in our environment may not seem to make sense, it 
could be justified in a number of ways: (a) it avoids a traditional paternalistic solution of forcing consumers to 
make a choice; (b) it enables competition among multiple firms rather than creating a regulated monopolist; (c) 
real world consumers are heterogeneous in preferences and may, e.g., care about non price dimension of real 
world tariffs (e.g., ‘green’ energy based), and, if they do, in a ‘smart nudge’ environment, they would still be 
able to act on this preference from switching from the automatically determined default choice. 
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U.K. Energy Secretary Ed Davey (BBC, 2012b) announced measures to reduce the number of 
tariffs, but, even with these measures, there would still be a large number of tariffs, including 
complex tariffs, that subjects would need to negotiate.64  However, even if I believed that 
these measures could be successful in tackling complexity issues, I would still expect 
significant suboptimal consumer outcomes as inattentive consumers stick to suboptimal 
defaults.   
A crucial issue from a policy viewpoint is therefore to consider how to raise consumer 
attention or otherwise deal with consumer inattention.  David Cameron’s suggestion of giving 
customers the cheapest tariff offered by each firm (BBC, 2012a) could be considered as a 
‘smart nudge’ in the sense that it could be interpreted as each company being required to give 
their best tariff as default one to consumers.  A key problem with it though is that it is not 
clear what incentive it would give to firms to provide lower tariffs, and in this sense it would 
risk soften the competition rather than making it tougher (Waddams, 2012).  My ‘smart 
nudge’ proposal is more radical and would rely on the concept of market’s cheapest deal that 
is being developed by Ofgem (2012).  While obviously further research is needed to evaluate 
its competitive effect and company costs that may be passed on to consumers, it would create 
a significant incentive for firms to undercut each other insofar as this would enable them to 
take business from competitors.65   
2.7.5  Methodological issues 
It is worth concluding this section by taking stock of three methodological issues that 
my experiments raise.  First, they presented different methods of identifying experimental 
complexity and I saw that their effect is different, with bundling of two tariffs presenting very 
                                                          
64 They would imply a minimum of 4 tariffs per company and there are a number of companies in the market. 
65  Note that consumers would, of course, retain the freedom to switch to a different tariff. While this is 
unequivocally suboptimal in our BDEA and BDED treatments, it may not be so in the real world, where 
consumers have a preference for e.g. green tariffs. 
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few problems.  In evaluating models of complexity or identifying policy recommendations, 
the devil may lie in the detail of what complexity is being affected.   
Second, what I provide is a methodology to study inattention in an experimental 
setup, based on more or less prominent alternative tasks, which in my view may be usefully 
applied in entirely different settings where inattention is considered a significant issue.  For 
example, one may argue that the first task that a charity needs to overcome in encouraging 
giving is to make people pay attention to what it is about; or that, in real effort experiments, 
one needs to take into account the distractions that alternative tasks (e.g., browsing the 
internet) may have (see Gómez-Miñambres et al., 2012 and Corgnet et al., 2014, for two 
recent other papers doing this). 
Third, I do not focus in this chapter on whether inattention is rational in the sense that 
bounded-rational agents would optimally choose to allocate effort in that way (e.g., Sims, 
2003; Gabaix, 2011; Woodford, 2012).66  However, I note that subjects lost over 6 pounds on 
average (equivalent to over 9 U.S. dollars) by sticking to the default tariff, which is a 
significant amount by the standard of the university students that made my sample.  
Conversely, they knew they could not earn any money from the alternative task, and, while in 
the case of internet browsing (our control alternative task) it is possible to argue that subjects 
may do it as a pastime, this does not look equally plausible with the counting task, which has 
been used in experiments as a tool to measure psychologically costly real effort (e.g., Abeler 
et al., 2011); nor do I find any significant difference in performance depending on the nature 
of the alternative task (Result 6).  It is hard to avoid the conclusion that subjects should have 
paid attention only to the tariffs task, given the sizeable incentives offered in that task and 
that task only.  The fact that the alternative task still induced more suboptimal choices in the 
                                                          
66 Cherumkin et al. (2011) try to fit Sims’ (2003) rational inattention model to a dataset on risky choice. Goecke 
et al. (2013) find that, the more expensive information is, the less subjects collect it in a macroeconomic 
forecasting experiment.  
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way it did at least suggests that the allocation of attention might not always be optimal, which 
reinforces the policy message of the need to take inattention seriously.  Obviously, further 
research is needed.   
2.8  Conclusions 
I found that, in markets for services and even in the presence of a search engine, 
consumers are likely to stick to defaults and achieve suboptimal outcomes.  The experiment 
aimed to unpack two key psychological reasons why they do this – complexity (in terms of 
non-linearity, number and bundling of tariffs) and consumer inattention.  By employing an 
experimental methodology, I am in a position not only to identify the causal role of different 
psychological dimensions, but I am also able to test the effectiveness of policies designed to 
improve consumer outcomes.  My experiment, and tariffs, are inspired by stylized features of 
UK electricity and gas markets, but the lessons I draw are likely to be more general, as both 
underlying features (such as non-linear tariffs and the presence of defaults) and psychological 
mechanisms are obviously more general.   
Task complexity matters. In the experiment, this is a function of product bundling, 
tariff complexity and of number of tariffs.  However, in the presence of a default tariff and of 
consumer inattention, markets are affected by large amounts of consumer inertia.  Similarly, 
providing a warning on the existence of a better tariff does not improve outcomes when 
inattention is a problem, though further research is needed to look at alternative warning 
messages that one can provide.  The reason why reducing complexity of the task solves the 
consumer inertia problem only partially is because subjects do not pay enough attention to the 
task in the first place and as a result just stick to the default.   
A ‘smart nudge’ policy of automatically switching default tariffs was a pragmatic and 
effective policy solution in our experiment to obtain better consumer outcomes.  This policy 
solution is in the same spirit, but more radical than, the one suggested by David Cameron in 
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the context of the U.K. energy market, and, while further research is needed, it is likely to 
create a greater competitive pressure than the latter.  It automatically changes default tariffs 
to the optimal one in a given time period, and by doing so it exploits inattention-based 
consumer inertia to achieve better consumer outcomes while leaving consumers free to 
choose an alternative tariff if so they wish. 
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Chapter 3 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a substantial amount of evidence showing that in some situations cognitively 
constrained consumers respond suboptimally when they have to make decisions from an 
excessively large choice set or among complex available options.  An individual’s 
willingness to participate in a market and the satisfaction derived from chosen options 
decrease when the choice set is overlarge (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Boatwright and Nunes, 
2001; Chernev, 2003; Huberman et al., 2007).  In Chapter 2, I have also listed evidence 
indicating that consumers are reluctant to switch to a new service provider even though the 
tariffs they are holding are suboptimal (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; OFT, 2008; DG Sanco, 
2010; Lunn, 2013) and even when switching occurs, consumers often fail to switch to the 
tariffs that are optimal for their consumption levels (Joskow, 2008; Wilson and Waddams 
Price, 2010; Chapter 2).   
If consumers behave suboptimally when facing complex choice problems, firms in 
retail markets, especially those who sell homogenous goods, may have incentives to create 
unnecessary complexity so as to exploit consumers' cognitive limitations.  The evidence from 
the literature described in the previous paragraph is often used by advocates of regulatory 
interventions to protect consumers from being exploited by retailers offering spuriously 
complex tariffs.  To date, established policies of this kind appear to have two main 
dimensions - reducing the number of available options and facilitating comparisons.  For 
example, in the energy market, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the U.K. Energy Secretary Ed 
Davey (BBC, 2012) announced measures to reduce the number of energy tariffs; Ofgem’s 
(2012) proposal required firms to limit the number of energy tariffs to 4 per fuel, meter and 
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payment type; Ofgem’s (2011) proposals required all energy tariffs to have a common 
standard; and the energy company npower claimed that it would use “petrol style” energy 
tariffs if other energy companies did the same (Skynews, 2013).   
So far, the efficiency of these policies is still ambiguous.  Some firms argue that a 
large number of tariffs cater to variety in consumers' preferences.  Some researchers have 
raised doubts about the existence of choice overload, pointing out that suboptimality in 
responses to choice overload may not be a robust phenomenon (Scheibehenne et al., 2010).  
If this is the case, resources used to develop and implement corresponding policies should be 
reallocated to other places.   
Given the conflicting arguments, it is reasonable for us to ask whether consumers 
require and can be efficiently protected by these policies, and whether the established policies 
for dealing with choice overload problems can effectively promote competitiveness in retail 
markets.  If the answers are positive, it is also important for one to know how and why these 
policies work, and whether or not more efficient policies can be proposed.   
An essential element for giving answers to these questions is to understand how 
consumers make decisions when facing complexity that might be spurious.  Knowing what 
heuristics the majority of consumers employ to cope with complex decision problems can 
potentially help policy makers propose more efficient policies to nudge cognitively 
constrained consumers to behave optimally.  Although many scholars have explored 
consumers’ decision-making processes in retail markets, few empirical studies focus on 
consumers' shortlisting heuristics in a specific environment, for example, an environment that 
involves complexity and common standards.   
In the present chapter, we report an experiment which sheds light on the following 
question: In a retail market in which consumers face complex decision problems involving 
homogenous goods priced according to different standards, do consumers use shorlisting 
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heuristics, and if so, what form do these heuristics take?  Our experiment also allows us to 
compare the effectiveness of different heuristics for cognitively constrained consumers.   
Section 2 reviews previous research on shortlisting heuristics, introducing the concept 
of common standards and mainly describing three different heuristics by which consumers 
might use common standards to simplify decisions problems.  Section 3 and 4 describe the 
experimental design and results respectively.  Section 5 provides the discussion and 
conclusion.   
3.2  Literature review 
3.2.1 Heuristics: previous studies 
One prevalent view about how consumers make decisions in a complex environment 
is that they use simplifying heuristics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974, 1979; Todd and 
Gigerenzer, 2000).  There is research suggesting that, given a large choice set with complex 
options, people use shortlisting heuristics (also called consideration-set heuristics or two-
stage choice procedures).  A person who uses a shortlisting heuristic first constructs a subset 
(shortlist) of the whole choice set and then evaluates the options in this subset to make a final 
decision (Eliaz et al., 2011; Hauser, 2010; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; Hauser et al., 2010; 
Manzini and Mariotti, 2007).  One interesting question to ask is what rules people use to 
construct the shortlist. Hauser (2010) introduced several potential rules including 
“conjunctive”, “disjunctive”, “subset conjunctive”, “lexicographic”, “elimination by aspects”, 
“disjunctions of conjunctions” and “compensatory” for shortlisting products with several 
attribute dimensions.  Eliaz, Richter, and Rubinstein (2011) analysed theoretically three 
possible rules – “the top two”, “the two extremes” and “the top and the top” – for 
constructing a shortlist of two “finalists”.  However, neither research deals explicitly with the 
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issue of how consumers use shortlisting heuristics to choose among a large set of complex 
prices/tariffs when common standards exist.   
3.2.2 Common standards 
Tariffs for products in retail markets, especially homogenous products, do not always 
have the same structure. In the energy market some energy tariffs are linear – for example, 
10.53p/kWh.  Some non-linear tariffs have two tiers with a celling – for example, Tier 1 has a 
unit price of 4.33p/kwh up to a ceiling of 720 kWh, and then Tier 2 has a unit price of 
13.76p/kWh.  Other non-linear tariffs have a daily standing charge – for example, 26.41p/day 
plus 6.43p/kWh. In the travel market, some airlines (e.g. KLM) quote an inclusive price for 
flights, while others (e.g. Ryanair and easyJet) quote an original price plus add-ons such as 
taxes, fees for extra luggage, seat choice and insurance.  In the entertainment market, cinemas 
and opera houses usually give their consumers different basic prices with, sometimes more 
than one, different discount rates.  Unsurprisingly, it is hard for cognitively constrained 
consumers to minimize their expenditure when facing many tariffs with different add-ons or 
discounts.  However, consumers can easily compare tariffs with the same numerical values of 
add-ons or discounts even if they are complex, as consumers can cancel out the common add-
ons and discounts and only rank the basic prices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, pp.274-275).   
In the present paper we define firms as using common standards for their tariffs when 
those tariffs have a common structure and use the same numerical values of add-ons or 
discounts.  For example, airline tickets prices “£710+ £60 luggage fee + £38 insurance” and 
“£680+ £60 luggage fee + £38 insurance” have a common standard because both prices have 
the same numerical values of luggage and insurance fees; but cinema ticket prices “£23 with 
5% discount” (i.e. £23*0.95) and “£25 with 9% discount” (i.e. £25*0.91) have individuated 
standards because of the different numerical values of discounts.   
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When consumers have to choose from a large number of tariffs, some but not all of 
which use common standards, what heuristics do they use to simplify the decision problem?  
Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) defined three psychological rules – “largest common standard”, 
“dominance editing” and "signal first” which might potentially be used by consumers to 
tackle such problems.   
3.2.3 Some possible shortlisting heuristics 
A consumer who uses the largest common standard (LCS) rule ignores individuated 
standard tariffs and shortlists only common standard tariffs for further evaluation.  When 
there is more than one common standard, only the tariffs with the common standard used by 
the largest number of firms are shortlisted.  For example, suppose there are three tariffs from 
firms A, B and C.  The tariffs of firms A and B have a common standard, while that of firm C 
has an individuated standard.  The final prices of firms B and C are equal, and less than that 
of firm A. For cognitively constrained consumers, tariffs A and B are easy to compare, but C 
is hard to compare with either B or A. According to Gaudeul and Sugden (2012), when 
comparing offer prices, consumers normally employ two evaluation systems.  The ranking 
system ranks offers that use a common standard without working out the absolute value of the 
offers' final prices.  The calculating system generates absolute values, but if consumers are 
cognitively constrained, absolute values contain errors.  The calculating system is modelled 
by treating the consumer’s perception of the final price as a noisy ‘signal’ of true value.   
In this case, if a consumer uses the LCS rule, she will first eliminate tariff C and 
construct a shortlist containing tariffs A and B, so the probabilities of choosing tariffs A, B 
and C are 0, 1 and 0 respectively.  If a consumer follows the LCS rule, she will only use the 
ranking system.  Crosetto and Gaudeul (2012) report experimental evidence of the use of the 
LCS rule.  In their experiment, subjects were allocated with a budget and asked to purchase 
grey paint to cover a fixed square area.  The prices of alternative paint products were 
88 
 
described in terms of the cost of covering areas of various shapes and sizes; in some choice 
problems, two or more products were priced in terms of areas with the same shape and size, 
thus creating a common standard.  There was a time constraint in each task of their 
experiment.  Crosetto and Gaudeul (2012) found that when other factors were held constant, 
subjects were more likely to choose common standard products.   
A consumer who follows the Dominance editing (DE) rule constructs a shortlist by 
eliminating tariffs that can be revealed to be suboptimal by means of common standard 
comparisons.  The final decision has to be made by comparing the shortlisted tariffs, all of 
which use different standards. In the preceding example, A (which is dominated by B) is 
eliminated at the first stage.  Assuming that errors in the second stage are unbiased, B and C 
(which have the same final price) are equally likely to be chosen, and so the probabilities of 
choosing tariffs A, B and C are 0, 0.5 and 0.5 respectively.  If a consumer follows the DE rule, 
the order for her using the two systems is firstly the ranking system and secondly the 
calculating system.  The DE rule is experimentally identified by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) in the context of choice between lotteries.   
A consumer who uses the signal first (SF) rule provisionally selects the tariff with the 
lowest “price signal”, that is, the tariff she perceives to be optimal after using some 
potentially erroneous method to estimate the actual price implied by each tariff.  She then 
shortlists tariffs that use the same standard as the provisionally selected tariff.  Because 
comparisons within this shortlist are easy, the best tariff on the shortlist is selected.  Applied 
to the preceding example, if errors in the first stage are unbiased and non-zero, the 
probabilities that tariffs A, B and C are provisionally perceived to be optimal are 1 – 2x, x and 
x respectively, where 1/3< x ≤1/2.  Thus the final choice probabilities are 0, 1 – x and x. If a 
consumer follows the SF rule, the order for her using the two systems is: first the calculating 
system and second the ranking system.   
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Note that first, for a consumer who is not cognitively constrained (i.e. for whom 
signals are always equal to true values), the DE and SF rules produce the optimal choice, 
while the LCS heuristic is suboptimal; and second, the DE and SF rules differ by using the 
two systems in different orders. Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) argued that, if consumers use the 
LCS heuristic, complex tariffs with individuated standards would not exist in the long run, 
unless firms were able to collude.  But if consumers use the DE or SF heuristic, they will, 
sooner or later, inspect the individuated standard tariffs, trying to calculate the absolute 
values of these tariffs.  If an individuated standard tariff has a lower price signal than the 
optimal common standard tariff, then people use DE or SF heuristic might choose it.  For 
cognitively unconstrained consumers, the price signals are accurate, and so firms which use 
individuated standard tariffs cannot exploit such consumers.  But for cognitively constrained 
consumers, price signals have errors.  Thus, profit-maximising firms may have incentives to 
set high prices and use individuated standards with the aim of selling to cognitively 
constrained consumers.   
These three heuristics have contrasting implications for firms’ behaviour and give 
different suggestions to policy makers.  Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) provide a theoretical 
prediction about which heuristic consumers will use in the long run.  They show that, given 
the assumption that some consumers employ the LCS heuristic in retail markets at the very 
beginning, a situation in which all firms use individuated standards is an unstable 
equilibrium.  If consumers learn to use heuristics that give better results and firms follow the 
principle of profit maximisation, based on evolutionary game theory, consumers who do not 
employ the LCS heuristic at the beginning will employ the LCS heuristic in the long run.   
It is clear that the conclusions are based on one key assumption, that is, "there always 
exist at least some consumers who employ the LCS heuristic in retail markets".  According to 
Gaudeul and Sugden (2012), the first reason why their model has this assumption is because 
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LCS is one possible explanation of the asymmetric dominance effect.  The second reason is 
because using LCS heuristic is psychologically plausible.  For example, when considering an 
employer who wants to employ one employee from some candidates, if all candidates except 
one have at least adequate educational qualifications of some standard kind, the candidate 
who has nonstandard and not obviously superior qualifications will be more likely to be 
disadvantaged in the shortlisting process.  The third reason is because common standard 
heuristics are the best rules of dealing with some classical decision problems, such as the 
“filling station problem” 67 .  However, Gaudeul and Sugden do not give any empirical 
evidence or relevant references showing that, in the short run, there exist some consumers 
who employ the LCS heuristic in retail markets.   
Although many researchers have tried to explore what heuristics consumers employ in 
retail markets, there is a limited amount of empirical research focusing on studying which 
shortlisting heuristic consumers will employ for minimising their expenditures when facing 
decision problems involving complexity and common standards, and whether or not the 
employed heuristic is efficient.  This chapter tries to give answers to these questions.   
3.3 Experimental design 
Gaudeul and Sugden’s (2012) model has five features: (1) consumers choose between 
offers; (2) the only dimension relevant for choice is price; (3) offers have a “standard” for 
expressing price; (4) if the offers are in the same standard, comparison is easy; (5) if the 
offers are in different standards, comparison is difficult.   
For investigating whether or not consumers will employ a common standard heuristic 
and if so, which of the three preceding shortlisting heuristics consumers will employ, my 
experiment implements features 1 to 5 of Gaudeul and Sugden’s (2012) model, by using 
                                                          
67 More details of the filling station problem can be found at Gaudeul and Sugden (2012), p. 213. 
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complex pricing schemes with common elements.  For example, offer prices can be formatted 
as the following: 
price of offer A: £10.60 * 95% 
price of offer B: £9.50 * 95% 
price of offer C: £12.20 * 86% 
where offers A and B have a common standard and offer C has an individuated 
standard.  In this design, I am able to find out how participants react to offers with different 
standards.   
3.3.1 Overview 
The experiment had a within subject design.  Each participant was required to 
complete 10 different tasks in a randomized order.  In each task, participants were given an 
endowment and told that they had to buy one out of twenty-four offers; their earnings from 
the task would be equal to the endowment minus the price of the chosen offer.  At the end of 
the experiment the computer would randomly pick one of the ten tasks for real. The 
participant’s payment depended on the offer she selected in that task.  All prices were lower 
than the endowment.  Thus, participants had an incentive to choose the offer with the lowest 
price. 
In each task, the details of the twenty-four offers were not immediately visible to 
participants, but were revealed in response to participants’ mouse clicks.  This mechanism 
will be explained later.  Each task comprised two pages - the marketing page and the 
shopping basket page.  Examples of these two pages are shown in appendix J. Initially, 
participants saw the marketing page.   
In the marketing page there were twenty-four coloured boxes representing twenty-
four offers with different offer prices, coded from OFFER A to OFFER X.  Offers with the 
same price structure (explained below) had the same colour.  No details of the offers apart 
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from the colours and the letter codes were visible.  The endowment and the price details of 
the twenty-four offers were described in “game points”, with a randomly generated exchange 
rate between game points and UK pounds (more details of the exchange rate will be given in 
section 3.2).  In every task, the endowment was £32 and the final money prices of the 24 
offers, prior to rounding, ranged from £20.270 to £28.895, in increments of £0.375.  
However, participants were not told that the distribution of prices was the same in all tasks.  
Because the exchange rate was randomly generated, independently for each task, and because 
price structures and price details differed between tasks, this feature of the design was not 
obvious to participants.  The allocation of offers to the boxes A, .., X was randomized. The 
price structures and price details will be explained in the “Tasks” section.   
In the marketing page participants were able to do four actions: (1) They could single 
click on an offer and see the price structure of that offer immediately.  For example, they 
would see “price structure 1” showing on the bottom of the screen after they clicked an offer 
box.  (2) They could click more than once on an offer and see the price detail of that offer 
after a 3 seconds delay.  For example, they would see “Original price = 4567 points; Final 
price = Original price * 36%” showing below “price structure 1”.  (Actions (1) and (2) 
could be done for only one offer at any time, i.e. if the participant clicked on a new offer, the 
price structure and/or price detail of the previous offer disappeared.)  (3) They could move an 
offer into the shopping basket by clicking the “Move into the shopping basket” button.  (4) 
They could go to the shopping basket page with 3 seconds delay by clicking the “View the 
shopping basket” button.   
In the shopping basket page, participants could see the price detail(s) of all the 
offer(s) that had been moved into the basket, displayed in the middle of the screen.  Thus, 
price comparisons (particularly for offers with complex price structures) could be made much 
more easily in the shopping basket page than in the marketing page, where the participant 
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could view the price details of only one offer at a time.  Because the purpose of the 
experiment was to investigate shortlisting, it was important that participants’ shortlists could 
be observed.  The properties of the shopping basket were designed to encourage participants 
to use it to store shortlisted offers.   
In the shopping basket page, participants were able to do three actions: they could 
move an offer out of the shopping basket; they could go back to the marketing page to 
continue shopping by clicking the “continue shopping” button; or they could make a final 
decision, deciding which of the offers in the basket to buy.  There was no time delay for these 
three actions.  The capacity of the shopping basket was nine, and so participants could not put 
more than nine offers into the shopping basket at the same time.  If the shopping basket was 
full but participants still wanted to put some new offers into it, they first had to move some 
old offers out of the shopping basket, and then go back to the marketing page and put some 
new offers in.   
There are two reasons why a 3 seconds time delay was added both on clicking a box 
more than once for seeing price details in the marketing page and on clicking the "View the 
shopping basket" button for going to the shopping basket page.  The first reason is that it 
replicates the fact that in the real world, there will always be a time delay while opening a 
new website for seeing price details of a specific product or going to a shopping basket page 
for checking out.  The time delay is normally caused by the limited computer and internet 
speed.  The second reason is that the time delay provides an additional incentive for 
participants to use the shopping basket when comparing prices.  For example, comparing the 
price details of 5 offers would involve 5*3=15 seconds of delay if the offers were inspected 
on the marketing page, but only 3 seconds of delay if the offers were moved to the shopping 
basket and then inspected in the shopping basket page.   
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3.3.2 Tasks 
The 10 tasks used in the experiment contain two main dimensions - the offer-type 
dimension and the common standard dimension.  
The offer-type dimension 
The offer-type dimension comprises four offer types: P1, P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and 
P1*D1+P2.  
In the P1 task, all offer price details are framed as a single price such as  
Final price = x points 
where x is a positive round number.  In this task, all 24 offers have the same price 
structure.  
In the P1*D1 tasks, the price details are described as an original price with a 
discount:  
Original price = x points; Final price = Original price * y%68 
where x is a positive round number and y is a round number in the interval  0<y<100.  
In these tasks I say that offers with the same numeric value of y have the same price structure.   
In the P1*D1*D2 tasks, the price details are described as an original price with two 
discounts: 
Original price = x points; Final price = Original price * y1% * y2% 
where x is a positive round number and y1 and y2 are round numbers in the intervals 
0<y1<100 and 0<y2<100.  In these tasks I say that offers with the same values of both y1 and 
y2 have the same price structure.   
In the P1*D1+P2 tasks, the price details are described as an original price with a 
discount plus an add-on price: 
                                                          
68 In the experiment we used X instead of * for the multiplication sign in all price details because some 
participants do not treat * as a multiplication sign. 
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Original price = x points; Final price = Original price * y% + z points 
where x and z are positive round numbers and y is a round number in the interval 
0<y<100.  In these tasks I say that offers with the same values of both y and z have the same 
price structure.   
The values of x, y (in the P1*D1 and P1*D1*D2 tasks), z (in the P1*D1+P2 tasks) 
and y1 and y2 (in the P1*D1*D2 tasks) were set so that, apart from the effects of rounding, the 
24 final prices, converted into UK pounds at the relevant exchange rate, were always 
£20.270, £20.645, …. , £28.895.  Subject to this constraint, to the constraints x, z > 0 and 0 < 
y, y1, y2 < 100, and to the constraints implied by the common standard dimension (see below), 
the values were randomized independently for each offer and for each participant.   
These four offer types have different complexity levels: offer type P1 is the simplest 
and offer types P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 are the hardest.   
The common standard dimension 
If two or more offers in a given task have the same price structure, I call these offers 
common standard offers.  If an offer has a different price structure from all the other offers, I 
call this offer an individuated standard offer.  The common standard is the key dimension I 
vary in the experiment across different tasks.  It comprises three common standard types.  In 
the first type of task – All Common Standard (AC) – all of the offers have one common 
standard.  In the second type – Part Common Standard (PC) – 8 of the 24 offers have a single 
common standard, and the other 16 have individuated standards.  The final money prices of 
the common standard offers were randomized, independently for each participant, subject to 
the constraint that the 24 final prices were always £20.270, £20.645, …. , £28.895.  Thus, 
whether or not an offer was a common standard offer provided no information about its final 
price.  In the third type – No Common Standard (NC) – all offers had individuated standards.  
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The 10 tasks used in the experiment are the P1 task plus the 3 offer types crossed with 
the 3 common standard types.  (Task P1 is also an AC task but this offer type cannot be 
extended to PC and NC tasks.  Because offer prices in a P1 task do not contain any add-ons 
or discounts, there is no space for one to manipulate these offers into individuated standard 
offers.) Table 3.1 shows the key features of these 10 tasks.   
 
 
Tasks Number of offers Offer types Common standard 
types 
Number of price 
structures 
1 24 P AC 1 
2 24 P1*D1 AC 1 
3 24 P1*D1 PC 17 
4 24 P1*D1 NC 24 
5 24 P1*D1*D2 AC 1 
6 24 P1*D1*D2 PC 17 
7 24 P1*D1*D2 NC 24 
8 24 P1*D1+P2 AC 1 
9 24 P1*D1+P2 PC 17 
10 24 P1*D1+P2 NC 24 
 
Table 3.1: Features of the tasks 
 
An example of offers with the same price structure (a common standard) in 
P1*D1*P2 tasks is the following: 
Original price = 265 points; Final price = Original price * 9% +43 points 
Original price = 168 points; Final price = Original price * 9% +43 points 
Original price = 437 points; Final price = Original price * 9% +43 points 
...... 
Original price = 563 points; Final price = Original price * 9% +43 points 
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An example of offers with different price structures (individuated standards) in 
P1*D1+P2 tasks is the following 
Original price = 263 points; Final price = Original price * 17% +45 points 
Original price = 435 points; Final price = Original price * 68% +170 points 
Original price = 699 points; Final price = Original price * 6% +98 points 
...... 
Original price = 158 points; Final price = Original price * 93% +16 points 
3.3.3 Implementation of the experiment 
When coming into the lab, participants were asked to put their belongings on a desk in 
order to prevent them from taking any pens, mobile phones or other electronic devices with 
calculating applications.  In each task there was a randomly generated exchange rate: x 
points=£1 (where x is a round number in the interval 10≤x≤100).  The exchange rates were 
randomly generated because, for reasons of experimental control, the 24 offers’ final prices 
(in £) in all tasks were always the same.  If the exchange rate in each task were also the same, 
participants might ignore the complexity, fast learning the value of the cheapest offer in game 
points, and then finding the cheapest offer in each task without the need to compare all the 
offers.  A randomly generated exchange rate can reduce the effect of this problem by 
allocating different game points to offers with the same final price.  Each participant was 
endowed with some game points in each task, which at the exchange rate would always be 
worth £32.   
Before starting the formal experiment, the experimenter read out the experimental 
instructions and activated all participants’ computer screens to let them do a practice task.  
The practice task was similar to the PC tasks but with a different offer type69.  Participants 
                                                          
69 The offer type used in the practice task is Original price = x points; Final price = Original price * y% with 
y>100 
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had to follow the experimenter’s instructions, doing the practice task step by step.  After 
finishing the practice task, participants needed to answer questionnaires to make sure that 
they understood how to do the experiment.  If the questions were answered correctly, the 
formal experiment would start.   
3.4 Predictions 
In the present experimental design, if an individual does not make mistakes and 
follows the LCS or DE heuristic, in AC tasks, she will only use the ranking system, 
cancelling the same add-ons or discounts in the price details and ranking offers by their 
original prices (compare the editing operation described by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 
pp.274-275).  In the case of employing the SF heuristic, she will first use the calculating 
system, trying to work out the absolute values of the offers, and then use the ranking system 
to find out the best offer.  Also, the individual will inspect all twenty-four offers. In this 
chapter, the term "inspect" is used when participants try to see an offer's price details either 
by clicking the offer box more than once, or by moving the offer into the shopping basket so 
as to see the offer's price details there.  In AC tasks, if an individual employs one of the three 
heuristics above, once she puts the optimal common standard offer into the shopping basket, 
it will stay in the shopping basket for comparing with other suboptimal common standard 
offers.  The optimal common standard offer will finally be chosen.   
In PC tasks, if an individual employs the LCS heuristic, she will use the ranking 
system and inspect only the eight common standard offers.  The sixteen individuated standard 
offers will not be inspected at all, as the participant eliminates them in the first place.  
However, if the individual employs the DE heuristic, she will first use the ranking system and 
then use the calculating system.  Accordingly, her inspections will also follow an evaluation 
order, which is, she first inspects the eight common standard offers and eliminates suboptimal 
ones, then (subjectively) chooses the optimal offer from among the seventeen non-eliminated 
99 
 
offers.  The individual will always inspect all twenty-four offers. Once the cheapest common 
standard offer is put into the shopping basket, it will stay in the shopping basket and be 
chosen at the end only if the participant does not find lower price signals from among 
individuated standard offers.  If they find one, the offer with the lowest price signal will be 
chosen and it is possible that the cheapest common standard offer may be moved out of the 
shopping basket before the participant makes the final decision.  If an individual employs the 
"SF" heuristic, she will first use the calculating system and then use the ranking system.  
Accordingly she will inspect all 24 offers in a inspecting sequence that first inspects offers 
without considering standards, provisionally selecting the tariff with the lowest price signal, 
and then shortlists tariffs which use the same standard as the provisionally selected tariff.  In 
NC tasks, although Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) do not explicitly discuss how an individual 
will behave if she employs the LCS heuristic in an environment where all offers have 
individuated standards, in the present chapter, I assume that the individual will inspect all 
twenty-four offers.70  If an individual employs the DE or SF heuristic, she will also inspect all 
twenty-four offers.  In NC tasks, the individual will only use the calculating system.   
Gaudeul and Sugden's model represents a world where consumers do not have search 
costs but many of them are cognitively constrained, which means that the price signals they 
work out have errors.  However, some classic search and choice models (Diamond, 1971; 
Salop and Stiglitz, 1977) have different assumptions.  In these models, consumers have 
search costs but do not have cognitive limitations.  A rational consumer can precisely work 
out an optimal reservation price that depends on her search cost.  A consumer's reservation 
price is positively related to her search cost.  She will stop searching once she finds an offer 
with a price lower than or equal to her reservation price.   
                                                          
70 We shall see in the result section that, a different definition will not affect our conclusions. 
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Each type of model has a realistic element in terms of consumers’ behaviour in the 
real world.  In the present chapter, I assume that some consumers are cognitively constrained 
and that all consumers have search costs.  In the current experiment, search costs can be 
defined as the effort and time used by a participant to rank offers and work out the absolute 
values of offer prices.  When ranking common standard offers, a participant's search cost is 
low, so her reservation price will be low as well.  Thus, the average number of offers 
inspected will be higher in AC tasks than in NC tasks.   
Apart from the heuristics discussed above, a participant might employ some cruder 
heuristic such as a random selection heuristic, that is, a participant inspects a few (or only one) 
offers and randomly chooses one of these offers without trying to work out its final price or 
comparing it to other offers.   
From the above discussions, we can see that different types of heuristics can be 
clearly differentiated in PC tasks.  Table 3.2 shows the differences.  
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Heuristics Number 
of offers 
inspected 
Inspecting sequence The status of the offers  
Largest common standard 
(LCS) 
8 Only inspect common 
standard offers. 
1. Sub-optimal common standard offers will 
be moved out of the shopping basket very 
quickly. 2. Once the optimal common 
standard offer is put into the shopping basket, 
it stays until the end of the task. 3. The 
optimal common standard offer will finally 
be chosen.  
 
Dominance editing (DE) 24 First inspect common 
standard offers and then 
inspect individuated 
standard offers. 
1. Sub-optimal common standard offers will 
be moved out of the shopping basket very 
quickly. 2. Once the best common standard 
offer is put into the shopping basket it will 
stay until a participant finds (if any) a cheaper 
individuated standard offer (there may be 
errors if the participant is cognitively 
constrained) 
 
Signal First (SF) 24 First inspect all offers 
without considering their 
standards. If the 
provisionally chosen offer 
is a common standard 
offer, then second, inspect 
other common standard 
offers, comparing them 
with the one provisionally 
chosen. If the 
provisionally chosen offer 
is not a common standard 
offer, stop inspecting. 
In the first stage, provisionally inspect all 
offers and pick the one that is relatively good 
(not necessarily be the best because of 
errors). 
If the second stage occurs (i.e. the picked 
offer is an common standard offer), when 
inspecting common standard offers,  
1. Sub-optimal common standard offers will 
be moved out of the shopping basket very 
quickly. 2. Once the best common standard 
offer is put into the shopping basket, it stays 
until the end of the task. 3. The optimal 
common standard offer will finally be chosen.  
 
Classic search and choose 
models 
Less 
than 24 
Inspect offers without 
considering their 
standards. 
Participants will stop searching once they 
find an offer’s price that is lower than their 
reservation price. At the end of the task, they 
will tend to choose the best offer in the 
shopping basket.  
 
Random selection heuristics A few Inspect offers without 
considering their 
standards. 
Participants might inspect any number of 
offers, and randomly choose one of them in 
the shopping basket. 
 
Table 3.2: Predictions of participants’ behaviour in PC tasks 
 
By using a range of different complexity levels for price details (i.e. P1, P1*D1, 
P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2), we make it more likely that each participant will face some tasks 
in which working out the absolute values of offer prices is perceived as easy and some in 
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which it is perceived as difficult.  This design feature also allows us to investigate whether 
the heuristics that participants use are affected by the complexity of the offer type.   
There are two reasons why AC and NC tasks are also included in the present 
experiment.  The first reason is that, although it is plausible to assume that it is easy for 
consumers to make comparisons between common standard offers and hard for them to 
compare individuated standard offers, there is no clear empirical evidence showing this.  
Having AC and NC tasks can help us check the plausibility of this assumption by seeing 
whether or not participants spend less time and earn more in AC tasks than in NC tasks.  If 
they do, then this implies that common standard offers are easier for participants to compare 
than individuated standard offers.  The second reason is that Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) 
predict that, when comparing to the market in which all offers are individuated standard 
offers, consumers can reap more benefits from the market in which some offers have a 
common standard.  Comparing time used and final earnings in PC and NC tasks helps us test 
this prediction.   
3.5 Results 
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social 
Science (CBESS) Laboratory at the University of East Anglia in the summer of 2013.  
Participants were recruited using a campus-wide online system.  There were 171 participants 
attending the experiment.  Most of the participants were students from a wide range of 
academic disciplines, ages ranging from 18 to 65.  The experiment lasted approximately 65 
minutes with an average payment of £10.76 per person.  The maximum payment was £11.73 
and the minimum payment was £3.10.   
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3.5.1 Final earnings and time used in each task 
Table 3.3 reports means and standard deviations of the time used and final earnings in 
each task, averaged across participants.   
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Means medians and standard deviations of the time used and final earnings in each 
task 
Tasks Time used (Sec.) Earnings 
AC tasks   
P1 157.9 [124.7] 11.40 [11.73] 
 (103.9) (1.36) 
P1*D1 177.3 [133.1] 11.26 [11.73] 
 (145.4) (1.64) 
P1*D1*D2 183.1 [138.3] 11.05 [11.73] 
 (121.1) (2.06) 
P1*D1+P2 187.2 [142.8] 11.23 [11.73] 
 (131.5) (1.71) 
Average 176.4 [133.9] 11.23 [11.73] 
 (126.6) (1.71) 
PC tasks   
P1*D1 341.9 [289.4] 10.41 [11.355] 
 (255.8) (1.94) 
P1*D1*D2 376.1 [363.5] 9.43 [10.23] 
 (242.5) (2.44) 
P1*D1+P2 353.6 [303.8] 10.04 [10.98] 
 (244.8) (2.04) 
Average 357.2 [312.2] 9.96 [10.98] 
 (247.7) (2.19) 
NC tasks   
P1*D1 343.6 [304.5] 10.11 [10.98] 
 (226.5) (2.00) 
P1*D1*D2 398.2 [355.4] 9.26 [10.23] 
 (296.1) (2.52) 
P1*D1+P2 362.9 [327.5] 10.11 [10.98] 
 (225.2) (2.07) 
Average 368.2 [321.9] 9.83 [10.605] 
 (252.0) (2.24) 
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Note: The first number is the mean; the second number in the square brace is the median; the number under the 
mean in the parenthesis is the standard deviation. There are 171 observations in each task. 
 
The average time used in AC tasks (176.4 seconds) is approximately 50% shorter than 
the average time used in NC (368.2 seconds) tasks (z = -9.96, p < 0.001)71.  The average 
earnings in AC tasks (£11.23) are significantly higher than the average earnings in NC 
(£9.83) tasks (z = 9.85, p < 0.001).  These results indicate that common standards make 
decision-making easier and better.   
However, although the mean value of time used as well as final earnings in PC tasks 
(time used: 357.2 seconds; final earnings: £9.96) are slightly lower than those in NC tasks 
(time used: 368.2 seconds; final earnings: £9.83), the differences are not significantly 
different (z = 1.15, p = 0.25 for time used; z = -0.32, p = 0.75 for final earnings).   
Let us now consider how these results shed light on what heuristics participants 
employed.   
First, let us see how the employment of each heuristic would impact on the time spent 
on PC and NC tasks.   
If participants employed the LCS heuristic, we would observe that the average time 
used in PC tasks was much lower than that in NC tasks.  This is because, when employing the 
LCS heuristic, in PC tasks, participants only need to compare 8 common standard offers but 
in NC tasks, participants would compare all 24 offers.   
If participants employed the DE heuristic, we would observe that the average time 
used in PC tasks was slightly lower than that in NC tasks.  This is because, although both PC 
and NC tasks have 16 individuated standard offers, for a participant, the time spent on 
ranking 8 common standard offers in PC tasks should be shorter than time spent on working 
out the absolute values and then ranking 8 individuated offers in NC tasks.   
                                                          
71 Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise stated, all within-subject tests are Wilcoxon signed rank tests, while 
for between-subjects comparisons we use Mann-Whitney tests.  All p-values are 2-sided. 
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If participants employed the SF heuristic, we would observe that the average time 
used in PC tasks was slightly higher than that in NC tasks.  This is because in PC tasks, after 
working out the absolute values (price signals) of all 24 offers, if the offer with the lowest 
price signal is a common standard offer, the participant still needs to compare the offer with 
other common standard offers.  In NC tasks, as there is no common standard offer, the 
participant does not engage in the common standard offers comparison.   
If participants employed a common standard unrelated heuristic72, we would observe 
that the average time used in PC tasks was the same as in NC tasks.   
Since we do not observe the very sharp difference between PC and NC tasks that 
would be generated if the LCS heuristic was widely used, it is clear that the results on time 
used in each task provide preliminary evidence against the possibility that participants 
employed this heuristic.  However, because the DE and SF heuristics have weaker 
implications for time used, it is too early to eliminate the possibility that participants may 
have employed these heuristics.   
Next, let us see how the employment of each heuristic has different impacts on the 
average final earnings.   
As we do not know how cognitively constrained the participants were, it is unclear 
whether, if participants employed the LCS or DE heuristic, final earnings would be higher or 
lower in PC tasks than in NC tasks.  However, if participants who were cognitively 
constrained used the SF heuristic, final earnings would be higher in PC tasks than in NC tasks.  
If participants employed a common standard unrelated heuristic, we would observe that the 
average final earnings in PC tasks were the same as that in NC tasks.  The results of the final 
                                                          
72 A heuristic is a common-standard-related heuristic if it involves consideration of offers’ standards.  In the 
present chapter, it includes the LCS, DE and SF heuristics.  A heuristic is a common standard unrelated heuristic 
if it does not involve any consideration of offers’ standards.   
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earnings in each task do not give us a clear answer to the question about which heuristic 
participants employed.   
Result 1: Relative to individuated standard offers, if all offers have a single common 
standard, decision making is made easier and better, but if some but not all offers have a 
common standard, this effect is weak or non-existent.  The data on time used in each task 
provide preliminary evidence against the possibility that participants employed the LCS 
heuristic.   
3.5.2 Total number of offers participants inspected in each task 
Although providing preliminary evidence against the usage of LCS heuristic, the 
preceding results do not give a clear answer to our key questions about whether or not the 
majority of participants employed a common-standard-related heuristic and if they did, which 
of the three common standard heuristics mentioned in the previous section they employed.  
For answering these questions, it is useful to consider the total number of offers participants 
inspected in each task.   
Remember that there were two approaches for participants to inspect offers' price 
details.  Participants could inspect an offer’s price details in the marketing page by clicking 
the box more than once and waiting for three seconds.  I call this way of inspection approach 
1.  They could also inspect price details in the shopping basket page by putting the offer into 
the shopping basket in the marketing page.  I call this way of inspection approach 2.  
ClickTwice denotes the number of non-repeated offers' price details inspected by approach 1 
and PutInBasket denotes the number of non-repeated offers' price details inspected by 
approach 2.  Notice that, although ClickTwice and PutInBasket account only for non-repeated 
offers' price details inspected by different approaches, the sum of ClickTwice and 
PutInBasket may be still higher than the total number of offers (twenty-four).  This is because 
one participant may inspect an offer's price detail by using both approaches.   
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Table 3.4 reports the means and standard deviations of ClickTwice and PutInBasket, 
aggregated across participants, and broken down according to offers' standards.   
Tasks ClickTwice 
of common 
standard 
offers 
PutInBasket 
of common 
standard 
offers 
TOTAL 
common 
standard 
offers 
ClickTwice 
of 
individuated 
standard 
offers 
PutInBasket 
of 
individuated 
standard 
offers 
TOTAL 
individuated 
standard 
offers 
AC tasks       
P1 11.39 [7] 13.39 [9] 24.78 [25]    
 (11.09) (9.60) (5.29)    
P1*D1 10.95 [4] 13.90 [10] 24.86 [25]    
 (11.17) (9.48) (5.90)    
P1*D1*D2 10.92 [5] 13.82 [9] 24.74 [25]    
 (11.02) (9.60) (5.22)    
P1*D1+P2 11.02 [6] 13.90 [11] 24.92 [25]    
 (11.07) (9.36) (5.88)    
Average 11.07 [6] 13.76 [10] 24.83 [25]    
 (11.07) (9.49) (5.57)    
PC tasks       
P1*D1 3.34 [1] 4.74 [5] 8.09 [8] 6.09 [1] 9.49 [9] 15.58 [16] 
 (3.73) (3.28) (2.24) (7.16) (5.55) (5.21) 
P1*D1*D2 3.33 [1] 4.48 [4] 7.82 [8] 5.90 [2] 8.67 [8] 14.58 [16] 
 (3.60) (3.36) (2.45) (6.76) (5.47) (6.03) 
P1*D1+P2 3.44 [1] 4.46 [4] 7.89 [8] 6.03 [2] 9.05 [8] 15.08 [16] 
 (3.68) (3.37) (2.57) (6.90) (5.64) (5.64) 
Average 3.37 [1] 4.56 [4] 7.93 [8] 6.01 [1] 9.07 [8] 15.08 [16] 
 (3.66) (3.33) (2.42) (6.93) (5.55) (5.64) 
NC tasks       
P1*D1    9.25 [2] 14.03 [11] 23.29 [24] 
    (10.54) (8.25) (8.17) 
P1*D1*D2    8.73 [2] 12.68 [10] 21.41 [24] 
    (10.12) (7.68) (8.36) 
P1*D1+P2    9.39 [2] 13.58 [10] 22.97 [24] 
    (10.56) (8.40) (8.19) 
Average    9.12 [2] 13.43 [10] 22.56 [24] 
    (10.39) (8.12) (8.27) 
 
Table 3.4: Means medians and standard deviations of ClickTwice and PutInBasket of offers 
having a common standard or individuated standards 
Note: The first number is the mean; the second number in the square brace is the median; the number under the 
mean in the parenthesis is the standard deviation. There are 171 observations in each task. 
 
From the table, it can be seen that some participants inspected nearly half of the 
offers' price details by using approach 1, although this approach is comparatively time 
consuming.  The results also imply that some participants inspected some offers' price details 
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by using both inspecting approaches.  This is because in the majority of the tasks, the sum of 
ClickTwice and PutInBasket is higher than twenty-four.   
Table 3.5 reports the number of participants who inspected x offers (x ranges from 0 
to 24) and Table 3.6 reports the means, medians, percentages and standard deviations of 
number of non-repeated offers inspected by participants (InspectionNum) across tasks73 .  
                                                          
73 Notice that there is a difference between InspectionNum and the sum of ClickTwice and PutInBasket.  The 
difference is that in a situation where a participant inspected the same offer's price details by using both 
approaches, InspectionNum will increase by 1 but the sum of ClickTwice and PutInBasket will increase by 2 (1 
for each approach).  A participant’s InspectionNum will never be higher than twenty-four, but the sum of 
ClickTwice and PutInBasket might be.   
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Number of participants inspecting 
offers\tasks 
AC 
(P1) 
AC 
(P1*D1) 
PC 
(P1*D1) 
NC 
(P1*D1) 
AC 
(P1*D1*D2) 
PC 
(P1*D1*D2) 
NC 
(P1*D1*D2) 
AC 
(P1*D1+P2) 
PC 
(P1*D1+P2) 
NC 
(P1*D1+P2) 
Number of participants inspecting 1 offer 1 0 0 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 
Number of participants inspecting 2 offers 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 
Number of participants inspecting 3 offers 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Number of participants inspecting 4 offers 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 
Number of participants inspecting 5 offers 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Number of participants inspecting 6 offers 0 3 1 2 3 3 7 2 2 3 
Number of participants inspecting 7 offers 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Number of participants inspecting 8 offers 2 1 3 2 1 4 3 1 1 1 
Number of participants inspecting 9 offers 2 4 3 8 3 7 13 5 2 10 
Number of participants inspecting 10 offers 1 1 2 8 1 5 5 0 4 6 
Number of participants inspecting 11 offers 0 0 3 3 0 2 4 0 3 5 
Number of participants inspecting 12 offers 0 0 1 3 0 3 4 2 3 1 
Number of participants inspecting 13 offers 1 0 2 3 0 3 2 0 4 2 
Number of participants inspecting 14 offers 0 3 5 3 2 2 4 0 4 0 
Number of participants inspecting 15 offers 0 0 1 2 1 4 3 3 3 2 
Number of participants inspecting 16 offers 0 2 5 4 1 15 5 0 6 5 
Number of participants inspecting 17 offers 1 0 6 3 4 9 8 0 10 7 
Number of participants inspecting 18 offers 1 1 6 4 2 4 10 2 3 8 
Number of participants inspecting 19 offers 1 0 4 3 2 3 3 1 5 1 
Number of participants inspecting 20 offers 0 0 2 1 1 3 4 1 1 2 
Number of participants inspecting 21 offers 1 1 6 0 0 5 4 2 7 6 
Number of participants inspecting 22 offers 2 1 5 2 0 7 4 2 10 1 
Number of participants inspecting 23 offers 4 3 13 4 3 13 5 5 9 7 
Number of participants inspecting 24 offers 149 147 98 109 144 75 77 141 87 98 
Total number of participants 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
 
Table 3.5: Number of participants who inspected x (from 0 to 24) offers 
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Table 3.6: Means, medians, percentages and standard deviations of number of non-repeated 
offers inspected by participants (InspectionNum) 
Note: The first number is the mean; the second number in the square braces is the median; the third number in 
the curly braces is the percentage; the number under the mean in the parenthesis is the standard deviation. There 
are 171 observations in each task. 
Note: There are no individuated offers in AC tasks and no common standard offers in NC tasks. 
 
It is clear from these tables that, in all tasks, most participants inspected most (and 
often all) the offers).   
In AC tasks, 84.9% participants inspected all twenty-four offers (87.1%, 86.0%, 
84.2% and 82.5% in P1, P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively).  This value 
drops to 50.7% in PC tasks (57.3%, 43.9% and 50.9% in P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 
Tasks InspectionNum of 
common standard 
offers 
InspectionNum of 
individuated standard 
offer 
Total InspectionNum 
AC tasks    
P1 22.63 [24] {94.3%}  22.63 [24] {94.3%} 
 (4.52)  (4.52) 
P1*D1 22.32 [24] {93.0%}  22.32 [24] {93.0%} 
 (4.88)  (4.88) 
P1*D1*D2 22.35 [24] {93.1%}  22.35 [24] {93.1%} 
 (4.53)  (4.53) 
P1*D1+P2 22.26 [24] {92.8%}  22.26 [24] {92.8%} 
 (4.83)  (4.83) 
Average 22.39 [24] {93.3%}  22.39 [24] {93.3%} 
 (4.69)  (4.69) 
PC tasks    
P1*D1 7.30 [8] {91.3%} 13.46 [16] {84.1%} 20.76 [24] {86.5%} 
 (1.78) (4.03) (5.29) 
P1*D1*D2 7.00 [8] {87.5%} 12.29 [15] {76.8%} 19.29 [23] {80.4%} 
 (2.12) (4.62) (5.96) 
P1*D1+P2 7.06 [8] {88.3%} 12.94 [16] {80.9%} 20.01 [24] {83.4%} 
 (2.12) (4.46) (5.79) 
Average 7.12 [8] {89.0%} 12.90 [16] {80.6%} 20.02 [24] {83.4%} 
 (2.01) (4.39) (5.71) 
NC tasks    
P1*D1  19.92 [24] {83.0%} 19.92 [24] {83.0%} 
  (6.33) (6.33) 
P1*D1*D2  18.38 [22] {76.6%} 18.38 [22] {76.6%} 
  (6.61) (6.61) 
P1*D1+P2  19.77 [24] {82.4%} 19.77 [24] {82.4%} 
  (6.28)  (6.28)  
Average  19.36 [24] {82.7%} 19.36 [24] {82.7%} 
  (6.43) (6.43) 
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tasks, respectively) and to 55.36% in NC tasks (63.7%, 45.0% and 57.3% in P1*D1, 
P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively).   
The average numbers of offers inspected in AC, PC and NC tasks are 22.39 offers 
(93.3%), 20.02 offers (83.4%) and 19.36 offers (80.7%), respectively.  The average number 
of offers inspected (InspectionNum) drops when tasks contain fewer common standard offers 
(AC vs PC: z = 9.17, p < 0.001; AC vs NC: z = 9.07, p < 0.001; PC vs NC: z = 2.41, p = 
0.02).   
Figures from 3.1 to 3.6 show, for each PC task, the number of participants who 
inspected x common standard or individuated standard offers (x ranges from 0 to 8 for 
common standard offers and from 0 to 16 for individuated standard offers).  Corresponding 
tables K2 to K7 can be found in Appendix K.   
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Figure 3.1: Numbers of participants who inspected different numbers of common standard 
offers: PC (P1*D1) task 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Numbers of participants who inspected different numbers of individuated 
standard offers: PC (P1*D1) task 
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Figure 3.3: Numbers of participants who inspected different numbers of common standard 
offers: PC (P1*D1*D2) task 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Numbers of participants who inspected different numbers of individuated 
standard offers: PC (P1*D1*D2) task 
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Figure 3.5: Numbers of participants who inspected different numbers of common standard 
offers: PC (P1*D1+P2) task 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Numbers of participants who inspected different numbers of individuated 
standard offers: PC (P1*D1+P2) task 
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From the figures, we can see that in PC tasks, there are many participants inspecting 
all 8 common standard offers, (82.5%, 76.6% and 75.4% in P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and 
P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively) and all 16 individuated offers.  (60.2%, 48.0% and 55.6% in 
P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively)  However, there are very few 
participants who did not inspect any individuated standard offers (0.6%, 0.6% and 1.2% in 
P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively).   
What do these results tell us about which heuristic was employed?   
Given that the majority of participants inspected most of the offers, first, some 
common standard unrelated heuristics such as the random selection heuristic can be ruled out.  
Second, comparing PC and NC tasks, if participants employed the LCS heuristic, the number 
of offers inspected in PC tasks would be much lower than in NC tasks and individuated 
standard offers would not be inspected in PC tasks. Nevertheless, the results show the 
opposite.  It is clear that in PC tasks, participants inspected both common standard offers 
(average 7.12 offers) and individuated standard offers (average 12.90 offers).  The possibility 
that participants employed the LCS heuristic can be ruled out as well.   
If all participants employed the DE or SF heuristics, there would be no systematic 
difference between the numbers of offers inspected in PC and NC tasks.  However, although 
the observed difference is small, it is statistically significant.  This is consistent with the 
prediction in section 4 of classic “search and choose” models, which is that the number of 
offers inspected falls as search costs increase.   
Table 3.7 reports the means, medians and standard deviations of the number of clicks 
that participants made in each task.   
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Table 3.7: means, medians and standard deviations of the number of clicks that participants 
made in each task 
Note: The first number is mean, the second number in the square brace is median and the number under the 
mean in the parenthesis is standard deviation. There are 171 observations in each task. 
 
Notice that the minimum number of clicks required to inspect all 24 offers will be 52 
if a participant only used approach 1 and 77 if she only used approach 2.  From the table, we 
can see that the means and medians of number of clicks that participants made in AC, PC and 
Tasks Number of clicks 
AC tasks  
P1 66.32 [71] 
 (15.56) 
P1*D1 67.60 [71] 
 (19.25) 
P1*D1*D2 67.02 [71] 
 (16.83) 
P1*D1+P2 68.63 [71] 
 (17.64) 
Average 67.39 [71] 
 (17.35) 
PC tasks  
P1*D1 67.32 [72] 
 (21.80) 
P1*D1*D2 64.36 [69] 
 (24.39) 
P1*D1+P2 65.44 [69] 
 (22.86) 
Average 65.70 [70] 
 (23.02) 
NC tasks  
P1*D1 64.45 [71] 
 (24.51) 
P1*D1*D2 57.58 [61] 
 (23.83) 
P1*D1+P2 63.37 [68] 
 (23.63) 
Average 61.80 [66] 
 (24.13) 
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NC tasks are roughly the same, with means ranging from 61 to 69 and medians ranging from 
61 to 71.  This result is in line with the previous findings, that is, a majority of participants 
inspected all or almost all the offers.   
Result 2: In all tasks, a majority of participants inspected all or almost all the offers. 
In PC tasks many participants inspected all individuated standard offers.  The average 
number of offers inspected was lower when tasks contained fewer common standard offers.  
The evidence does not support the hypothesis that participants employed the LCS or random 
selection heuristics.   
3.5.3 The offer inspecting sequence in PC tasks 
Although LCS and some common standard unrelated heuristics are eliminated, it is 
still ambiguous which heuristic most participants employed.   
Recall that the key difference between DE, SF and common standard unrelated 
heuristics is the sequence of inspecting common standard offers.  If participants employed the 
DE heuristic, in PC tasks, one would observe a clear offer inspection sequence showing that 
participants first inspected common standard offers and then inspected individuated standard 
offers.  If participants employed the SF heuristic, the offer inspection sequence would be 
different, that is, first all offers would be inspected without any distinction between common 
standard and individuated standard offers, and then only common standard offers would be 
inspected.  But, if participants employed common standard unrelated heuristics, the 
inspection sequence would not discriminate between the two types of offer.   
Now let us look at participants' offer inspection sequence in PC tasks.  To simplify the 
analysis, some additional variables will now be introduced.   
For each participant, the total number of clicks used during the course of a given task 
could be different.  To normalise the spectrum of each task, each click of a participant is 
converted into a corresponding percentage of the whole spectrum of total clicks ranging from 
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0% to 100% calculated as the quotient of 100% divided by total number of clicks made by a 
participant.  I use this normalisation to create a new variable called clicking time.  Clicking 
time represents how much of a task has been completed according to the number of clicks 
used in the course of the task.  The unit of clicking time is not "second" but "percentage".  
For example, if in the course of a task, a participant has clicked a total of 200 times, then 
each click is converted to 0.5% of the whole spectrum (100%/200 clicks), and so each click 
increases clicking time by 0.5 percentage points.  But if a participant made a total of only 50 
clicks in the course of a task, then her each click is converted to 2% of the whole spectrum 
(100%/50 clicks), for this participant, each click increases clicking time by 2 percentage 
points.   
In the following figures and tables, the clicking time of a task is divided into 10 equal 
clicking time intervals.  Remember that the number of clicks used in a clicking time interval 
may be different for different participants.  The data in table 3.7 implies that on average each 
clicking time interval contains about 6 to 7 clicks.   
Summing over all 171 participants, for each PC task and each clicking time interval, I 
count (a) the total number of offers inspected and (b) the total number of common standard 
offers inspected.  The ratio of (b) to (a) is the proportion of common standard inspections.  
Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 plot the trends of these proportions for the three PC tasks.  
Corresponding tables K8, K9 and K10 can be found in Appendix K.   
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Figure 3.7: Proportion of common standard inspections over course of task: PC (P1*D1) task 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Proportion of common standard inspections over course of task: PC (P1*D1*D2) 
task 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Clicking time interval
PC (P1*D1) Task
Proportion of common
standard inspections
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Clicking time interval
PC (P1*D1*D2) Task
Proportion of common
standard inspections
120 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Proportion of common standard inspections over course of task: PC (P1*D1+P2) 
task 
 
Since in each PC task eight out of the twenty-four offers are common standard offers, 
if participants inspected offers in a random sequence the proportion of common standard 
inspections would be around 0.33 throughout the task.  However, in all PC tasks we observe 
that the proportion of common standard inspections is approximately 0.7 in the first clicking 
interval (0.687, 0.654 and 0.703 in P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively) 
and this value decreases over the course of the experiment to approximately 0.1 in the last 
clicking time interval (0.114, 0.107 and 0.146 in P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, 
respectively).  This pattern indicates that many participants inspected the offer in a common-
standard-related offer inspecting sequence, that is, they first inspected the common standard 
offers and then inspected the individuated standard offers.  This offer inspecting sequence 
eliminates the possibility that participants employed the SF heuristic.  It is consistent with the 
possibility that many participants employed the DE heuristic.   
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It is also useful to look at how the contents of the shopping basket changed over the 
course of a task.  For each PC task and for each clicking time interval, aggregating over all 
participants, I calculate (a) the average number of offers in the shopping basket and (b) the 
average number of common standard offers in the shopping basket.  The ratio of (b) to (a) is 
the proportion of common standard offers in the shopping basket.  Figures 3.10, 3.11 and 
3.12 plot the trends of these proportions for the three PC tasks.  Corresponding tables K11, 
K12 and K13 can be found in Appendix K.   
 
 
Figure 3.10: Proportion of common standard offers in the shopping basket: PC (P1*D1) task 
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Figure 3.11: Proportion of common standard offers in the shopping basket: PC (P1*D1*D2) 
task 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Proportion of common standard offers in the shopping basket: PC (P1*D1+P2) 
task 
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In all PC tasks, the proportion of common standard offers in the shopping basket was 
between 0.6 and 0.7 in the first clicking time interval (0.619, 0.637 and 0.699 in P1*D1, 
P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively), decreasing over the course of the task to 
approximately 0.2 in the last clicking time interval (0.225, 0.214 and 0.199 in P1*D1, 
P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively).  This pattern is again consistent with the 
possibility that many participants employed the DE heuristic.   
3.5.4 Sensitivity to price information 
Although a common-standard-related offer inspecting sequence has been observed, it 
is still possible that a participant may not be sensitive to the final prices of offers.  For 
example, she might choose a common standard offer from among all common standard offers 
at random, or according to its position on the screen, and then compare this offer with 
individuated standard offers in order to make a final decision.  If this was the case, even 
though the participant would be using a common-standard-related offer inspecting sequence, 
she would not be using the DE heuristic.   
Because an offer could be bought only when it was in the shopping basket, and 
because the shopping basket had a limited capacity, participants who are sensitive to prices 
need to keep offers with low final prices in the shopping basket and remove offers with high 
final prices.  If the majority of the participants employed the DE heuristic and were 
cognitively unconstrained, one would observe that in AC and PC tasks, once the cheapest 
common standard offer has been put into the shopping basket, it will stay there until all more 
expensive common standard offers have been eliminated.   
For each participant, the course of each task can be divided into a sequence of 
moments 1, …, N, each corresponding with one click.  For each moment i, for any given 
offer, I define the offer’s basket status Bi as 1 if the offer is in the shopping basket at that 
moment and 0 if it is not.  The ten clicking time intervals can be defined by the sets of 
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moments T1 = {1, …, N/10}, …, T10 = {(9N/10)+1, …, N}.  I define the probability that the 
offer is in the shopping basket in interval Tt as: 
ProbabilityInBasket =∑ 𝐵𝑖  (
𝑁
10
)⁄𝑖∈𝑇𝑡  
In each task, each offer can be assigned one of the ranks 1, …, 24, according to its 
final price.  The offer with the lowest final price, which we will call the optimal offer, is 
given the rank 1; the offer with the highest final price is given the rank 24. 
First, I consider the AC tasks.  In these tasks, all 24 offers are common standard 
offers.  Consider how the basket status of offers with different ranks will change over the 
course of a task if all participants use the DE heuristic, without making any errors.  Since 
putting offers in the basket uses clicking time, ProbabiltyInBasket will be low for all offers in 
the first clicking time interval.  Because all visible non-price attributes of offers (e.g. position 
on screen) were randomized, the order of initial inspection of offers (identified by final price) 
must be random.  Different participants will discover the optimal offer in different clicking 
time intervals.  However, once a participant has discovered the optimal offer, it will not be 
removed from the basket.  Thus, for the optimal offer, ProbabilityInBasket will increase over 
the course of the task until it reaches its maximum value of 1.  Non-optimal offers, on the 
other hand, will tend to be moved out of the shopping basket when cheaper offers are 
discovered.  The lower the final price of an offer, the higher the probability that it will stay in 
the basket until the end of the task.  Figures 3.13 to 3.16 plot average ProbabilityInBasket 
over the course of each AC task for different sets of offers, classified by rank.  To keep the 
diagram readable, we use only four sets of ranks, but because we are particularly interested in 
the optimal offer, we give this a set of its own.  (The complete data for figures 3.13 to 3.25 
are provided in tables K14 to K26 in Appendix K.)   
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Figure 3.13: ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: AC (P1) 
task 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14: ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: AC 
(P1*D1) task 
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Figure 3.15: ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: AC 
(P1*D1*D2) task 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16: ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: AC 
(P1*D1+P2) task 
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In all AC tasks, ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer increases from under 0.02 in 
the first clicking time interval (0.017, 0.018, 0.003 and 0.012 in P, P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and 
P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively) to over 0.8 in the last interval (0.858, 0.851, 0.807 and 0.019 
in P, P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively). Other high-rank offers (those 
with ranks 2, 3 and 4) have a higher probability of staying in the shopping basket until the 
end of the task than offers with lower ranks.  These results support the hypothesis that 
participants discriminate between common standard offers according to their final prices.  
We now consider the NC tasks.  In these tasks, there is no common standard, and so 
the dominance editing operation of the DE heuristic cannot be used.  Figures 3.17, 3.18 and 
3.19 plot average ProbabilityInBasket over the course of each NC task for different sets of 
offers, classified by rank in the same way as before.   
 
 
Figure 3.17: ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: NC 
(P1*D1) task 
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Figure 3.18: ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: NC 
(P1*D1*D2) task 
 
 
 
Figure 3.19: ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: NC 
(P1*D1+P2) task 
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In all three NC tasks, ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer increases slowly over 
the course of the task and in the final clicking time interval is higher for this offer than for 
lower-ranked offers.  But the final value of this probability (0.476, 0.396, and 0.474 in 
P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks, respectively) is much lower, and much closer to the 
probabilities for lower-ranked offers, than in the corresponding AC tasks.  This may be 
because it is hard for cognitively constrained participants to compare individuated standard 
offers.  Although participants are not completely insensitive to price information, many 
participants fail to discover and choose the optimal individuated standard offer due to its 
complexity and so they end up choosing a suboptimal offer.   
Finally, I consider the PC tasks.  In reporting ProbabilityInBasket data for these tasks, 
I classify offers not only by their ranks (defined as before) in the set of 24 offers, but also by 
whether they were common standard or individuated standard offers. I also give special 
attention to the cheapest common standard offer – that is, the offer with the lowest final price 
in the subset of eight offers that have a common standard.  Because the 24 final prices were 
randomized between common and individuated standards, the cheapest common standard 
offer need not be the optimal offer (i.e. the offer with rank 1).  The cheapest common 
standard offer has special significance in relation to the DE heuristic, because this heuristic 
begins by eliminating all common standard offers other than the cheapest. 
Figures 3.20, 3.21 and 3.22 plot average ProbabilityInBasket for common standard 
offers over the course of the three PC tasks.  In each figure, one graph plots 
ProbabilityInBasket for the cheapest common standard offer.  The other three graphs plot 
ProbabiltyInBasket for the seven remaining common standard offers, grouped by their ranks 
in the set of 24 offers.  (The highest possible rank is 2, because a common standard offer with 
rank 1 would necessarily be the cheapest common standard offer.)   
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Figures 3.23, 3.24 and 3.25 plot ProbabilityInBasket for individuated standard offers 
over the course of the three PC tasks.  To allow comparisons with the graphs for common 
standard offers, offers are classified in a similar way – that is, one graph plots 
ProbabilityinBasket for the cheapest individuated standard offer, and the other three graphs 
plot ProbabiltyInBasket for the fifteen remaining individuated standard offers, grouped by 
their ranks in the set of 24 offers.   
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Figure 3.20: ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: PC 
(P1*D1) task 
 
 
 
Figure 3.21: ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: PC 
(P1*D1*D2) task 
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Figure 3.22: ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: PC 
(P1*D1+P2) task 
 
 
 
Figure 3.23: ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: PC 
(P1*D1) task 
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Figure 3.24: ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: PC 
(P1*D1*D2) task 
 
 
 
Figure 3.25: ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: PC 
(P1*D1+P2) task 
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In all three PC tasks, ProbabilityInBasket for the cheapest common standard offer 
increases steadily over the first half of the task, rising to approximately 0.6.  In the PC 
(P1*D1) and PC (P1*D1*D2) tasks it remains almost constant, but with a slight downward 
trend, from then on; in the PC (P1*D1+P2) task it falls gradually over the second half of the 
task to approximately 0.4 in the final interval.  On the other hand, ProbabilityInBasket for the 
other seven common standard offers rises over the first three clicking time intervals but drops 
sharply afterwards.  This pattern implies that first, many participants compared the common 
standard offers at the beginning of a PC task and second, common standard offers other than 
the cheapest were moved from the shopping basket at an early stage in the task.  This 
suggests that, in the later part of the task, most participants were comparing the cheapest 
common standard offer with individuated standard offers.  Because of randomization, the 
cheapest common standard offer was optimal in only one third of cases.  Thus, even if 
participants were not cognitively constrained, we would expect these comparisons to lead to 
some removals of the cheapest common standard offer from the shopping basket.   
In all three PC tasks, ProbabilityInBasket for individuated standard offers of all ranks 
increases slowly but continuously over the course of the task (except for some slight declines 
in the final clicking time interval).  The rate of increase for the cheapest individuated 
standard offer is not much greater than that for lower-ranked individuated standard offers.  
The patterns in these figures are similar to those observed in the NC tasks.   
These results for PC tasks are consistent with the hypothesis that many participants 
used the DE heuristic.  That is, participants first compared common standard offers, finding 
the cheapest of these, and then compared the cheapest common standard offer with 
individuated standard offers.   
Result 3: In tasks in which some but not all offers have a common standard, many 
participants begin by comparing the common standard offers, eliminating all of them except 
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the cheapest.  They then try to choose the lowest-priced offer from among non-eliminated 
offers.   
3.5.5 Cognitively constrained participants 
Recall that, if a perfectly rational participant employs the DE heuristic, after all 
common standard offers other than the cheapest have been moved from the shopping basket, 
the cheapest common standard offer will remain in the shopping basket unless the participant 
finds an individuated standard offer with a lower final price.  If such an offer is found before 
all offers have been inspected, the cheapest common standard offer may then be moved from 
the shopping basket to create space for further comparisons.  If the cheapest common 
standard offer is the optimal offer, it will stay in the shopping basket until the end of the task 
and finally be chosen.  However, for cognitively constrained consumers, an offer’s price 
signal contains errors, so in a PC task, even if the cheapest common standard offer is the 
optimal offer, it is still possible that a cognitively constrained consumer would mistakenly 
move it out of the shopping basket and end up choosing a suboptimal individuated standard 
offer.   
This raises the question: How many participants were constrained by complexity?  It 
is clear that in AC tasks, the majority of participants successfully chose the optimal offer.  
This implies that very few participants were constrained by the complexity of comparisons 
between common standard offers.  In NC tasks, the majority of participants failed to choose 
the optimal offer, which implies that many participants were constrained by the complexity 
of comparisons between offers with different standards.  However, it is hard to answer the 
question for PC tasks using only the data in Figures 3.20 to 3.25.  This is because in these 
tasks the cheapest common standard offer is not necessary the optimal offer, and so moving 
that offer out of the shopping basket may be rational behaviour for some participants.  A 
similar argument applies to the cheapest individuated standard offer.   
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To investigate whether or not participants were constrained by the complexity of price 
comparisons in tasks with both common standard and individuated standard offers, I use 
Figures 3.26, 3.27 and 3.28.  For each PC task, these figures plot ProbabilityInBasket for the 
optimal offer under two alternative conditions – first, that the optimal offer is a common 
standard offer, and second, that it is an individuated standard offer.  Corresponding tables 
K27, K28 and K29 can be found in Appendix K.   
 
Figure 3.26: ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer, conditional on its standard: PC 
(P1*D1) task 
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Figure 3.27: ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer, conditional on its standard: PC 
(P1*D1*D2) task 
 
 
 
Figure 3.28: ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer, conditional on its standard: PC 
(P1*D1+P2) task 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
In
B
as
ke
t
Clicking time interval
PC (P1*D1*D2) Task
The optimal offers is an
individuated standard
offer
The optimal offers is a
common standard offer
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
In
B
as
ke
t
Clicking time interval
PC (P1*D1+P2) Task
The optimal offers is an
individuated standard
offer
The optimal offers is a
common standard offer
138 
 
In all three PC tasks, when the optimal offer is a common standard offer, its 
ProbabilityInBasket increases sharply during the first four clicking time intervals, reaching a 
value of around 0.6 or 0.7.  In the P1*D1 and P1*D1*D2 tasks, this probability remains 
stable for the rest of the task; in the P1*D1+P2 task, it falls steadily to a final value of about 
0.35.  When the optimal offer is an individuated standard offer, its Probability-In-Basket 
increases throughout the task but, except in the final two intervals of the P1*P2+D1 task, is 
always below the corresponding probability for common standard offers.  The trend of 
ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer clearly differs according to whether the optimal 
offer is a common or individuated standard offer.  This again implies that many participants 
used a heuristic related to the common standard.   
Recall that participants could only buy an offer if it was in the shopping basket, so if 
all participants were cognitively unlimited, ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer in the 
last clicking time interval would be very close to one.  However, when the optimal offer is a 
common standard offer, this probability is 0.631, 0.637 and 0.350 in the P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 
and P1*D1+P2 tasks respectively; when the optimal offer is an individuated standard offer, it 
is 0.384, 0.342 and 0.432 in the P1*D1, P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks respectively.  The 
fact that none of these values is close to 1 implies that many participants were constrained by 
the complexity of the PC tasks, and did not end up choosing the optimal offer (both when this 
was a common standard offer and when it was an individuated standard offer).   
Consider the case in which the optimal offer is a common standard offer.  If all 
participants employ the DE heuristic and some of them are cognitively constrained, 
ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer will increase sharply in the early part of the task 
(when participants are comparing common standard offers and eliminating those that are not 
cheapest), but is likely to decrease later in the task (when participants are comparing the 
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optimal offer with sub-optimal individuated standard offers) since some participants may 
mistakenly move the optimal offer out of the shopping basket.   
This pattern is observed in the P1*D1+P2 task, but not in the P1*D1 and P1*D1*D2 
tasks.  To try to understand why this is the case, it is useful to look in more detail at 
movements of the optimal offer into and out of the shopping basket.  Table 3.8 shows, for 
every task in the experiment, the number of participants who moved the optimal offer out of 
the shopping basket during the course of a task.  This table shows that in AC tasks, once the 
optimal offer had been put into the shopping basket, it was very unlikely to be moved out.  
The number of participants who moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket was 
much higher in NC and PC tasks.  Notice that in all PC tasks, optimal offers that were also 
common standard offers were sometimes moved out of the shopping basket, but this occurred 
most frequently in the PC (P1*D1+P2) task.   
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Table 3.8: The number of participants who moved the optimal offer out of the shopping 
basket during the course of a task 
Note: There are 171 observations in each task 
 
Tables K30 to K42 in Appendix K provide further details about the movements of the 
optimal offer into and out of the shopping basket over the course of each task.  For each 
clicking time interval, these tables show how many participants had the optimal offer in the 
shopping basket at the beginning of that interval, how many of them kept that optimal offer in 
the shopping basket and how many of them moved it out of the shopping basket during the 
clicking time interval.74  Tables C30 to C36 show that participants were more likely to make 
mistakes in NC tasks than in AC tasks.  Tables C37 and C39 show that, in the later intervals 
of PC tasks in which the optimal offer was a common standard offer, some participants were 
moving the optimal offer into the shopping basket while others were moving it out.  In the PC 
(P1*D1) and PC (P1*D1*D2) tasks, these movements approximately offset one another, 
producing the aggregate stability of ProbabilityInBasket over these intervals that was 
                                                          
74 According to the experimental design, no offer can be put into the shopping basket at the first click.  So the 
number of participants for whom the optimal offer is in the shopping basket is at the beginning of the 0%-10% 
clicking time interval is always 0.  For this reason, the clicking time intervals in these tables start from the 10%-
20% clicking time interval.  
Tasks Number of participants 
who moved the 
optimal offer, which is 
also a common 
standard offer, out of 
the shopping basket 
Number of participants 
who moved the 
optimal offer, which is 
also an individuated 
standard offer, out of 
the shopping basket 
Total 
AC    
P1 2  2 
P1*D1 0  0 
P1*D1*D2 1  1 
P1*D1+P2 4  4 
PC    
P1*D1 15 14 29 
P1*D1*D2 9 24 33 
P1*D1+P2 28 24 52 
NC    
P1*D1  36 36 
P1*D1*D2  31 31 
P1*D1+P2  41 41 
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observed in Figures 3.26 and 3.27.  A possible explanation is that a significant minority of 
participants did not use the DE heuristic, and that these participants were responsible for the 
movement of optimal offers into the basket in the later intervals.  (This explanation is also 
supported by the evidence, shown in Figures 3.7 to 3.9 above, that in the later intervals of PC 
tasks, between 10% and 20% of inspections were of common standard offers.)   
Result 4: Many participants are cognitively constrained.  The majority of the 
participants are able to find the optimal offer if all offers have a common standard.  However, 
participants are more likely to make mistakes when comparing individuated standard offers, 
and as a result, many participants choose suboptimal offers when not all offers have a 
common standard. 
There is clear evidence that many participants employ the DE heuristic when they 
face complex decision problems involving a mix of common and individuated standards. 
Nevertheless, as shown above, if participants are cognitively constrained, they may not be 
able to maximise their monetary payoffs in problems of this kind.  In this case, the DE 
heuristic is not necessarily the optimal heuristic in terms of earnings.   
Table 3.9 shows the average final earnings for participants and the hypothetical 
earnings if every participant always used the LCS heuristic and did not make errors.  In AC 
tasks, the LCS heuristic always chooses the optimal offer.  Actual earnings in these tasks are 
quite close to the hypothetical values.  This indicates that most participants were able to find 
the cheapest of 24 common standard offers.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that most 
participants had the cognitive ability to use the LCS heuristic accurately in PC tasks (where 
that heuristic would require them only to find the cheapest of eight common standard offers).   
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Tasks Actual earnings Hypothetical earnings 
AC   
P1 11.40  11.73 
 (1.36)  
P1*D1 11.26 11.73 
 (1.64)  
P1*D1*D2 11.05 11.73 
 (2.06)  
P1*D1+P2 11.23 11.73 
 (1.71)  
Average 11.23 11.73 
 (1.71)  
PC   
P1*D1 10.41 11.09 
 (1.94) (0.72) 
P1*D1*D2 9.43 11.04 
 (2.44) (0.78) 
P1*D1+P2 10.04 11.12 
 (2.04) (0.66) 
Average 9.96 11.08 
 (2.19) (0.72) 
NC   
P1*D1 10.11 N/A 
 (2.00)  
P1*D1*D2 9.26 N/A 
 (2.52)  
P1*D1+P2 10.11 N/A 
 (2.07)  
Average 9.83 N/A 
 (2.24)  
 
Table 3.9: Actual final earnings for participants and the hypothetical earnings if every 
participant always used the LCS heuristic 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations. There are 171 observations in each task. 
 
However, in PC tasks, actual average earnings (£9.96) are significantly lower than 
hypothetical earnings (£11.08) (sign test, pooled data, z = 7.48, p<0.001).  The difference 
between actual and hypothetical earnings in the P1*D1 task is not significant (sign test, z = 
1.52, p=0.13), but it is significant in the P1*D1*D2 and P1*D1+P2 tasks (sign test, z = 6.53, 
p<0.001; z = 4.80, p<0.001, respectively).  Since the P1*D1 task has the least complex price 
structure, these results suggest that when the price structure is relatively complex, the DE 
heuristic is less efficient than the LCS heuristic in terms of final earnings.   
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Result 5: For cognitively constrained participants facing complex decision problems 
involving a mix of common and individuated standards, the LCS heuristic is more efficient 
than the DE heuristic in terms of maximising monetary payoffs.   
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
The experiment reported above has investigated the heuristics consumers employ in 
specific environments.  There are two main findings.  First, many consumers are likely to 
employ the DE heuristic when they face complex decision problems involving homogenous 
goods priced according to different standards.  Second, common standards help consumers to 
make price comparisons, but if most offers have individuated standards, the presence of a 
subset of common standard offers does little to improve decision-making.  This is because 
many consumers are cognitively constrained.   
The finding that very few consumers employ the LCS heuristic is inconsistent with 
the assumption made by Gaudeul and Sugden (2012).  They assume that there exist some 
consumers who employ the LCS heuristic in retail markets.  Apparently, at least in the short 
run, this assumption was a bit too optimistic.  My results indicate that, at least prior to any 
long-run learning, consumers are likely to employ the DE heuristic rather than the LCS, SF or 
common standard unrelated ones.  Notice that time constraints were not employed in the 
present experiment, because in most of the purchasing cases, consumers do not have to make 
decisions within an explicit time limitation.  Possibly, in studies that involve time constraints 
(e.g. Crosetto and Gaudeul, 2012), some participants may switch from one shortlisting 
heuristic to another.  But this is not the research question that I am trying to explore in the 
present chapter.   
The main reason why many individuals employed the DE heuristic rather than the 
LCS heuristic may be because of overconfidence (Adams & Adams, 1961; Oskamp, 1965; 
Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Malmendier & Tate, 2006).  There is evidence indicating that 
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people tend to be more overconfident when facing complex tasks.  This is the so called hard-
easy effect (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977).  After having found the cheapest common 
standard offer, consumers who are sufficiently confident about their cognitive abilities will 
continue inspecting offers in the belief that, if the optimal offer is an individuated standard 
offer, they will be able to find it.  However, further comparisons may reduce their final 
earnings, because when trying to work out the absolute values for offer prices, the price 
signals for individuated standard offers contain errors.  This is in fact what I found in the 
experiment.  Many participants made mistakes when they compared the cheapest common 
standard offer to individuated standard offers.  The present chapter does not provide direct 
evidence showing that overconfidence must be the only reason why many participants 
employed the DE heuristic and this will be interesting for future studies to explore.  Research 
into overconfidence and underconfidence is relevant to domains such as finance (Thomson et 
al., 2003), eyewitness testimony (Wells et al., 1981; Loftus et al., 1989), autobiographical 
memory (Barclay & Wellman, 1986), meteorology (Murphy and Winkler, 1984) etc.  Many 
previous studies attempt to express confidence in relation to probability judgments, but there 
are very few empirical studies exploring people’s levels of confidence in their own cognitive 
abilities.  This could be a productive research direction.   
In conclusion, my findings suggest that consumers can make purchasing decisions 
more efficiently when the prices of all goods are expressed in a common standard, but that 
common standards will benefit consumers only if almost all firms use them.  In contrast to 
what would happen if consumers used the LCS heuristic, the shortlisting heuristic that most 
consumers are inclined to use – the DE heuristic – gives firms incentives to deviate from 
common standards.  If consumers use the DE heuristic, a pricing regime in which all firms 
used a common standard would not be self-sustaining because individual firms could benefit 
by switching to individuated standard offers as a way of exploiting cognitively constrained 
145 
 
consumers.  These findings challenge conventional assumptions about market efficiency and 
have implications for the regulation of retail markets.  They suggest that, if policy makers 
want firms to use common standards, they may have to impose them by law.  Alternatively, 
in order to help cognitively constrained consumers, government might promote third party 
institutions which convert individuated standard prices into a common standard.  For 
example, government could promote or subsidize online price comparison search engines 
such as Which?, so as to protect cognitively constrained consumers from being exploited by 
firms that provide suboptimal individuated standard offers.   
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Appendix A 
Experimental instructions (WTA) 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for coming.  In this experiment you will be 
making a series of choices involving money and various goods.  Everyone who takes part will 
earn some money or get some goods at the end of the experiment.  We have cash and goods 
with us, so you will be paid before you leave today. 
We shall say more about what will be involved in the experiment soon.  Before we do 
this, I would like to set some ground rules, which you must all observe.  There must be no 
talking during the experiment unless you want to ask me a question – in which case, simply 
raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.  You must not attempt to look 
at what other people are doing. 
Also, please follow all instructions on your computer screen.  There will be times 
during the experiment when you will be required to wait for others.  Please wait patiently and 
please do not attempt to open any other application on your computer. 
Please keep to these simple rules, because anyone breaking them may be asked to 
leave the experiment without any reward. 
We are now ready to describe the nature of the tasks within the experiment. 
 
Tasks 
There are 11 periods in the experiment and at the end of the experiment your payoff 
will be determined by your decisions in one of these periods which the computer will pick 
randomly. 
In each period you are endowed with one good.  The good may be a food item, some 
other consumer product, some National Lotteries, or a ‘win-win gamble’.   
 
158 
 
If this period is picked by the computer to determine your payoff and you choose to 
keep the good this good will be yours.   
A win-win gamble has three different amounts of money, one of which you will win; 
the outcome of the gamble is determined by the computer.    
Depending on what you have said you prefer to do, you will either keep the good or 
sell it for money. 
There are two tasks in each period.  In the first task, you will be asked to answer 
either one or two questions. 
In the second task, you will be asked 25 questions.  Each of these asks you how you 
would respond to an opportunity to sell the good you have been endowed with.  You are 
asked to consider an offer of a stated amount of money, and you have to say whether or not 
you would accept this offer.  
All 25 questions are shown on the same screen, with the lowest offer at the top and 
the highest offer at the bottom.  To simplify this task, if in any question you say “Yes” to an 
offer of “x” for your good, the computer will assume that you accept all offers greater than “x” 
and so it will automatically answer “Yes” for you to these questions.  And vice versa, if in 
any question you say “No” to an offer of “y” for your good, the computer will assume that 
you reject all offers less than “y” and so it will automatically answer “No” for you to these 
questions.  
Whenever you are asked to answer a question, the screen will have either a RED or 
BLUE background.  If a question has a RED background, there is a chance that the question 
is for real.  We will explain what this means later.  
 
After you have completed the tasks in all 11 periods, you can click OK and you will 
be asked to wait until everyone in this room has completed their tasks.  
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For each question, we want you to give an honest and considered response.  For 
example, in a task in which you have been endowed with a win-win gamble, you should 
accept any offer which, FROM YOUR PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE, exceeds the value TO 
YOU of playing out the lottery.  Similarly, you should reject any offer which YOU think is 
worth less to YOU than playing out the win-win gamble.  The same applies when you have 
been endowed with other goods.  
You may find that some of the tasks are quite similar to one another, but it is 
important for the experiment that you complete all of them.    
So let me stress that there are no tricks involved in our tasks, neither are there right or 
wrong answers.  We simply want you to give honest and considered responses; and it is in 
your interests to do so. 
One of the red background tasks you face is for real.  At the end of the experiment the 
computer will randomly pick one of the red background tasks and within that period, the 
computer will randomly pick one of the questions.  That question will have asked you to 
consider an offer of a specific amount of money in return for the good you were endowed 
with in that period.  If you chose to accept that offer, you will receive that amount of money 
instead of the good.  We will pay you immediately in cash.  If you chose to reject the offer, 
you will keep the good.    
If the good is a food item, a consumer product or some National Lotteries, you will be 
given the good to take away.  If it is a win-win gamble, the computer will run it and tell you 
the result; you will then be given the amount of money you won. 
 
Before we move to the first task, please raise your hand if you have any questions.  
Before starting to take decisions, we ask you to answer the questionnaire in next several 
screens, with the only purpose of checking whether you have understood these instructions.  
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Experimental instructions (WTP) 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for coming.  In this experiment you will be 
making a series of choices involving money and various goods.  Everyone who takes part will 
earn some money or get some goods at the end of the experiment.  We have cash and goods 
with me and so you will be paid before you leave today.  
We shall say more about what will be involved in the experiment soon.  Before we do 
this, we would like to set some ground rules, which you must all observe.  There must be no 
talking during the experiment unless you want to ask me a question – in which case, simply 
raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.  You must not attempt to look 
at what other people are doing.  
Also, please follow all instructions on your computer screen.  There will be times 
during the experiment when you will be required to wait for others.  Please wait patiently and 
please do not attempt to open any other application on your computer.  
Please keep to these simple rules, because anyone breaking them may be asked to 
leave the experiment without any reward.  
We are now ready to describe the nature of the tasks within the experiment. 
 
Tasks 
There are 11 periods in the experiment and at the end of the experiment your payoff 
will be determined by your decisions in one of these periods which the computer will pick 
randomly.  
In each period you are endowed with £12 and you have an opportunity to buy a good 
or some goods.  The good may be a food item, some other consumer product, some National 
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Lotteries, or a "win-win gamble".  If this period is picked by the computer to determine your 
payoff and you choose to buy the good, this good will be yours.   
A win-win gamble has three different amounts of money, one of which you will win; 
the outcome of the gamble is determined by the computer.   
Depending on what you have said you prefer to do, you will either keep all of the £12 
or you will spend some or all of that money to buy a good.  
There are two tasks in each period.  In the first task, you will be asked to answer 
either one or two questions. 
In the second task, you will be asked 25 questions.  Each of these asks you how you 
would respond to an opportunity to buy the good by using some or all of the money you have 
been endowed with.  You are asked to consider a stated money price, and you have to say 
whether or not you would pay this price.  
All 25 questions are shown on the same screen, with the lowest price at the top and 
the highest price at the bottom.  To simplify this task, if in any question you say "Yes" to a 
price of "x" for your good, the computer will assume that you would pay all prices lower than 
"x" and so it will automatically answer "Yes" for you to these questions.  And vice versa, if in 
any question you say "No" to a price of "y" for your good, the computer will assume that you 
reject all prices higher than "y" and so it will automatically answer "No" for you to these 
questions. 
Whenever you are asked to answer a question, the screen will have either a RED or 
BLUE background.  If a question has a RED   background, there is a chance that the question 
is for real.  We will explain what this means later.   
 
After you have completed the tasks in all 11 periods, you can click OK and you will 
be asked to wait until everyone in this room has completed their tasks.  
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For each question, we want you to give an honest and considered response.  For 
example, in a task in which you have the opportunity to buy a win-win gamble, you should 
pay any price which, FROM YOUR PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE, is less than the value TO 
YOU of playing out the win-win gamble.  Similarly, you should reject any price which YOU 
think is worth more to YOU than playing out the win-win gamble.  The same applies when 
you have opportunities to buy other goods.   
It is important for the experiment that you complete all of them.   
So let me stress that there are no tricks involved in our tasks, neither are there right or 
wrong answers.  We simply want you to give honest and considered responses; and it is in 
your interests to do so.  
One of the red background tasks you face is for real.  At the end of the experiment the 
computer will randomly pick one of the red background tasks and within that task, the 
computer will randomly pick one of the questions.  That question will have asked you to 
consider a specific price for buying the good that was being offered in that period.  If you 
chose not to pay that price, you will keep all of your £12 endowment.  We will pay you 
immediately in cash.  If you chose to pay that price, you will receive the good and the price 
will be deducted from your £12 endowment.     
If the good is a food item, a consumer product or some National lotteries, you can 
take the good away.  If it is a win-win gamble, the computer will run it and tell you the result; 
you will then be given the amount of money you won.   
Before we move to the first task, please raise your hand if you have any questions.  
Before starting to take decisions, we ask you to answer the questionnaire in next several 
screens, with the only purpose of checking whether you have understood these instructions.   
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Appendix B 
An example of experimental task’s screen shots 
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Appendix C 
Regression results for different commodity 
WTA OLS cluster 6 regressions 
Observations: 108 participants over 11 periods   
Estimation methods: OLS with clustering the variable “subjects”. 
Dependent Variable: Participants’ WTA 
Independent Variables: Period, High anchor (High anchor=1 if the anchor is high; 0 else) 
This table shows the coefficients, standard errors (in brackets) and significant levels (*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10) of 9 regressions using different anchor 
types.  
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity Win-win 
gamble 
Two bottles of 
Chinese sauce 
Box of 
chocolate 
Towel Pen Five National 
Lottery scratch 
cards 
 (180 obs.) (180 obs.) (180 obs.) (180 obs.) (180 obs.) (108 obs.) 
Period -0.035 0.182*** -0.032 0.038 -0.129* 0.020 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.40) (0.08) (0.44) 
       
       
High anchor 0.384  0.596*** 0.607*** 0.402** 0.494** 0.445* 
 (0.24) (0.21) (0.19) (0.16) (0.22) (0.26) 
Constant 6.134*** 2.797*** 5.769*** 4.613*** 4.196*** 5.848*** 
 (0.57) (0.40) (0.48) (0.48) (0.63) (0.53) 
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WTP OLS cluster 6 regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations: 120 participants over 11 periods   
Estimation methods: OLS with clustering the variable “subjects”. 
Dependent Variable: Participants’ WTP 
Independent Variables: Period, High anchor (High anchor=1 if the anchor is high; 0 else) 
This table shows the coefficients, standard errors (in brackets) and significant levels (*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10) of 9 regressions using different anchor 
types.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity Win-win 
gamble 
Two bottles of 
Chinese sauce 
Box of 
chocolate 
Towel Pen Five National 
Lottery scratch 
cards 
 (200 obs.) (200 obs.) (200 obs.) (200 obs.) (200 obs.) (200 obs.) 
Period -0.089* -0.031 -0.031 -0.005 -0.019 -0.108** 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.31) (0.02) (0.05) 
       
       
High anchor 0.099 0.163*** 0.157* 0.037 0.045 0.170* 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) 
Constant 2.650*** 1.015*** 1.786*** 1.599*** 0.652*** 2.674*** 
 (0.45) (0.19) (0.28) (0.26) (0.15) (0.43) 
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WTA random effect 6 regressions 
Observations: 108 participants over 11 periods   
Estimation methods: Random effect regression. 
Dependent Variable: Participants’ WTA 
Independent Variables: Period, High anchor (High anchor=1 if the anchor is high; 0 else) 
This table shows the coefficients, standard errors (in brackets) and significant levels (*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10) of 9 regressions using different anchor 
types.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity Win-win 
gamble 
Two bottles of 
Chinese sauce 
Box of 
chocolate 
Towel Pen Five National 
Lottery scratch 
cards 
 (180 obs.) (180 obs.) (180 obs.) (180 obs.) (180 obs.) (108 obs.) 
Period 0.020 0.126*** 0.056* 0.005 -0.016 0.060 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
       
       
High anchor 0.392 0.625*** 0.663*** 0.400** 0.563*** 0.434* 
 (0.24) (0.21) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20) (0.26) 
Constant 5.787*** 3.117*** 5.201*** 4.807*** 3.473*** 5.622*** 
 (0.46) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36) (0.43) (0.46) 
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WTP random effect 6 regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations: 120 participants over 11 periods   
Estimation methods: Random effect regression. 
Dependent Variable: Participants’ WTA 
Independent Variables: Period, High anchor (High anchor=1 if the anchor is high; 0 else) 
This table shows the coefficients, standard errors (in brackets) and significant levels (*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10) of 9 regressions using different anchor 
types.
Commodity Win-win 
gamble 
Two bottles of 
Chinese sauce 
Box of 
chocolate 
Towel Pen Five National 
Lottery scratch 
cards 
 (200 obs.) (200 obs.) (200 obs.) (200 obs.) (200 obs.) (200 obs.) 
Period -0.078** -0.022* -0.052** -0.027* -0.016 -0.043** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
       
       
High anchor 0.096 0.161*** 0.141 0.044 0.044 0.158* 
 (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) 
Constant 2.587*** 0.957*** 1.923*** 1.720*** 0.637*** 2.295*** 
 (0.26) (0.14) (0.19) (0.21) (0.11) (0.24) 
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Regression results for different types of anchors 
WTA OLS cluster 9 regressions 
Observations: 108 participants over 11 periods   
Estimation methods: OLS with clustering the variable “subjects”. 
Dependent Variable: Participants’ WTA 
Independent Variables: Period, Good dummies (Chinese sauce, Chocolate, Towel, Pen, National Lottery scratch cards; Win-win gamble is the baseline dummy), High anchor (High anchor=1 if the anchor is high; 0 
else) 
This table shows the coefficients, standard errors (in brackets) and significant levels (*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10) of 9 regressions using different anchor types.  
Anchor types Baseline Implausible 
price 
Similar good  Dissimilar good Incentivized Passive number 
search  
Passive price 
search  
Active number 
search 
Active price 
search  
 (216 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) 
Period -0.060 0.039 -0.041 0.018 0.071 0.072 0.076 -0.068 0.088 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) 
          
Chinese sauce -0.866 -1.985* -4.541*** -1.558 -2.481** -2.025 -1.037 -3.438** -0.693 
 (1.08) (1.17) (1.07) (1.46) (1.23) (1.41) (1.41) (1.42) (1.03) 
Chocolate -0.129 0.178 -3.144*** 0.738 3.166** -2.119* -0.907 -1.769 1.724 
 (1.04) (1.37) (0.84) (1.47) (1.37) (1.11) (1.46) (1.57) (0.95) 
Towel 
 
-0.981 -0.951 -2.672* -0.760 0.162 -1.544 -1.618 -0.418 -0.917 
 (0.98) (1.06) (1.43) (1.42) (1.45) (1.29) (1.37) (1.47) (0.83) 
Pen -1.377 -3.431*** -4.313*** -3.249*** -1.139 -2.424 -1.179 -2.739* -3.011*** 
 
 
(1.15) (1.05) (0.82) (1.21) (1.49) (1.59) (1.46) (1.55) (0.83) 
National Lottery scratch cards 0.053 2.062* -2.482** 1.525 1.392 -1.571 -0.336 0.068 0.101 
 (1.14) (1.12) (0.95) (1.59) (1.31) (1.21) (1.36) (1.55) (1.35) 
          
High anchor 0.764*** 0.284 0.188 -0.048 0.685** 0.933*** 0.590* 0.711*** 0.745** 
 (0.18) (0.28) (0.33) (0.29) (0.30) (0.20) (0.34) (0.25) (0.29) 
Constant 5.698*** 5.734*** 7.849*** 5.257*** 4.241*** 5.952*** 5.315*** 7.026*** 4.696*** 
 (0.99) (1.00) (0.82) (1.18) (1.07) (1.10) (1.07) (1.20) (0.65) 
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WTA random effects 9 regressions 
Observations: 108 participants over 11 periods   
Estimation methods: Random effect regression. 
Dependent Variable: Participants’ WTA 
Independent Variables: Period, Good dummies (Chinese sauce, Chocolate, Towel, Pen, National Lottery scratch cards; Win-win gamble is the baseline dummy), High anchor (High anchor=1 if the anchor is high; 0 
else) 
This table shows the coefficients, standard errors (in brackets) and significant levels (*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10) of 9 regressions using different anchor types. 
 
 
 
 
Anchor types Baseline Implausible 
price 
Similar good  Dissimilar good Incentivized Passive 
number search  
Passive price 
search  
Active number 
search 
Active price 
search  
 (216 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) (108 obs.) 
Period 0.029 0.053 0.069 0.013 0.054 0.044 0.058 0.031 0.067 
 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Chinese sauce -0.797 -1.980* -4.505*** -1.558 -2.479* -2.036 -1.048 -3.367** -0.700 
 
 
(1.07) (1.15) (1.22) (1.40) (1.39) (1.37) (1.40) (1.49) (1.21) 
Chocolate -0.020 0.181 -3.205*** 0.734 3.153** -2.127 -0.870 -1.862 1.717 
 
 
(1.07) (1.15) (1.22) (1.40) (1.40) (1.37) (1.41) (1.49) (1.21) 
Towel -0.906 -0.953 -2.733** -0.757 0.136 -1.527 -1.636 -0.336 -0.917 
 
 
(1.07) (1.15) (1.22) (1.40) (1.40) (1.37) (1.40) (1.49) (1.21) 
Pen -1.353 -3.427*** -4.442*** -3.250** -1.166 -2.453* -1.163 -2.794* -3.022** 
 
 
(1.07) (1.15) (1.22) (1.40) (1.40) (1.37) (1.40) (1.49) (1.21) 
National Lottery scratch cards 0.182 2.064* -2.604** 1.525 1.378 -1.597 -0.354 0.090 0.104 
 (1.07) (1.15) (1.22) (1.40) (1.40) (1.37) (1.40) (1.49) (1.21) 
High anchor 0.675*** 0.292 0.231 -0.048 0.676** 0.916*** 0.577* 0.647*** 0.721*** 
 
 
(0.18) (0.28) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (0.18) (0.34) (0.24) (0.26) 
Constant 5.112*** 5.650*** 7.235*** 5.281*** 4.359*** 6.131*** 5.426*** 6.465*** 4.847*** 
 (0.80) (0.89) (0.95) (1.05) (1.06) (1.00) (1.09) (1.09) (0.93) 
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 WTP OLS with cluster 9 regressions 
Observations: 120 participants over 11 periods   
Estimation methods: OLS with clustering the variable “subjects”. 
Dependent Variable: Participants’ WTP 
Independent Variables: Period, Good dummies (Chinese sauce, Chocolate, Towel, Pen, National Lottery scratch cards; Win-win gamble is the baseline dummy), High anchor (High anchor=1 if the anchor is high; 0 
else) 
This table shows the coefficients, standard errors (in brackets) and significant levels (*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10) of 9 regressions using different anchor types.  
 
 
 
 
Anchor types Baseline Implausible 
price 
Similar good  Dissimilar good Incentivized Passive number 
search  
Passive price 
search  
Active number 
search 
Active price 
search  
 (240 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) 
Period -0.052 -0.057 0.015 -0.064** 0.027 -0.104** -0.033 -0.080 -0.100* 
 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) 
Chinese sauce -0.788* -1.998* -1.529** -0.573 -0.607 -1.632** -1.448** -2.421** -0.631 
 
 
(0.40) (1.11) (0.67) (0.41) (0.61) (0.62) (0.67) (1.15) (0.45) 
Chocolate -0.806** -1.548 -0.359 1.457** 0.035 -0.550 -0.992 -2.095* 0.704 
 
 
(0.36) (1.12) (0.82) (0.61) (0.68) (0.66) (0.69) (1.07) (0.55) 
Towel 0.137 -0.732 -1.678*** 0.434 -0.932 -0.849 -1.493** -1.259 0.469 
 
 
(0.67) (1.29) (0.61) (0.63) (0.55) (0.77) (0.62) (1.22) (0.63) 
Pen -1.340*** -2.538** -1.943*** -0.607* -1.495*** -2.101*** -0.876 -3.014*** -0.779* 
 
 
(0.37) (1.06) (0.70) (0.35) (0.49) (0.53) (0.69) (1.09) (0.45) 
National Lottery scratch cards 0.256 -0.556 -0.741 0.130 0.346 0.107 -0.452 -0.319 0.585 
 (0.54) (1.33) (0.73) (0.46) (0.64) (1.11) (0.80) (1.42) (0.90) 
High anchor 0.078 0.073 0.050 0.129 0.163 0.058 0.253* 0.000 0.187** 
 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.19) (0.09) 
Constant 2.261*** 3.058*** 2.455*** 1.392*** 1.672*** 2.929*** 2.262*** 3.856*** 1.927*** 
 (0.37) (1.11) (0.59) (0.33) (0.50) (0.60) (0.66) (1.37) (0.40) 
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WTP random effects 9 regressions 
Anchor types Baseline Implausible 
price 
Similar good  Dissimilar good Incentivized Passive number 
search  
Passive price 
search  
Active number 
search 
Active price 
search  
 (240 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) (120 obs.) 
Period -0.034** -0.021 -0.023 -0.020 -0.031 -0.034* -0.038 -0.086** -0.057*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Chinese sauce -0.805 -2.044** -1.515** -0.575 -0.642 -1.625** -1.448** -2.411** -0.692 
 
 
(0.53) (0.94) (0.68) (0.58) (0.57) (0.81) (0.60) (0.95) (0.69) 
Chocolate -0.800 -1.611* -0.333 1.486** 0.119 -0.550 -0.991* -2.081** 0.670 
 
 
(0.53) (0.94) (0.68) (0.58) (0.57) (0.81) (0.60) (0.96) (0.69) 
Towel 0.141 -0.743 -1.732** 0.412 -0.969* -0.782 -1.501** -1.250 0.397 
 
 
(0.53) (0.94) (0.68) (0.58) (0.57) (0.81) (0.60) (0.95) (0.69) 
Pen -1.330** -2.560*** -1.956*** -0.651 -1.501*** -2.097*** -0.872 -3.004*** -0.777 
 
 
(0.53) (0.94) (0.68) (0.58) (0.57) (0.81) (0.60) (0.95) (0.69) 
National Lottery scratch cards 0.254 -0.583 -0.763 0.126 0.300 0.103 -0.452 -0.315 0.517 
 
 
(0.53) (0.94) (0.68) (0.58) (0.57) (0.81) (0.60) (0.95) (0.69) 
High Anchor 0.093 0.090 0.070 0.126* 0.188* 0.092 0.257* 0.007 0.150** 
 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.18) (0.07) 
constant 2.141*** 2.865*** 2.688*** 1.130*** 2.024*** 2.468*** 2.293*** 3.882*** 1.745*** 
 (0.39) (0.67) (0.50) (0.42) (0.43) (0.59) (0.45) (0.70) (0.49) 
Observations: 120 participants over 11 periods   
Estimation methods: Random effect regression. 
Dependent Variable: Participants’ WTP 
Independent Variables: Period, Good dummies (Chinese sauce, Chocolate, Towel, Pen, National Lottery scratch cards; Win-win gamble is the baseline dummy), High anchor (High anchor=1 if the anchor is high; 0 
else) 
This table shows the coefficients, standard errors (in brackets) and significant levels (*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10) of 9 regressions using different anchor types 
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Appendix D 
 Experimental Instructions 
The experimental instructions were common across treatments except where 
specified otherwise below in square brackets. 
This is an experiment on the choices of services such as electricity and gas. You will 
be asked to choose one service (Good A) or two services (Good A and Good B) for which a 
number of tariffs are available. You will then be asked to choose how much of each service 
you wish to buy. The experiment is divided into 36 tasks, in each of which you can earn 
experimental points. 
The Tasks 
In each task you will be given a choice of 4 or 24 tariffs. Tariffs can be either for one 
good (Good A) or two goods (Good A and Good B) depending on the task. In each task you 
will be told whether the tariffs are for one good or two goods. You will pay for what you buy 
based on the tariff that you are on. 
 [DE mDE DEAI DEA DEAD WDEAD WDEA BDEAD and BDEA treatments] 
There is a default tariff that you are automatically assigned to and it is up to you 
whether to keep it or switch from it. If you decide to switch, you will be given a certain time 
to decide which tariff you wish to switch to. There is a search engine available to compare 
tariffs; were you to wish to use it, you will be required to input some information. If the time 
expires before you choose, you will automatically keep the default tariff.] 
[D treatment 
There is a default tariff that you are automatically assigned to and it is up to you 
whether to keep it or switch from it. If you decide to switch, you will be given a certain time 
to decide which tariff you wish to switch to. If the time expires before you choose, you will 
automatically keep the default tariff.] 
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[DF treatment 
There is a default tariff that you are automatically assigned to and it is up to you 
whether to keep it or switch from it.]  
      You are asked to choose separately how much of each good you wish to buy. You 
will be given 5 buying options for each good: 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 or 5,000 units. You 
can buy different amounts of each good. 
[DEA WDEA and BDEA treatments 
The Counting Exercise 
At the beginning of each task you will have the chance to do a counting exercise. You 
can do this exercise for as little or as long as you like until time elapses. If you do it for the 
entire duration of the task, you will automatically keep the default tariff.] 
[DEAD WDEAD and BDEAD treatments 
The Counting Exercise 
You will have the chance to use another computer to do a counting exercise. You can 
do this for as little or as long as you like until time elapses. If you do it for the entire duration 
of the task, you will automatically keep the default tariff; you will still need to use the 
experimental computer, at the end of each task, to choose how much of each good you wish to 
buy.] 
[DEAI treatment 
The Counting Exercise 
You will have the chance to use another computer to browse websites. You can do this 
for as little or as long as you like until time elapses. If you do it for the entire duration of the 
task, you will automatically keep the default tariff; you will still need to use the experimental 
computer, at the end of each task, to choose how much of each good you wish to buy.] 
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The Tariffs 
During the experiment you will be presented with tariffs having different structures. 
Tariffs can have a Tier 1 price, a Tier 2 price, a Ceiling and a Standing Charge. 
Standing Charge. The standing charge is a fixed amount that you pay if you are on a 
given tariff, independently of how much you consume. 
Tier 1 Price. The Tier 1 price is the price that you pay on each unit bought up to a 
certain number of units, which we label Ceiling. If the ceiling is not specified, then the Tier 1 
price applies for any number of units bought. 
Tier 2 Price. The Tier 2 price is the price that you pay for each unit bought above the 
Ceiling. 
Two Goods Tariffs 
The following table contains illustrative examples of two goods tariffs. While they are 
not tariffs actually used in the tasks you will face, they will give you an idea of the kind of 
tariffs that you may encounter. 
Example Tariff 1: GOOD A – Tier 1: 34.52; GOOD B – Tier 1: 16.18;  
 
Example Tariff 2: GOOD A – Tier 1: 20.89; Ceiling: 900; Tier 2: 16.52; GOOD B – Tier 
1: 15.89; Ceiling: 1100; Tier 2: 12.59; 
 
Example Tariff 3: GOOD A – Standing Charge: 10,875; Tier 1: 30.59; GOOD B – 
Standing Charge: 6,345; Tier 1: 10.26;  
 
Table 1: Example Tariffs 
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Example tariff 1. Good A has a Tier 1 price of 34.52. This means that you pay 34.52 
points for every unit of Good A you buy. As an illustration, were you to buy 1,000 units, you 
would pay 34,520 points; and, were you to buy 5,000 units, you would pay five times as 
much, and so 5 *34,520 = 172,600 points. Similar computations apply to Good B, except that 
the Tier 1 price is 16.18 for this good. 
Example tariff 2. Good A has a Tier 1 price of 20.89, a Ceiling of 900 units and a Tier 
2 price of 16.52. This means that you pay 20.89 points per unit for every unit of Good A you 
buy up to 900 units, and you pay 16.52 for any extra units you buy. As an illustration, were 
you to buy 1,000 units, you would pay 900 *20.89 = 18,801 and 100 *16.52 = 1,652 points, 
for a total of 18,801 + 1,652 = 20,453 points. Were you to buy 5,000 units you would pay 
900 *20.89 = 18,801 and 4,100 *16.52 = 67,732 points, for a total of 18,801 + 67,732 points 
= 85,533 points. Similar computations apply to Good B, except that the Tier 1 and Tier 2 
prices, and the Ceiling, are different. 
Example tariff 3. Good A has a Standing Charge of 10,875 and a Tier 1 price of 30.59, 
with no Ceiling specified. This means that you always pay 10,875 points and, on top of that, 
you pay 30.59 points for every unit of Good A you buy. As an illustration, were you to buy 
1,000 units, you would pay 1,000 *30.59 = 30,590 on top of the Standing Charge of 10,875, 
for a total of 10,875 + 30,590 = 41,465 points. Were you to buy 5,000 units, you would pay 
5,000 *30.59 = 152,950 points on top of the Standing Charge of 10,875, for a total of 10,875 
+ 152,950 = 163,825 points. Similar computations apply to Good B, except that the Standing 
Charge and Tier 1 prices are different. 
Returns with Two Goods Tariffs 
For every tariff you choose you will get a return that depends on how much you buy. 
This return is specified in the table below. 
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GOOD A GOOD B
Amount Bought Returns Returns
1,000 45,000 35,000
2,000 80,000 61,000
3,000 106,000 78,000
4,000 122,000 88,000
5,000 128,000 89,000  
Table 2: Returns on Good A and Good B 
As you can see from the table, returns depend on how much you buy. As an 
illustration, if you buy 1,000 units of Good A, your return is 45,000 points, while if you buy 
3,000 units of Good A, your return is 106,000 points; if you buy 1,000 units of Good B, your 
return is 35,000 points, while if you buy 5,000 units of Good B, your return is 89,000 points.  
Earnings with Two Goods Tariffs 
Your net earnings are the difference between your returns on the services you buy and 
how much you spend to buy them. Specifically, for each tariff, they can be computed as 
follows: 
Good A returns MINUS Good A buying cost PLUS Good B returns MINUS Good B 
buying cost. 
Example. Suppose that you choose Example Tariff 1 in Table 1 and you buy 3,000 
units of Good A and 4,000 units of Good B. From Table 2, you can find that your return from 
3,000 units of Good A is 106,000 points. From Table 1, and using the calculator on the 
computer display, you can find that you pay 3,000*34.52 = 103,560 points for buying 3,000 
units of Good A. Your net earnings from Good A are then 106,000 – 103,560 = 2,440 points. 
This can also be computed for you by the computer display calculator. 
Similarly, from Table 2, you can find that your return from 4,000 units of Good B is 
88,000 points. You can also find that you pay 4,000 *16.18 = 64,720 points for buying 4,000 
units of Good B. Your net earnings from Good B are then 88,000 – 64,720 = 23,280 points. 
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Your overall net earnings are equal to (2,440 + 23,280) = 25,720 points. Note that this 
amount could have been higher or lower had you been on a different tariff and/or bought 
different amounts of Good A and/or B.  
One Good Tariffs 
One good tariffs have the same structure as above, but this time the tariff is only 
defined in relation to Good A rather than both Good A and Good B. 
Returns with One Good Tariffs 
Again, for every tariff you choose you will get a return that depends on how much 
you buy. This return will be as specified for Good A in Table 1 above. 
Earnings with One Good Tariffs 
Your net earnings are again the difference between your returns on the services you 
buy and how much you spend to buy them. Specifically, for each tariff, they can be computed 
as follows: 
Good A returns MINUS Good A buying cost  
Example. Suppose that you choose Example Tariff 1 in Table 1 and you buy 3,000 
units of Good A. From Table 2, you can find that your return from 3,000 units of Good A is 
106,000 points. From Table 1, and using the calculator on the computer display, you can find 
that you pay 3,000 *34.52 = 103,560 points for buying 3,000 units of Good A. Your net 
earnings from Good A are then 106,000 – 103,560 = 2,440 points. This can also be computed 
for you by the computer display calculator. Note that this amount could have been higher or 
lower had you been on a different tariff and/or bought different amounts of Good A. 
Final Payment 
At the end of the experiment one of the 36 tasks will be randomly selected by the 
computer. 
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 If it is a task with one good tariffs, you will be paid for your net earnings at the rate 
of 1 penny for every 35 points earned in that task (or, equivalently, 1 pound for each 3,500 
points earned). 
 If it is a task with two goods tariffs, you will be paid for your net earnings at the rate 
of 1 penny for every 70 points earned in that task (or, equivalently, 1 pound for each 7,000 
points earned). 
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Questionnaire 
 
1. Based on Table 2, what is your return on Good A if you buy 2,000 units? 
a. 50,000 
b. 80,000 
c. 90,000 
d. 120,000 
e. It depends 
 
2. Assume that, in relation to a good, the Standing Charge is 10,000 points, that the 
Tier 1 price is 10 and that there is no Ceiling. If you buy 3,000 units of the good, 
how much do you need to pay? 
a. 10,010 
b. 13,000 
c. 30,000 
d. 40,000 
e. It depends 
 
3. Assume that, in relation to a good, the Tier 1 price is 10 and there is no Ceiling or 
Standing Charge. If you buy 4,000 units of the good, how much do you need to pay? 
a. 4,000 
b. 4,010 
c. 30,000 
d. 40,000 
e. It depends 
 
4. Assume that, in relation to a good, there is a Tier 1 price of 20, a Tier 2 price of 10, 
a Ceiling of 1,000 units, and no Standing Charge. If you buy 2,000 units of the good, 
how much do you need to pay? 
a. 10,000 
b. 20,000 
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c. 30,000 
d. 40,000 
e. It depends 
 
5. What is the following statement is false? 
a. In the experiment you get money from buying goods at a price lower than 
the return on them. 
b. A default tariff is a tariff that is chosen for you as a default, unless you wish 
to make another choice. 
c. A calculator is available on the computer display in case you feel you need 
it. 
d. Net earnings may differ as a result of how much you buy and the tariff you 
choose. 
e. If there is a Ceiling of 3,000, this means that, if you buy 1,000 units, only 
the Tier 2 price matters in determining how much you pay. 
 
[Correct answers: 1. b; 2. d; 3. d; 4. c; 5. e]  
 
 
Appendix E 
Tariffs and Tariff Tasks 
In our three experiments we use 144 tariffs used that are differentiated according to 
four features.  
The first feature is tariff complexity. The tariffs we employ are simple tariffs (tariffs 
1-24, 49-72 and 97-120) and complex tariff (tariffs 25-48; 73-96 and 121-144). Simple tariffs 
only have one tier: that is, they have a single marginal cost regardless of the amount 
consumed, and no fixed costs. Complex tariffs are of two types. One type has two tiers and 
ceiling. One tier determines the cost if the amount consumed is below the ceiling, the other 
one applies to units consumed above the ceiling. The other type has one tier and a standing 
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charge. The standing charge is a fixed cost independent of the amount consumed. The tier 
determines the marginal cost of each unit.   
The second feature that differentiates our tariffs is whether they are for a single good 
(i.e. good A, modeled on energy – tariffs 1-48) or two goods (i.e. goods A and B, modeled on 
energy and gas – tariffs 49-144). 
Third, tariffs can be differentiated into default tariffs, best tariffs and non-default 
suboptimal tariffs. The earnings of the default tariffs with the optimal consumption level are 
around 16 pounds. Apart from the best default treatments, in 24 tariffs tasks, the earnings of 
the default tariffs are neither the highest nor the lowest; in the 4 tariffs tasks, the earnings of 
the defaults tariffs can be the lowest. The earnings of the best tariffs with the optimal 
consumption level are around 22 pounds, which is over 6 pounds higher than the default 
tariffs and 3 pounds higher than the second-best tariffs.75 If a tariff is the best tariff then it is 
always the best tariff in all consumption levels.  
Finally, tariffs differ depending on whether they are collected from the real world or 
derived.  All real tariffs used in our experiment were collected from the energy search engine 
website “Which?” (http://www.which.co.uk/energy/)  in May 2011. Real tariffs come from 
the following energy companies: “e-on”, “npower”, “scottishpower”, “British Gas”, “EDF 
energy”,  “npower juice”,  “OVO new energy”, ”Southern Electric” and “The utility 
warehouse”.  In order to use the search engine "Which?", some basic information needed to 
be provided, such as post-code, current energy supplier, and so on. Below is the list of items 
for which we had to provide such information and the information we provided. 
 
Post code: SE1 0AA 
Who is your supplier: E-on 
                                                          
75 In a task, the second best tariff is the best tariff among the non-default suboptimal tariffs. 
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Do you have a gas mains supply to your property?  No 
Are you an IGT gas customer? No 
Have you got a bill in front of you? Yes 
Electricity I used Kwh 4000 in the last year 
How do you pay for your bills?  Monthly Direct Debit 
Please tell us your tariff: Standard. 
 
Some points of clarification:  
SE10AA is a London post code. We have chosen the energy tariffs of the central 
London area for two reasons. 
1.  Firstly, London is a large market and so it is an obvious place where to use as 
a benchmark. some energy companies cannot offer as many of their tariffs as they can 
offer in London. London is one of the cities where has the most number of energy 
tariffs in UK.  
2. In London, the household energy consumption per year from 2005 to 2009 is 
comparatively more stable than other cities. It is easy for us to use these stable yearly 
household energy consumptions in our experiment.   
2. The sub-national authority electricity consumption statistics (2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008 and 2009) (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2010)76 shows that the average 
domestic electricity consumption per household in “the London city” is around 4000kwh/year. 
This is the reason why we have inputted “I used Kwh 4000 in the last year” and the best 
consumption level in our experiment is also 4000 units.77  
                                                          
76 This workbook was produced in December 2010 – Publication URN: 10D/999 – For up to date statistics 
please visit the website: 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/energy_stats/regional/electricity/electricity.aspx 
77 The average consumption of gas is around 16000 units; we normalized the gas consumption to 4000 for 
comparability with the average consumption of electricity. 
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The derived tariffs are modeled after the collected real tariffs. Derived tariffs are 
created for comparative reasons. Despite the same final earnings, as the electricity tariff 
prices in the nature dual energy market are different from the electricity tariff prices in the 
nature single market, participants’ different behaviour in the dual and single tariff tasks may 
not only arise (if it does) because of the different number of goods, but also because the 
electricity tariffs in the dual and single market tasks are different. To control for this, the 
derived dual tariffs have the same electricity tariffs as the single real electricity tariffs so as to 
ensure comparability. 78  Furthermore, we wanted our default, best and some sub-optimal 
tariffs (the second best tariff) used in the experiment to satisfy certain properties. We wanted 
the default tariff to be roughly comparable in every task in terms of incentives at the margin, 
with, for a consumption level of 4000, a 3 pounds difference in average earnings between 
first and second best tariff and around a difference of a further 3 pounds from the default 
tariff. Where necessary, we scaled real tariffs accordingly.  
The list of tariff tasks is provided in Table E1, and the list of tariffs in Table E2. 144 
tariffs are used in our experiment and they can be divided into 6 sets: simple single real tariffs, 
complex single real tariffs, simple dual real tariffs, complex dual real tariffs, simple dual 
derived tariffs and complex dual derived tariffs.79. Each set has 24 tariffs which includes 1 
best tariff and 2 default tariffs.  The reason we needed 2 default tariffs is because we had 
tasks that employed a mix of complex and simple tariffs (e.g. 12 simple tariffs and 12 
complex tariffs). These tasks however needed to have both a simple default tariff and a 
complex default tariff to check whether the complexity of the default made a difference. The 
12 simple tariffs and the 12 complex tariffs were selected from a bigger set of 24 tariffs 
(simple and complex respectively). Let as call SA a subset of 12 tariffs that contains the best 
                                                          
78 In our experiment, we do not find a statistically significant difference in behaviour between dual natural 
tariffs tasks and dual derived tariffs tasks. 
79 For the reasons we mentioned above, some default tariffs in the "nature tariff sections" are constructed. To 
simplify these sections’ names, here we still call them "nature tariff sections". 
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simple tariff and SB the remaining 12 tariff subset that contains the remaining (all sub-
optimal) 12 tariffs. Let us call CA the subset of 12 complex tariff containing the best complex 
tariff and CB the other subset that contains the remaining (all sub-optimal) 12 tariffs. In order 
to create mixed tariffs tasks, we mixed the following sets: 1) SA with CB or 2) SB with CA. 
In the mixed set 1) the best tariff was the simple one while in the mixed set 2) the best tariff 
was the complex one. The mixed set 1) contained one of two default tariffs depending on the 
task: a simple default tariff in SA or a complex default tariff in set CB.80 The mixed set 2) 
contained one of two default tariffs depending on the task, a simple default tariff in SB or a 
complex tariff in CA. Having two possible default tariffs (a single and a complex) allowed us 
to check, for every mixed tariffs task, how the complexity of the default tariff affects subjects’ 
outcomes. This also explains why we needed two possible default tariffs for both simple and 
complex tariffs. A similar procedure applied for 4 tariffs tasks.  
Reference Not in Paper 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2010. The sub-national authority electricity 
consumption statistics (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009). Publication URN: 10D/999 - 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/energy_stats/regional/electricity/electricity.
aspx 
 
 
  
                                                          
80  Whether either tariff actually acted as a default tariff in the experiment depended of course on the 
experimental treatment. 
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Table E1. Tariff Tasks 
 
 
 
  
Task No. Simple/mixed/
complex 
Single/Dual 4/24 Real/derived Best 
simple/co
mplex 
Default 
simple/co
mplex 
1 Simple Single 24 Real Simple Simple 
2 Complex Single 24 Real Complex Complex 
3 Mixed Single 24 Real Complex Simple 
4 Mixed Single 24 Real Complex Complex 
5 Mixed Single 24 Real Simple Simple 
6 Mixed Single 24 Real Simple Complex 
7 Simple Single 4 Real Simple Simple 
8 Complex Single 4 Real Complex Complex 
9 Mixed Single 4 Real Complex Simple 
10 Mixed Single 4 Real Complex Complex 
11 Mixed Single 4 Real Simple Simple 
12 Mixed Single 4 Real Simple Complex 
13 Simple Dual 24 Real Simple Simple 
14 Complex Dual 24 Real Complex Complex 
15 Mixed Dual 24 Real Complex Simple 
16 Mixed Dual 24 Real Complex Complex 
17 Mixed Dual 24 Real Simple Simple 
18 Mixed Dual 24 Real Simple Complex 
19 Simple Dual 4 Real Simple Simple 
20 Complex Dual 4 Real Complex Complex 
21 Mixed Dual 4 Real Complex Simple 
22 Mixed Dual 4 Real Complex Complex 
23 Mixed Dual 4 Real Simple Simple 
24 Mixed Dual 4 Real Simple Complex 
25 Simple Dual 24 Derived Simple Simple 
26 Complex Dual 24 Derived Complex Complex 
27 Mixed Dual 24 Derived Complex Simple 
28 Mixed Dual 24 Derived Complex Complex 
29 Mixed Dual 24 Derived Simple Simple 
30 Mixed Dual 24 Derived Simple Complex 
31 Simple Dual 4 Derived Simple Simple 
32 Complex Dual 4 Derived Complex Complex 
33 Mixed Dual 4 Derived Complex Simple 
34 Mixed Dual 4 Derived Complex Complex 
35 Mixed Dual 4 Derived Simple Simple 
36 Mixed Dual 4 Derived Simple Complex 
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Table E2. Tariffs 
 
 Good 1 Good 2 
Tariff Standing 
charge 
Tier 1  Ceiling Tier 2 Standing 
charge 
Tier 1  Ceiling Tier 2 
1 - 16.325 - - - - - - 
2 - 10.726 - - - - - - 
3 - 13.398 - - - - - - 
4 - 13.577 - - - - - - 
5 - 14.499 - - - - - - 
6 - 15.74 - - - - - - 
7 - 16.259 - - - - - - 
8 - 17.378 - - - - - - 
9 - 19.992 - - - - - - 
10 - 20.663 - - - - - - 
11 - 22.322 - - - - - - 
12 - 23.252 - - - - - - 
13 - 13.514 - - - - - - 
14 - 17.537 - - - - - - 
15 - 18.061 - - - - - - 
16 - 19.548 - - - - - - 
17 - 16.46 - - - - - - 
18 - 16.926 - - - - - - 
19 - 17.115 - - - - - - 
20 - 17.699 - - - - - - 
21 - 18.753 - - - - - - 
22 - 18.921 - - - - - - 
23 - 21.94 - - - - - - 
24 - 21.857 - - - - - - 
25 - 16.325 900 15.263 - - - - 
26 - 19.467 728 8.432 - - - - 
27 - 21.94 900 10.154 - - - - 
28 3887.1 12.128 - - - - - - 
29 3969 12.338 - - - - - - 
30 - 19.278 900 11.96 - - - - 
31 4142.4 12.81 - - - - - - 
32 - 19.992 900 12.19 - - - - 
33 4041.6 13.514 - - - - - - 
34 - 18.921 900 13.324 - - - - 
35 - 20.663 900 13.221 - - - - 
36 - 15.74 900 15.598 - - - - 
37 - 23.252 720 10.886 - - - - 
38 - 17.378 900 12.128 - - - - 
39 - 27.447 900 11.561 - - - - 
40 - 20.412 900 14.374 - - - - 
41 - 18.753 900 11.435 - - - - 
42 - 15.74 728 12.506 - - - - 
43 - 16.926 720 13.451 - - - - 
44 - 18.291 900 12.768 - - - - 
45 7767.9 11.235 - - - - - - 
46 4038.3 12.484 - - - - - - 
47 3969 13.577 - - - - - - 
48 3887.1 11.938 - - - - - - 
49 - 16.325 - - - 7.523 - - 
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50 - 10.726 - - - 2.009 - - 
51 - 13.398 - - - 4.516 - - 
52 - 13.577 - - - 5.815 - - 
53 - 14.499 - - - 4.53 - - 
54 - 16.259 - - - 5.269 - - 
55 - 15.74 - - - 7.659 - - 
56 - 17.378 - - - 9.651 - - 
57 - 19.992 - - - 8.56 - - 
58 - 20.663 - - - 9.12 - - 
59 - 22.322 - - - 8.45 - - 
60 - 23.252 - - - 9.21 - - 
61 - 13.514 - - - 4.692 - - 
62 - 17.537 - - - 1.012 - - 
63 - 18.061 - - - 1.036 - - 
64 - 19.548 - - - 1.965 - - 
65 - 16.46 - - - 2.365 - - 
66 - 16.926 - - - 2.101 - - 
67 - 17.115 - - - 3.251 - - 
68 - 17.699 - - - 2.695 - - 
69 - 18.753 - - - 1.543 - - 
70 - 18.921 - - - 3.957 - - 
71 - 21.94 - - - 1.693 - - 
72 - 21.857 - - - 3.625 - - 
73 - 16.325 900 15.982 - 7.002 670 6.784 
74 - 19.467 728 8.432 - 7.032 670 1.301 
75 - 21.94 900 10.154 - 5.126 670 4.876 
76 3887.1 12.128 - - 3785.1 4.268 - - 
77 - 23.252 720 10.886 - 6.562 625 5.269 
78 - 17.378 900 12.128 - 6.263 1143 5.496 
79 - 19.992 900 12.19 - 5.878 670 5.521 
80 - 18.921 900 13.324 - 7.263 670 5.369 
81 3969 12.338 - - 2870.7 7.269 - - 
82 7767.9 11.235 - - 3110.7 8.76 - - 
83 - 15.74 900 15.598 - 8.632 670 6.962 
84 4038.3 12.484 - - 4776 8.83 - - 
85 - 23.252 720 10.886 - 15.36 670 2.698 
86 - 17.378 900 12.128 - 18.369 670 2.036 
87 - 27.447 900 11.561 - 11.365 625 1.965 
88 - 20.412 900 14.374 - 4.698 1144 1.036 
89 - 18.753 900 11.435 - 5.964 670 4.457 
90 - 15.74 728 12.506 - 4.911 670 4.663 
91 - 16.926 720 13.451 - 4.532 625 3.858 
92 - 18.291 900 12.768 - 11.033 1144 1.001 
93 7767.9 11.235 - - 1608.6 4.223 - - 
94 4038.3 12.484 - - 5180.7 2.977 - - 
95 3969 13.577 - - 8596.2 1.008 - - 
96 3887.1 11.938 - - 3610.5 3.981 - - 
97 - 16.325 - - - 7.523 - - 
98 - 9.71 - - - 3.21 - - 
99 - 13.514 - - - 4.28 - - 
100 - 14.499 - - - 4.4 - - 
101 - 15.74 - - - 7.323 - - 
102 - 17.537 - - - 5.707 - - 
103 - 15.74 - - - 7.659 - - 
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104 - 17.115 - - - 7.476 - - 
105 - 18.921 - - - 7.102 - - 
106 - 19.992 - - - 7.666 - - 
107 - 21.834 - - - 7.903 - - 
108 - 23.252 - - - 7.488 - - 
109 - 17.378 - - - 7.592 - - 
110 - 13.398 - - - 3.675 - - 
111 - 16.259 - - - 7.102 - - 
112 - 17.699 - - - 6.504 - - 
113 - 18.061 - - - 6.637 - - 
114 - 16.926 - - - 7.874 - - 
115 - 17.313 - - - 7.999 - - 
116 - 19.458 - - - 6.971 - - 
117 - 20.283 - - - 6.637 - - 
118 - 21.914 - - - 5.958 - - 
119 - 20.663 - - - 7.607 - - 
120 - 21.857 - - - 7.038 - - 
121 - 16.325 900 15.982 - 7.002 670 6.784 
122 - 21.467 728 6.126 - 8.851 1,143 2.036 
123 - 25.652 900 10.804 - 8.348 670 3.014 
124 3887.1 11.938 - - 8810.4 3.255 - - 
125 3887.1 12.128 - - 8810.7 3.308 - - 
126 - 17.262 728 13.724 - 8.031 1,143 2.84 
127 - 25.203 720 12.109 - 7.875 670 3.682 
128 4142.4 12.81 - - 6211.8 3.521 - - 
129 - 27.447 900 11.561 - 7.768 670 3.38 
130 4041.6 13.514 - - 3298.5 4.28 - - 
131 - 20.663 900 13.221 - 7.607 670 4.455 
132 - 15.74 900 15.598 - 8.632 670 6.962 
133 - 22.926 900 11.636 - 8.298 670 3.298 
134 - 26.935 720 11.344 - 7.623 670 3.316 
135 - 21.696 900 13.882 - 7.987 670 4.678 
136 - 17.772 900 14.124 - 8.268 670 2.924 
137 - 22.988 728 12.480 - 8.974 1,143 3.109 
138 - 24.415 720 11.430 - 7.862 1,143 3.666 
139 - 18.247 900 12.734 - 7.972 670 3.473 
140 - 20.992 900 12.800 - 8.049 670 3.513 
141 6141.87 11.290 - - 8268.75 3.266 - - 
142 5421,15 11.636 - - 8086.68 3.298 - - 
143 8156 11.797 - - 4713.03 3.699 - - 
144 4081.455 11.907 - - 9250.92 3.247 - - 
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Appendix F 
Regression Analysis 
In this appendix we reproduce the results of our regression analysis (marginal effects are 
reported)81. This is listed in six tables: 
 Table F1: probit regression on the suboptimal outcome rate, with error clustering to 
control for subject level non independence of observations. All experimental 
treatments are included. 
 Table F2: random effects probit regression on the suboptimal outcome rate, 
controlling for subject level non independence of observations. All experimental 
treatments are included. 
 Table F3: multinomial probit regression simultaneously estimating (a) the 
(suboptimal) default rate and (b) the suboptimal switching rate, with error clustering 
to control for subject level non independence of observations. Treatments BDEAD 
and BDEA cannot be included in these regressions since only two outcomes are 
possible in these treatments: to stick to the optimal tariff or to switch suboptimally. 
 Table F4: probit regression on the suboptimal outcome rate / suboptimal switching 
rate, controlling for subject level non independence of observations and including 
only treatments BDEAD and BDEA. 
 Table F5: random effects probit regression on the suboptimal outcome rate / 
suboptimal switching rate, controlling for subject level non independence of 
observations and including only treatments BDEAD and BDEA. 
 Table F6: probit regression with error clustering on default rate for all subjects for 
which we have social desirability questionnaire data. The treatments for which we 
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have the social desirability answers are: DEAD (20 subjects out of 50), DEA, DEAI, 
BDEAD, BDEA, WDEAD and WDEA. Treatments BDEAD and BDEA are not 
included in the regression because the default tariff was also the best tariff, and so 
there is no clear interpretation of sticking to the default tariff as being driven by 
experimenter demand effects. 
 Table F7: random effects probit-regression on default rate for all subjects for which 
we have social desirability questionnaire data. 
The variables used in the regression analysis are as follows: 
 Dual is a dummy variable for the type of market that takes value 1 when the market is 
for dual tariffs and value 0 otherwise;  
 24 is a dummy whose value is 1 when the number of tariffs employed is 24 and 0 
otherwise;  
 The dummy variables Complex and Mix represent the complexity of the tariffs 
employed. Complex takes value 1 when all tariffs are complex and 0 otherwise and 
Mix takes value 1 when all tariffs are mixed and 0 otherwise; 
 Complex24, Mix24, ComplexDual, MixDual, Dual24 are all interaction variables 
between variables as listed above, e.g. Complex24 is Complex × 24; 
 DefaultCompMix takes value 1 when the default tariff employed in the mix tariffs 
tasks is complex and 0 otherwise. This helps us to identify the effect of the 
complexity of the default tariff on suboptimal choices; 
 BestCompMix has value 1 when the best tariff is complex and the tasks involve only 
mixed tariffs and 0 otherwise. This helps us to identify the effect of the complexity of 
the best tariff on suboptimal choices; 
 The variable represents the period of play and takes value from 1 to 36; 
 Dummy variables are added for each treatment as appropriate to the dataset used; 
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 Demographic variables are sometimes used: UK  (=1 when subjects are from the UK),  
Gender (= 1 when subjects are males) and Age. 
Social Desirability: first, assign a value of 1 for each socially desirable response to the 16 
questions of Stöber’s (2001) social desirability scale questionnaire; this provides an integer 
between 0 and 16 depending on the answers subjects gave; then subtract the resulting integer 
from the average social desirability score to get a zero-centered scale across subjects. Higher 
values pointing to higher sensitivity to social pressure. 
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Table F1. Probit Regressions on Suboptimal Outcome Rate with Error Clustering 82 
 
 
                                                          
82 The Log pseudo-likelihood for the models is -9777, -9578, -9766, -9568. n = 16560 in model 1 and 3. n = 
16344 in model 2 and 4 due to some missing values of the variable Age.  
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dual 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.074*** 0.060***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.020)
24 0.180*** 0.168*** 0.145*** 0.122***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021)
Complex 0.157*** 0.147*** 0.158*** 0.135***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024)
Mix 0.013 0.019 0.040** 0.048**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021)
Complex24 0.069*** 0.076***
(0.020) (0.025)
Mix24 0.01 0.009
(0.016) (0.020)
ComplexDual -0.053*** -0.041*
(0.017) (0.024)
MixDual -0.048*** -0.051**
(0.014) (0.020)
Dual24 0.025** 0.041**
(0.012) (0.016)
DefaultCompMix -0.002 -0.012 -0.002 -0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
BestCompMix 0.170*** 0.168*** 0.169*** 0.167***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Period -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
mDE 0.029 0.041 0.029 0.041
(0.066) (0.077) (0.066) (0.077)
D 0.102*** 0.063 0.102*** 0.063
(0.029) (0.039) (0.029) (0.039)
DF 0.006 -0.025 0.006 -0.025
(0.056) (0.071) (0.056) (0.071)
F -0.022 -0.099 -0.022 -0.098
(0.054) (0.062) (0.054) (0.062)
DEAD 0.061*** 0.076*** 0.061*** 0.076***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
DEA 0.057 -0.009 0.057 -0.009
(0.058) (0.060) (0.058) (0.060)
DEAI 0.061 -0.006 0.061 -0.006
(0.066) (0.072) (0.066) (0.072)
BDEAD -0.311*** -0.378*** -0.311*** -0.378***
(0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067)
BDEA -0.357*** -0.396*** -0.358*** -0.396***
(0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.064)
WDEAD 0.166** -0.013 0.166** -0.013
(0.072) (0.093) (0.072) (0.093)
WDEA -0.111* -0.076 -0.111* -0.076
(0.062) (0.070) (0.062) (0.070)
nationality -0.064 -0.064
(0.044) (0.044)
Gender -0.068** -0.068**
(0.033) (0.033)
age -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Dep. Var. Suboptimal Choices
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Table F2. Random Effect Probit Regressions on Suboptimal Outcome Rate83 
 
                                                          
83 The Log likelihood for the models is -6990, -6882, -6975 and  -6867. n =16560 in model 1 and 3. n = 16344 
in model 2 and 4. 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dual 0.059*** 0.049*** 0.107*** 0.081***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.022) (0.028)
24 0.239*** 0.218*** 0.208*** 0.169***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.021) (0.028)
Complex 0.204*** 0.184*** 0.224*** 0.186***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.026) (0.034)
Mix 0.019 0.023 0.070*** 0.075**
(0.012) (0.016) (0.022) (0.029)
Complex24 0.067*** 0.074**
(0.025) (0.033)
Mix24 -0.001 -0.001
(0.020) (0.027)
ComplexDual -0.079*** -0.060*
(0.027) (0.035)
MixDual -0.074*** -0.075***
(0.022) (0.029)
Dual24 0.030* 0.055***
(0.015) (0.020)
DefaultCompMix -0.003 -0.014 -0.003 -0.014
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
BestCompMix 0.215*** 0.207*** 0.215*** 0.206***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Period -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
mDE 0.027 0.048 0.027 0.048
(0.094) (0.108) (0.094) (0.108)
D 0.151*** 0.102* 0.151*** 0.102*
(0.041) (0.057) (0.041) (0.057)
DF 0.025 -0.001 0.025 -0.001
(0.084) (0.106) (0.084) (0.105)
F -0.032 -0.110 -0.032 -0.110
(0.084) (0.105) (0.084) (0.105)
DEAD 0.093*** 0.112*** 0.093*** 0.112***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031)
DEA 0.108 0.009 0.108 0.009
(0.084) (0.097) (0.084) (0.096)
DEAI 0.122 0.048 0.122 0.048
(0.094) (0.108) (0.094) (0.108)
BDEAD -0.389*** -0.451*** -0.389*** -0.451***
(0.095) (0.116) (0.095) (0.116)
BDEA -0.465*** -0.473*** -0.466*** -0.474***
(0.096) (0.106) (0.096) (0.106)
WDEAD 0.241** 0.029 0.241** 0.028
(0.093) (0.120) (0.093) (0.120)
WDEA -0.110 -0.058 -0.110 -0.057
(0.094) (0.113) (0.094) (0.113)
nationality -0.074 -0.074
(0.052) (0.052)
Gender -0.082* -0.082*
(0.042) (0.042)
age -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Dep. Var. Suboptimal Choices
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Table F3. Multinomial Probit Regressions on Suboptimal Default Rate and on 
Suboptimal Switching Rate.84  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
84 The pseudo log likelihood for the models is -13037, -12772, -13002 and  -12739. n =14400 in model 1 and 3. 
n = 4184 in model 2 and 4 again this is due to some missing values of the variable Age.  
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dual 0.033*** 0.026*** -0.02 -0.041** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.116*** 0.131*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.096*** -0.090***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.019) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021) (0.029) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) (0.025)
24 -0.003 -0.001 -0.081*** -0.067*** 0.203*** 0.194*** 0.274*** 0.234*** -0.200*** -0.193*** -0.194*** -0.168***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) (0.023) (0.031) (0.009) (0.012) (0.020) (0.026)
Complex 0.026*** 0.034*** -0.053*** -0.047** 0.151*** 0.133*** 0.272*** 0.238*** -0.177*** -0.167*** -0.219*** -0.191***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.022) (0.013) (0.018) (0.029) (0.038) (0.013) (0.018) (0.025) (0.032)
Mix -0.005 0.004 -0.089*** -0.074*** 0.022* 0.018 0.173*** 0.162*** -0.017 -0.022 -0.083*** -0.089***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027) (0.035) (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.028)
Complex24 0.078*** 0.068*** -0.045* -0.021 -0.033 -0.047
(0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023) (0.030)
Mix24 0.080*** 0.056*** -0.104*** -0.074*** 0.024 0.018
(0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.019) (0.025)
ComplexDual 0.052*** 0.064*** -0.121*** -0.120*** 0.069*** 0.057**
(0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.020) (0.028)
MixDual 0.053*** 0.063*** -0.114*** -0.133*** 0.061*** 0.069***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.016) (0.024)
Dual24 0.015 0.024* 0.014 0.022 -0.029** -0.046***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
DefaultCompMix 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.001 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.01 0.001 0.009 0 0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
BestCompMix -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 0.185*** -0.182*** -0.182*** -0.181*** -0.180***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018)
Period -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
mDE 0.001 0.064 0.001 0.063 0.027 -0.005 0.027 -0.005 -0.028 -0.058 -0.028 -0.058
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.042) (0.049) (0.042) (0.049) (0.073) (0.085) (0.074) (0.085)
D 0.115*** 0.123*** 0.115*** 0.122*** -0.01 -0.034 -0.01 -0.033 -0.105*** -0.089** -0.105*** -0.089**
(0.031) (0.045) (0.031) (0.045) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) (0.042) (0.030) (0.042)
DF 0.025 0.117 0.025 0.116 -0.015 -0.106*** -0.015 -0.105*** -0.01 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011
(0.066) (0.076) (0.066) (0.076) (0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.038) (0.063) (0.078) (0.063) (0.078)
F -0.218*** -0.220*** -0.218*** -0.221*** 0.119*** 0.049 0.119*** 0.049 0.099 0.171** 0.099 0.171**
(0.059) (0.077) (0.059) (0.077) (0.034) (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) (0.065) (0.084) (0.065) (0.084)
DEAD 0.090*** 0.110*** 0.090*** 0.110*** -0.034*** -0.031** -0.034*** -0.031** -0.056*** -0.080*** -0.056*** -0.079***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
DEA 0.141** 0.119** 0.141** 0.119** -0.080** -0.105*** -0.080** -0.106*** -0.061 -0.013 -0.061 -0.013
(0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.062) (0.067) (0.062) (0.067)
DEAI 0.120* 0.1 0.120* 0.1 -0.053 -0.091** -0.053 -0.092** -0.067 -0.009 -0.067 -0.008
(0.072) (0.082) (0.072) (0.082) (0.041) (0.046) (0.041) (0.046) (0.070) (0.078) (0.070) (0.078)
BDEAD
BDEA
WDEAD 0.226*** 0.190** 0.225*** 0.189** -0.059 -0.201*** -0.059 -0.200*** -0.167** 0.011 -0.167** 0.011
(0.066) (0.079) (0.066) (0.079) (0.049) (0.066) (0.049) (0.066) (0.075) (0.098) (0.075) (0.098)
WDEA -0.024 0.049 -0.024 0.049 -0.088** -0.111** -0.088** -0.111** 0.111 0.062 0.112 0.062
(0.062) (0.066) (0.062) (0.066) (0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.045) (0.068) (0.077) (0.068) (0.077)
nationality -0.118** -0.118** 0.036 0.036 0.082 0.08182
(0.050) (0.050) (0.032) (0.032) (0.051) (0.051)
Gender -0.057 -0.057 -0.015 -0.016 0.072* 0.072*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.230) (0.023) (0.039) (0.039)
age -0.016** -0.016** 0.004 0.004 0.013** 0.013**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Default Rate Sub. Switches Best Tariff Rate
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Table F4. Probit Regressions on Suboptimal Outcome Rate with Error Clustering in 
BDEAD and BDEA85 
 
 
                                                          
85 The pseudo log likelihood for the models is -835, -815, -833 and -814. N= 2160 in all models. 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dual -0.014 -0.033* 0.032 0.002
(0.017) (0.019) (0.035) (0.039)
24 0.028** 0.018 0.037 0.025
(0.014) (0.015) (0.036) (0.036)
Complex 0.040*** 0.045** 0.049 0.05
(0.015) (0.019) (0.036) (0.035)
Mix 0.001 0.011 0.038 0.047
(0.022) (0.031) (0.035) (0.043)
Complex24 0.033 0.028
(0.049) (0.048)
Mix24 -0.010 -0.016
(0.041) (0.035)
ComplexDual -0.040 -0.030
(0.046) (0.048)
MixDual -0.048 -0.041
(0.034) (0.037)
Dual24 -0.012 -0.003
(0.027) (0.032)
DefaultCompMix -0.016 -0.030 -0.016 -0.030
(0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021)
BestCompMix 0.065*** 0.054** 0.065*** 0.054**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Period -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
mDE
D
DF
F
DEAD
DEA
DEAI
BDEAD 0.030 -0.009 0.030 -0.009
(0.044) (0.039) (0.044) (0.039)
BDEA
WDEAD
WDEA
nationality -0.046 -0.047
(0.052) (0.052)
Gender 0.005 0.005
(0.040) (0.040)
age 0.003*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Dep. Var. Suboptimal Choices
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Table F5. Random Effects Regressions on Suboptimal Outcome Rate in BDEAD and 
BDEA 86 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86 The pseudo log likelihood for the models is -687, -685, -885  and  -683. n = 2160 in all models. 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dual -0.010 -0.026* 0.038 0.009
(0.012) (0.014) (0.035) (0.040)
24 0.026 0.015 0.035 0.019
(0.012) (0.013) (0.034) (0.039)
Complex 0.036 0.039 0.051 0.047
(0.020) (0.023) (0.042) (0.048)
Mix 0.003 0.011 0.042 0.045
(0.019) (0.022) (0.036) (0.042)
Complex24 0.028 0.026
(0.039) (0.045)
Mix24 -0.011 -0.013
(0.032) (0.037)
ComplexDual -0.045 -0.033
(0.043) (0.048)
MixDual -0.049 -0.040
(0.036) (0.041)
Dual24 -0.010 -0.001
(0.023) (0.026)
DefaultCompMix -0.011 -0.023 -0.011 -0.023
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
BestCompMix 0.055*** 0.045** 0.055*** 0.044**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Period -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
mDE
D
DF
F
DEAD
DEA
DEAI
BDEAD 0.030 -0.006 0.030 -0.006
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
BDEA
WDEAD
WDEA
nationality -0.031 -0.031
(0.042) (0.042)
Gender 0.014 0.014
(0.033) (0.033)
age 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Dep. Var. Suboptimal Choices
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Table F6. Probit  regressions on Default Rate with Social Desirability as Independent 
Variable and Error Clustering87  
 
 
                                                          
87 The pseudo log likelihood for the models is -3639, -3489, -3637 and -3487. N= 6840 in models 1 and 3. N= 
6768 in models 2 and 4. 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dual 0.039*** 0.039*** -0.008 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
24 0.007 0.006 -0.011 -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.023)
Complex 0.034*** 0.036*** -0.016 -0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023)
Mix 0.002 0.003 -0.039* -0.036
(0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.022)
Complex24 0.009 0.010
(0.021) (0.022)
Mix24 0.016 0.018
(0.020) (0.021)
ComplexDual 0.068*** 0.065**
(0.026) (0.026)
MixDual 0.048** 0.045**
(0.021) (0.021)
Dual24 0.008 0.010
(0.014) (0.014)
DefaultCompMix 0.018** 0.018* 0.018** 0.018*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
BestCompMix -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Period -0.007***-0.007***-0.007***-0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
mDE
D
DF
F
DEAD 0.102*** 0.098*** 0.102*** 0.098***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
DEA 0.150** 0.157** 0.150** 0.157**
(0.068) (0.064) (0.068) (0.064)
DEAI 0.129 0.116 0.129 0.116
(0.081) (0.079) (0.081) (0.079)
BDEAD
BDEA
WDEAD 0.248*** 0.227*** 0.248*** 0.227***
(0.073) (0.071) (0.073) (0.071)
WDEA -0.042 -0.048 -0.043 -0.048
(0.068) (0.065) (0.068) (0.065)
UK -0.072 -0.072
(0.047) (0.047)
Gender -0.118*** -0.118***
(0.043) (0.043)
Age 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.006)
Social Desirability 0.013* 0.015** 0.013* 0.015*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Dep. Var. Default Rate
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Table F7. Random Effects regressions on Default Rate with Social Desirability as an 
Independent Variable88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
88 The pseudo log likelihood for the models is -2161, -2147, -2157 and -2143. n = 6840 in models 1 and 3. n = 
6768 in models 2 and 4. 
  
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dual 0.064*** 0.063*** -0.003 0.001
(0.013) (0.012) (0.031) (0.031)
24 0.014 0.013 -0.014 -0.018
(0.011) (0.011) (0.031) (0.031)
Complex 0.049** 0.050*** -0.024 -0.020
(0.019) (0.019) (0.038) (0.038)
Mix -0.001 0.000 -0.065** -0.061
(0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.032)
Complex24 0.002 0.005
(0.037) (0.037)
Mix24 0.035 0.037
(0.030) (0.030)
ComplexDual 0.104** 0.098**
(0.041) (0.040)
MixDual 0.068** 0.063*
(0.032) (0.032)
Dual24 0.006 0.008
(0.024) (0.023)
DefaultCompMix 0.031** 0.031** 0.031** 0.031**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
BestCompMix -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Period -0.010***-0.010***-0.010***-0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
mDE
D
DF
F
DEAD 0.143*** 0.135*** 0.143*** 0.135***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
DEA 0.179** 0.181** 0.179** 0.181**
(0.083) (0.078) (0.083) (0.078)
DEAI 0.154* 0.128 0.154* 0.128
(0.093) (0.088) (0.093) (0.087)
BDEAD
BDEA
WDEAD 0.303*** 0.262*** 0.303*** 0.262***
(0.091) (0.088) (0.091) (0.088)
WDEA 0.005 -0.006 0.005 -0.006
(0.092) (0.087) (0.092) (0.087)
UK -0.087 -0.087
(0.053) (0.053)
Gender -0.133*** -0.133***
(0.050) (0.050)
Age 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.007)
Social Desirability 0.015* 0.016** 0.015* 0.016**
(0.008) (0.008)
Dep. Var. Default Rate
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Appendix G 
 
Time Trend of Consumer Performance  
 
Below we list frequencies by period of key variables. 
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  G2. Experiment 2  
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G3. Experiment 3  
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Appendix H 
 
Experimental Earnings (note that in treatments BDEAD and BDEA default tariff 
earnings and best tariff earnings are the same) 
 
        
Panel a - Experiment 1     
Treatment Default Tariff Suboptimal Tariff Best Tariff 
DE 53951.49 66549.31 78923.59 
mDE 55536.61 63210.58 78614.40 
D 56836.60 67268.79 79074.65 
DF 55935.77 66986.23 78735.26 
F 53841.09 64907.16 78748.95 
Average 56045.93 65799.78 78805.41 
Panel b - Experiment 2     
DEAD 54619.51 63786.94 78336.90 
DEA 56754.80 66215.39 79022.52 
DEAI 57450.90 66710.52 79143.56 
Average 55790.47 65550.84 78837.82 
Panel c - Experiment 3     
BDEAD 77217.12 62763.29 77217.12 
BDEA 78840.71 62703.03 78840.71 
WDEAD 55519.44 63629.13 78580.61 
WDEA 53207.95 64274.23 78423.91 
Average 72689.58 63459.12 78209.50 
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Appendix I 
 
Experimental instructions 
Welcome to today's experiment on decision making. Today's session will begin 
shortly.  Before we start, I have a few friendly reminders. First, to help us keep the lab neat 
and tidy, we ask that you do not eat or drink in the lab.  Also, we ask that you turn off 
completely your mobile phones and other devices, as they may not be used during today's 
session. Please refrain from talking to other participants during the experiment. Finally, you 
are not allowed to use calculators, take notes or use the computer privately.  Do not open any 
webpage or any other applications on this computer. Calculators, mobile phones, paper and 
pens are not allowed to be used in this experiment. 
A copy of the instructions is on your desk. Please follow along as I read through the 
instructions. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come and answer it 
privately.  
(On the desk in front of you, you will see a receipt form. DO NOT sign the receipt. 
You will sign the receipt form only once you have been paid.) 
We are now ready to describe the nature of the tasks within the experiment. 
Tasks  
In the experiment, you will make decisions that involve buying goods from firms. 
There are 10 tasks in this experiment. I will now describe a typical task for you. 
At the beginning of each task, you are given an endowment of game points.  Using 
this endowment, you must buy one unit of a good. Exactly the same good is being sold by 24 
firms.  Each firm offers you a price at which you can buy the good.  We will call this the 
firm’s offer. Each firm’s offer is also in game points. Your job is to choose which firm to buy 
the good from. The price you pay the firm is deducted from your endowment to give your 
payment points for the round. Different firms may offer different prices, so how many 
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payment points you earn will depend on which firm you buy the good from. However, all the 
prices will be less than your endowment. So, whichever firm you buy from, the number of 
payment points you earn will be positive.   
It is in your interest to try to get as many payment points as possible in each task. At 
the end of the experiment, one of the 10 tasks will be selected randomly. We will find out 
how many payment points you earned in that task and convert them into UK pounds, using an 
exchange rate.  We will pay you that amount of money, immediately after the experiment.  
The exchange rate between points and UK pounds may be different for different tasks. It will 
be shown on the screen for each task. In each task, the value of your endowment at the 
exchange rate will be £32. 
Now I will explain more about the task.  
[Activating the computer screen] 
This is an example and your payment will NOT relate to this example. Please do not 
click anything except when I tell you to. 
Each task has two pages: a “market page” and a “shopping basket page”.   
Market page 
Now what you see is the market page.  
Notice that your endowment and the exchange rate are shown on the top of the screen. 
It says: “Your endowment is 64 points.” and “The exchange rate is 2 points = £1.” 
On the left hand side of the screen you can see 24 colored boxes, “OFFER A”, 
OFFER B”……., “OFFER X”. These are the offers of a good from the 24 firms (details of 
the offers are not yet visible). Different colors represent different “price structures” which I 
will explain later. 
On the right hand side of the screen you can see a “shopping basket”.  
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On the bottom of the screen you can see two buttons: The “View the shopping basket” 
button on the left and the “Move into the shopping basket” button on the right. 
In the market page, you can do the following four actions: 
1. Discover the price structure used by a firm to present its offer 
2. Discover  the price details of a firm’s offer 
3. Move an offer into the shopping basket 
4. View the shopping basket 
I will now explain these actions.  
Please click ONCE on offer A. Notice that this is a red box. You can see that the offer 
now has a black frame round it.  This tells you that you have chosen to look at this offer. The 
price structure of offer A is shown on the screen, below the 24 offers:  it says “price structure 
1”. Now, click offer A again and wait.  There is a delay of 3 seconds before anything 
happens.  Now you can see the price details of offer A, below the price structure information: 
“Original price = 15 points; Final price = Original price x 110%”.  This means that the final 
price is 15 points multiplied by 110%, which comes to 16.5 points. This is what you would 
have to pay if you bought the good from this firm.  Your endowment in this task is 64 points. 
If you bought offer A, your payment points for this task would be 64 points - 16.5 points = 
47.5 points. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  
If this was a real task, you would now be able to choose whether or not to put this 
offer into the shopping basket.  For the purposes of this practice, let us now put this offer into 
the shopping basket. Click the “Move into the shopping basket” button at the bottom right of 
the screen. Now the offer A is moved into the shopping basket and you can see it in the 
shopping basket on the right side of the screen.   
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Now we’ll look at another offer with the same price structure.  Click once on offer D.  
Notice that this is also a red box.  You can see the black frame has moved from offer A to 
offer D.   Offer A’s price structure and price details have both disappeared and offer D’s 
price structure is now shown on the screen. Below the 24 offers, it says “price structure 1”. It 
has the same price structure as offer A. Offers with the same color always have the same 
price structure. 
Click offer D again and wait for 3 seconds.  Now you can see the price details of offer 
D: “Original price = 20 points; Final price = Original price x 110%”.  This means that the 
final price is 20 points multiplied by 110%, which comes to 22 points.  Your endowment in 
this task is 64 points. If you bought offer D, your payment points for this task would be 64 
points - 22 points = 42 points. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  
Remember that offer A was Original price x 110%.  Offer A and offer D have 
different original prices (15 points or 20 points), but in both cases the original price is 
multiplied by the same percentage.  This is because these two offers have the same price 
structure.  In this example, all offers which use price structure 1 consist of an original price 
multiplied by 110%.   
Put offer D into the shopping basket by clicking the “Move into the shopping basket” 
button. 
Now we’ll look at another offer with a different price structure.  Click once on offer 
E.  Notice that this is a yellow box.  Below the 24 offers, it says: “price structure 2”. Offers 
with different colors always have different price structures.  
Click offer E again and wait for 3 seconds.  Now you can see the price details of offer 
E showing below the price structure information: “Original price = 18 points; Final price = 
Original price x 120%”  This means that the final price is 18 points multiplied by 120%, 
which comes to 21.6 points.  Your endowment in this task is 64 points. If you bought offer E, 
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your payment points for this task would be 64 points - 21.6 points = 42.4 points. Please raise 
your hand if you have any questions. 
Remember that offer A and offer D both had original prices multiplied by 110%.  
Offer E has an original price multiplied by 120%. This is because E has a different price 
structure than A and D.  In this example, all offers which use price structure 2 consist of an 
original price multiplied by 120%.   
Put offer E into the shopping basket by clicking the “Move into the shopping basket” 
button. 
Now let us quickly put some more offers in the shopping basket. Do this for offer F, 
by clicking the offer once and then clicking the “Move into shopping basket” button. 
And do the same for offer G. 
And do the same for offer M. 
And finally, do the same for offer W. 
Now we will go to the shopping basket. Click “View the shopping basket” button. 
Shopping basket page 
After 3 seconds delay, you can see the shopping basket page. 
Your endowment and the exchange rate are still shown at the top of the screen. These 
values stay the same throughout the task. 
In the middle of the screen you can see the price details of the seven offers that you 
have put into the shopping basket.  Notice that the shopping basket allows you to see the 
price details of several offers at the same time.  This makes it easier to compare different 
offers. 
On the left side of the screen, you can see a “Move offer out” button for each offer. 
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On the right side of the screen, you can see a “Buy the good from firm” button for 
each offer. 
On the bottom of the screen, you can see a “Continue shopping” button. 
In the shopping basket page, you can do the following three actions.  
1. Move an offer out of the shopping basket 
2. Continue shopping 
3. Buy the good from one of the firms whose offers are in the shopping 
basket. 
Let us move offer E out of the shopping basket.  Click the “Move offer E out” button. 
After clicking, you can see the information of offer E, the “Move offer E out” button and the 
“Buy the good from firm E” button all disappear. This means that offer E has been moved out 
of the shopping basket.  
Notice, the capacity of the shopping basket is nine. This means you cannot put more 
than nine offers into the shopping basket at the same time.  If the shopping basket is full but 
you want to put some new offers into it, you must first move some old offers out of the 
shopping basket, and then go back to the market page. 
Let us go back to the market page.  Click the “Continue shopping” button. 
Now you are in the market page again. 
Put offer U into the shopping basket and click “View the shopping basket button”. 
Wait for 3 seconds. 
Now you are back at the shopping basket page.  You can see the price details of the 
offers in the basket, listed in the middle of the screen. Notice that this list includes offer U, 
which you just added to the basket. 
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If this was a real task, you would now be able to decide whether to buy the good from 
any one of the firms whose offers are in the shopping basket, or whether to continue 
shopping.  
Now, look at offer A: 
“Original price = 15 points; Final price = Original price x 110%”.  This means that 
the final price is 15 points multiplied by 110%, which comes to 16.5 points. This is what you 
would have to pay if you bought the good from this firm.  Your endowment in this round is 
64 points. If you bought offer A, your payment points would be 64 points - 16.5 points = 47.5 
points.  
Now, let us assume that this is a real task and at the end of the experiment this round 
is randomly picked by the computer. So you would have 47.5 payment points, which would 
covert to UK pounds.  
We know that the exchange rate in this round is 2 points = £1, so we would pay you 
47.5 points / 2 = £23.75. This £23.75 is called your final payment. Please raise your hand if 
you have any questions.  
Now, look at offer D: 
“Original price = 20 points; Final price = Original price x 110%”.  This means that 
the final price is 20 points multiplied by 110%, which comes to 22 points.  Your endowment 
in this round is 64 points. If you bought offer A, your payment points would be 64 points - 22 
points = 42 points. 
Now, let us assume that this is a real task and at the end of the experiment this round 
is randomly picked by the computer. You would have 42 points, which would covert to UK 
pounds. 
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We know that the exchange rate in this round is 2 points = £1, so we would pay you 
42 points / 2 = £21.00 and your final payment is £21.00 Please raise your hand if you have 
any questions. 
Now, look at offer E 
“Original price = 18 points; Final price = Original x 120%”   This means that the 
final price is 18 points multiplied by 120%, which comes to 21.6 points.  Your endowment in 
this round is 64 points. If you bought offer E, your payment points would be 64 points - 21.6 
points = 42.4 points. 
Now, let us assume that this is a real task and at the end of the experiment this round 
is randomly picked by the computer. You would have 42.4 points, which would covert to UK 
pounds. 
We know that the exchange rate in this round is 2 points = £1, so we would pay you 
42.4 points / 2 = £21.20. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  
For the purposes of this practice, let us now buy the good from any firm you want. 
Click a “Buy the good from firm” button at the right hand side of the screen.  
If this was a real task, your payment points for this task would be your endowment 
minus the final price of the offer you have bought. 
The practice is over. 
Please answer the following questions. After finishing these questions, please raise 
your hand and I will come to you to check your answers…  If all your answers correct, you 
will be able to start the experiment. 
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Questionnaire 
Questions 1 to 6: please answer each question ticking ONE box.  
1. The capacity of the shopping basket is: 
A. 8 offers 
B. 10 offers 
C. 9 offers 
D No limitation 
 
2. At the beginning of each task, you are endowed with: 
A. Payment points that convert to £32  
B. Payment points that convert to £64  
C. 32 payment points  
D. Nothing 
 
3. If you want to move an offer out of the shopping basket, you can do it in the 
A. Market page  
B. Shopping basket page  
C. Both pages  
D. You cannot move an offer out of the shopping basket  
 
 
4. The exchange rate between payment points and UK pounds in different tasks:  
A. Is always the same  
B. May be different  
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5. Offers with the same color: 
A. Have the same price structure 
B. Have the same final price 
C. May have different price structures and different final prices 
 
6. You payment is equal to: 
A. The final price of the good 
B. Your endowment 
C. Your endowment minus the final price of the good 
 
Questions 7 to 9:  Please answer each question by filling in the blanks. 
7. If your endowment is 200 points and the final price of the offer you select is: 
Original price = 100 points; Final price = Original price + 20 points  
then your payment points are _______. 
If this is the selected round and the exchange rate is 20 points = 1 pound, your final 
payment is ____ pounds 
 
8. If your endowment is 200 points and the final price of the offer you select is: 
Original price = 200 points; Final price = Original price x 60% 
then your payment points are _______. 
If this is the selected round and the exchange rate is 10 points = 1 pound, your final 
payment is ____ pounds. 
9. If your endowment is 200 points and the final price of a selected offer is: 
Original price = 100 points; Final price = Original price x 60% + 40 points 
then your payment points are _______. 
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If this is the selected round and the exchange rate is 50 points = 1 pound, your final 
payment is ____ pounds. 
 
Answers: 
 
1.C  2.A  3.B  4.B  5.A  6.C 
7. 80; 4      8. 80; 8       9.100; 2  
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Appendix J 
 
An example of experimental tasks screen shots 
 
Marketing page 
 
 
Shopping basket page 
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Appendix K 
 
Table K1  
Twenty-four offers’ final money prices from low to high and corresponding earnings if a 
participant chooses this offer 
 
Offers Final money prices (£) Earnings (Endowment minus 
Final money price) (£) 
1 20.27 11.73 
2 20.645 11.355 
3 21.02 10.98 
4 21.395 10.605 
5 21.77 10.23 
6 22.145 9.855 
7 22.52 9.48 
8 22.895 9.105 
9 23.27 8.73 
10 23.645 8.355 
11 24.02 7.98 
12 24.395 7.605 
13 24.77 7.23 
14 25.145 6.855 
15 25.52 6.48 
16 25.895 6.105 
17 26.27 5.73 
18 26.645 5.355 
19 27.02 4.98 
20 27.395 4.605 
21 27.77 4.23 
22 28.145 3.855 
23 28.52 3.48 
24 28.895 3.105 
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Table K2 
Number of participants who inspected different number of common standard offers: PC 
(P1*D1) task 
 
Number of common 
standard offers inspected  
Number of participants  Percent (%) 
0 0 0 
1 6 3.51 
2 4 2.34 
3 3 1.75 
4 3 1.75 
5 5 2.92 
6 3 1.75 
7 6 3.51 
8 141 82.46 
* 171 observations 
 
 
Table K3  
Number of participants who inspected different number of individuated standard offers: PC 
(P1*D1) task 
 
Number of individuated 
standard offers inspected  
Number of participants  Percent (%) 
0 1 0.58 
1 1 0.58 
2 1 0.58 
3 4 2.34 
4 0 0 
5 4 2.34 
6 6 3.51 
7 2 1.17 
8 5 2.92 
9 9 5.26 
10 7 4.09 
11 6 3.51 
12 1 0.58 
13 6 3.51 
14 3 1.75 
15 12 7.02 
16 103 60.23 
* 171 observations 
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Table K4 
Number of participants who inspected different number of common standard offers: PC 
(P1*D1*D2) task 
 
Number of common standard 
offers inspected  
Number of participants  Percent (%) 
0 3 1.75 
1 4 2.34 
2 6 3.51 
3 10 5.85 
4 2 1.17 
5 3 1.75 
6 4 2.34 
7 8 4.68 
8 131 76.61 
* 171 observations 
 
 
Table K5 
Number of participants who inspected different number of individuated standard offers: PC 
(P1*D1*D2) task 
 
Number of individuated 
standard offers inspected  
Number of participants  Percent (%) 
0 1 0.58 
1 5 2.92 
2 3 1.75 
3 1 0.58 
4 4 2.34 
5 1 0.58 
6 4 2.34 
7 10 5.85 
8 17 9.94 
9 9 5.26 
10 5 2.92 
11 4 2.34 
12 2 1.17 
13 7 4.09 
14 6 3.51 
15 10 5.85 
16 82 47.95 
* 171 observations 
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Table K6 
Number of participants who inspected different number of common standard offers PC 
(P1*D1+P2) task 
 
Number of common standard 
offers inspected  
Number of participants  Percent (%) 
0 3 1.75 
1 10 5.85 
2 2 1.17 
3 3 1.75 
4 1 0.58 
5 5 2.92 
6 2 1.17 
7 16 9.36 
8 129 75.44 
* 171 observations 
 
 
Table K7 
Number of participants who inspected different number of individuated standard offers PC 
(P1*D1+P2) task 
 
Number of individuated 
standard offers inspected  
Number of participants  Percent (%) 
0 2 1.17 
1 3 1.75 
2 2 1.17 
3 5 2.92 
4 1 0.58 
5 3 1.75 
6 4 2.34 
7 2 1.17 
8 9 5.26 
9 10 5.85 
10 3 1.75 
11 6 3.51 
12 4 2.34 
13 6 3.51 
14 10 5.85 
15 6 3.51 
16 95 55.56 
* 171 observations 
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Table K8 
Proportion of common standard and individual standard inspections over course of task: PC 
(P1*D1) task 
 
Clicking time interval Proportion of common 
standard inspections 
Proportion of individuated 
standard inspections 
10% 0.687  0.313  
20% 0.696  0.304  
30% 0.714  0.286  
40% 0.365  0.635  
50% 0.231  0.769  
60% 0.188  0.812  
70% 0.127  0.873  
80% 0.153  0.847  
90% 0.134  0.866  
100% 0.114  0.886  
 
 
 
 
Table K9 
Proportion of common standard and individual standard inspections over course of task: PC 
(P1*D1*D2) task 
 
Clicking time interval Proportion of common 
standard inspections 
Proportion of individuated 
standard inspections 
10% 0.654 0.346 
20% 0.689 0.311 
30% 0.658 0.342 
40% 0.434 0.566 
50% 0.309 0.691 
60% 0.160 0.840 
70% 0.196 0.804 
80% 0.131 0.869 
90% 0.150 0.850 
100% 0.107 0.893 
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Table K10 
Proportion of common standard and individual standard inspections over course of task: PC 
(P1*D1+P2) task 
 
Clicking time interval Proportion of common 
standard inspections 
Proportion of individuated 
standard inspections 
10% 0.703 0.297 
20% 0.739 0.261 
30% 0.702 0.298 
40% 0.396 0.604 
50% 0.240 0.760 
60% 0.176 0.824 
70% 0.113 0.888 
80% 0.115 0.885 
90% 0.116 0.884 
100% 0.146 0.854 
 
 
 
 
Table K11 
Proportion of common standard and individuated standard offers in the shopping basket: PC 
(P1*D1) task 
 
Clicking Time interval Proportion of common 
standard offers in the 
shopping basket 
Proportion of individuated 
standard offers in the shopping 
basket 
10% 0.619 0.381 
20% 0.621 0.379 
30% 0.659 0.341 
40% 0.568 0.432 
50% 0.409 0.591 
60% 0.333 0.667 
70% 0.296 0.704 
80% 0.261 0.739 
90% 0.224 0.776 
100% 0.225 0.775 
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Table K12 
Proportion of the common standard and individuated standard offers in the shopping basket: 
PC (P1*D1*D2) task 
 
Clicking Time interval Proportion of common 
standard offers in the 
shopping basket 
Proportion of individuated 
standard offers in the shopping 
basket 
10% 0.637 0.363 
20% 0.660 0.340 
30% 0.659 0.341 
40% 0.597 0.403 
50% 0.458 0.542 
60% 0.373 0.627 
70% 0.322 0.678 
80% 0.275 0.725 
90% 0.228 0.772 
100% 0.214 0.786 
 
 
 
Table K13 
Proportion of the common standard and individuated standard offers in the shopping basket: 
PC (P1*D1+P2) task 
 
Clicking Time interval Proportion of common 
standard offers in the 
shopping basket 
Proportion of individuated 
standard offers in the 
shopping basket 
10% 0.699 0.301 
20% 0.685 0.315 
30% 0.695 0.305 
40% 0.608 0.392 
50% 0.423 0.577 
60% 0.339 0.661 
70% 0.290 0.710 
80% 0.233 0.767 
90% 0.213 0.787 
100% 0.199 0.801 
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Table K14 
ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: AC (P1) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal common standard offers at that rank.  
 
 
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Optimal offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (171) 
Offer rank  
3 (171) 
Offer rank  
4 (171) 
 Offer rank 5 
(171) 
Offer rank  
6 (171) 
Offer rank  
7 (171) 
Offer rank  
8 (171) 
Offer rank  
9 (171) 
Offer rank 
10 (171) 
Offer rank 
11 (171) 
Offer rank 
12 (171) 
10% 0.017 0.027 0.033 0.026 0.023 0.036 0.025 0.039 0.019 0.047 0.028 0.038 
20% 0.090 0.122 0.147 0.126 0.105 0.095 0.116 0.107 0.067 0.128 0.133 0.117 
30% 0.152 0.241 0.241 0.218 0.188 0.184 0.186 0.167 0.137 0.176 0.192 0.181 
40% 0.184 0.287 0.233 0.220 0.158 0.147 0.088 0.123 0.099 0.097 0.093 0.118 
50% 0.254 0.326 0.254 0.231 0.179 0.135 0.082 0.109 0.093 0.090 0.058 0.088 
60% 0.346 0.429 0.330 0.287 0.224 0.198 0.163 0.167 0.155 0.141 0.088 0.142 
70% 0.397 0.474 0.355 0.303 0.226 0.223 0.185 0.196 0.158 0.154 0.117 0.127 
80% 0.457 0.470 0.349 0.236 0.166 0.174 0.113 0.111 0.092 0.074 0.067 0.076 
90% 0.603 0.539 0.366 0.282 0.178 0.208 0.139 0.142 0.125 0.093 0.091 0.100 
100% 0.858 0.584 0.398 0.338 0.227 0.224 0.168 0.137 0.126 0.123 0.126 0.121 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank 13 
(171) 
Offer rank 
14 (171) 
Offer rank 
15 (171) 
Offer rank 
16 (171) 
Offer rank 
17 (171) 
Offer rank 
18 (171) 
Offer rank 
19 (171) 
Offer rank 
20 (171) 
Offer rank 
21 (171) 
Offer rank 
22 (171) 
Offer rank 
23 (171) 
Offer rank 
24 (171) 
10% 0.042 0.022 0.024 0.029 0.046 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.020 0.048 0.044 0.015 
20% 0.148 0.093 0.110 0.112 0.099 0.106 0.085 0.091 0.098 0.102 0.149 0.048 
30% 0.221 0.152 0.150 0.155 0.145 0.151 0.143 0.117 0.144 0.171 0.172 0.084 
40% 0.121 0.094 0.096 0.062 0.085 0.062 0.086 0.045 0.068 0.102 0.062 0.045 
50% 0.074 0.065 0.083 0.077 0.060 0.066 0.086 0.064 0.054 0.086 0.080 0.041 
60% 0.129 0.133 0.123 0.151 0.119 0.121 0.108 0.119 0.103 0.147 0.146 0.082 
70% 0.117 0.159 0.119 0.143 0.129 0.122 0.116 0.124 0.099 0.148 0.132 0.098 
80% 0.082 0.074 0.047 0.055 0.072 0.058 0.068 0.060 0.051 0.060 0.067 0.051 
90% 0.135 0.094 0.097 0.071 0.102 0.082 0.101 0.081 0.073 0.059 0.095 0.116 
100% 0.146 0.085 0.126 0.111 0.135 0.149 0.137 0.093 0.106 0.093 0.139 0.192 
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Table K15 
ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: AC (P1*D1) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal common standard offers at that rank.  
 
 
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Optimal offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (171) 
Offer rank  
3 (171) 
Offer rank  
4 (171) 
 Offer rank 5 
(171) 
Offer rank  
6 (171) 
Offer rank  
7 (171) 
Offer rank  
8 (171) 
Offer rank  
9 (171) 
Offer rank 
10 (171) 
Offer rank 
11 (171) 
Offer rank 
12 (171) 
10% 0.018 0.033 0.012 0.017 0.034 0.040 0.039 0.048 0.021 0.041 0.045 0.038 
20% 0.096 0.106 0.063 0.119 0.123 0.121 0.110 0.118 0.127 0.110 0.132 0.134 
30% 0.143 0.177 0.152 0.218 0.183 0.188 0.166 0.176 0.178 0.180 0.151 0.187 
40% 0.175 0.246 0.176 0.236 0.147 0.157 0.129 0.099 0.104 0.120 0.093 0.110 
50% 0.231 0.315 0.237 0.277 0.177 0.159 0.153 0.082 0.098 0.085 0.109 0.107 
60% 0.343 0.407 0.363 0.320 0.250 0.221 0.195 0.134 0.163 0.129 0.138 0.169 
70% 0.457 0.434 0.402 0.324 0.250 0.239 0.204 0.165 0.160 0.155 0.148 0.164 
80% 0.550 0.431 0.365 0.242 0.181 0.186 0.129 0.096 0.099 0.090 0.083 0.089 
90% 0.671 0.507 0.405 0.291 0.226 0.206 0.169 0.122 0.124 0.118 0.114 0.137 
100% 0.851 0.558 0.414 0.299 0.226 0.209 0.181 0.152 0.133 0.148 0.130 0.150 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank 13 
(171) 
Offer rank 
14 (171) 
Offer rank 
15 (171) 
Offer rank 
16 (171) 
Offer rank 
17 (171) 
Offer rank 
18 (171) 
Offer rank 
19 (171) 
Offer rank 
20 (171) 
Offer rank 
21 (171) 
Offer rank 
22 (171) 
Offer rank 
23 (171) 
Offer rank 
24 (171) 
10% 0.029 0.039 0.037 0.047 0.023 0.042 0.032 0.022 0.043 0.037 0.025 0.019 
20% 0.118 0.087 0.100 0.133 0.123 0.131 0.105 0.093 0.141 0.131 0.089 0.059 
30% 0.193 0.122 0.138 0.169 0.183 0.170 0.162 0.142 0.196 0.173 0.136 0.110 
40% 0.075 0.062 0.071 0.066 0.091 0.086 0.059 0.062 0.094 0.084 0.097 0.058 
50% 0.052 0.068 0.077 0.063 0.083 0.051 0.027 0.070 0.075 0.080 0.090 0.078 
60% 0.089 0.092 0.144 0.133 0.141 0.124 0.072 0.099 0.117 0.170 0.139 0.125 
70% 0.086 0.098 0.161 0.122 0.160 0.124 0.112 0.103 0.111 0.161 0.132 0.110 
80% 0.034 0.060 0.058 0.063 0.075 0.056 0.068 0.068 0.048 0.096 0.071 0.067 
90% 0.052 0.100 0.066 0.056 0.081 0.089 0.091 0.143 0.070 0.110 0.125 0.138 
100% 0.093 0.132 0.110 0.109 0.107 0.103 0.112 0.166 0.102 0.142 0.173 0.179 
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Table K16 
ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: AC (P1*D1*D2) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal common standard offers at that rank.  
 
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Optimal offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (171) 
Offer rank  
3 (171) 
Offer rank  
4 (171) 
 Offer rank 5 
(171) 
Offer rank  
6 (171) 
Offer rank  
7 (171) 
Offer rank  
8 (171) 
Offer rank  
9 (171) 
Offer rank 
10 (171) 
Offer rank 
11 (171) 
Offer rank 
12 (171) 
10% 0.003 0.026 0.051 0.041 0.032 0.019 0.057 0.032 0.047 0.027 0.029 0.025 
20% 0.045 0.113 0.137 0.153 0.092 0.087 0.113 0.110 0.142 0.128 0.118 0.111 
30% 0.120 0.180 0.222 0.237 0.149 0.159 0.171 0.159 0.184 0.185 0.157 0.147 
40% 0.162 0.229 0.253 0.213 0.153 0.130 0.126 0.087 0.113 0.089 0.073 0.093 
50% 0.189 0.292 0.278 0.250 0.161 0.134 0.159 0.117 0.116 0.094 0.086 0.108 
60% 0.280 0.373 0.317 0.314 0.221 0.245 0.207 0.177 0.201 0.168 0.140 0.171 
70% 0.354 0.437 0.359 0.341 0.231 0.258 0.186 0.207 0.214 0.154 0.130 0.161 
80% 0.445 0.441 0.354 0.283 0.148 0.159 0.117 0.141 0.125 0.086 0.055 0.104 
90% 0.581 0.481 0.407 0.324 0.168 0.182 0.146 0.181 0.128 0.105 0.108 0.116 
100% 0.807 0.532 0.393 0.292 0.171 0.179 0.143 0.188 0.142 0.079 0.126 0.118 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank 13 
(171) 
Offer rank 
14 (171) 
Offer rank 
15 (171) 
Offer rank 
16 (171) 
Offer rank 
17 (171) 
Offer rank 
18 (171) 
Offer rank 
19 (171) 
Offer rank 
20 (171) 
Offer rank 
21 (171) 
Offer rank 
22 (171) 
Offer rank 
23 (171) 
Offer rank 
24 (171) 
10% 0.034 0.021 0.023 0.011 0.038 0.030 0.038 0.041 0.023 0.047 0.055 0.011 
20% 0.126 0.096 0.093 0.077 0.111 0.101 0.123 0.110 0.105 0.162 0.142 0.053 
30% 0.191 0.140 0.138 0.170 0.162 0.135 0.144 0.134 0.165 0.219 0.174 0.085 
40% 0.105 0.093 0.077 0.087 0.100 0.053 0.078 0.073 0.076 0.101 0.104 0.059 
50% 0.064 0.076 0.069 0.074 0.074 0.064 0.121 0.052 0.063 0.078 0.099 0.069 
60% 0.102 0.118 0.139 0.103 0.136 0.136 0.169 0.084 0.114 0.128 0.146 0.081 
70% 0.112 0.157 0.152 0.113 0.127 0.141 0.156 0.120 0.105 0.125 0.142 0.085 
80% 0.079 0.078 0.066 0.057 0.107 0.070 0.104 0.076 0.072 0.091 0.088 0.070 
90% 0.113 0.111 0.094 0.095 0.161 0.087 0.121 0.096 0.115 0.128 0.114 0.149 
100% 0.097 0.122 0.105 0.133 0.152 0.101 0.142 0.140 0.143 0.137 0.142 0.218 
228 
 
 
Table K17 
ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: AC (P1*D1+P2) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal common standard offers at that rank.  
 
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Optimal offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (171) 
Offer rank  
3 (171) 
Offer rank  
4 (171) 
 Offer rank 5 
(171) 
Offer rank  
6 (171) 
Offer rank  
7 (171) 
Offer rank  
8 (171) 
Offer rank  
9 (171) 
Offer rank 
10 (171) 
Offer rank 
11 (171) 
Offer rank 
12 (171) 
10% 0.012 0.049 0.034 0.029 0.025 0.020 0.027 0.032 0.025 0.027 0.049 0.034 
20% 0.065 0.144 0.108 0.130 0.113 0.060 0.128 0.131 0.128 0.132 0.136 0.106 
30% 0.121 0.265 0.182 0.218 0.222 0.153 0.217 0.205 0.179 0.188 0.171 0.150 
40% 0.162 0.321 0.177 0.164 0.201 0.136 0.151 0.111 0.106 0.098 0.104 0.086 
50% 0.238 0.378 0.235 0.163 0.211 0.135 0.128 0.127 0.120 0.143 0.117 0.078 
60% 0.327 0.457 0.330 0.267 0.256 0.231 0.211 0.208 0.139 0.235 0.160 0.150 
70% 0.373 0.496 0.345 0.250 0.257 0.204 0.189 0.187 0.143 0.178 0.150 0.134 
80% 0.468 0.502 0.295 0.216 0.202 0.147 0.122 0.130 0.101 0.095 0.091 0.084 
90% 0.654 0.569 0.348 0.258 0.249 0.166 0.145 0.160 0.146 0.124 0.141 0.076 
100% 0.819 0.585 0.383 0.288 0.250 0.216 0.180 0.176 0.148 0.125 0.141 0.094 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank 13 
(171) 
Offer rank 
14 (171) 
Offer rank 
15 (171) 
Offer rank 
16 (171) 
Offer rank 
17 (171) 
Offer rank 
18 (171) 
Offer rank 
19 (171) 
Offer rank 
20 (171) 
Offer rank 
21 (171) 
Offer rank 
22 (171) 
Offer rank 
23 (171) 
Offer rank 
24 (171) 
10% 0.026 0.024 0.040 0.049 0.031 0.059 0.032 0.041 0.026 0.038 0.038 0.019 
20% 0.118 0.102 0.118 0.139 0.100 0.147 0.082 0.108 0.090 0.108 0.109 0.087 
30% 0.181 0.142 0.160 0.207 0.167 0.183 0.115 0.151 0.152 0.145 0.156 0.135 
40% 0.098 0.062 0.090 0.087 0.091 0.101 0.064 0.070 0.080 0.058 0.076 0.061 
50% 0.104 0.071 0.094 0.073 0.105 0.097 0.051 0.053 0.090 0.051 0.086 0.056 
60% 0.162 0.128 0.142 0.130 0.155 0.155 0.115 0.133 0.150 0.104 0.166 0.083 
70% 0.164 0.113 0.108 0.122 0.149 0.130 0.127 0.140 0.135 0.102 0.150 0.078 
80% 0.072 0.092 0.057 0.107 0.067 0.062 0.049 0.055 0.069 0.060 0.113 0.063 
90% 0.108 0.131 0.091 0.131 0.095 0.106 0.102 0.114 0.116 0.136 0.131 0.115 
100% 0.105 0.152 0.141 0.116 0.115 0.119 0.129 0.119 0.118 0.149 0.151 0.149 
229 
 
 
Table K18 
ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: NC (P1*D1) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal individuated standard offers at that rank.  
 
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Optimal offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (171) 
Offer rank  
3 (171) 
Offer rank  
4 (171) 
 Offer rank 5 
(171) 
Offer rank  
6 (171) 
Offer rank  
7 (171) 
Offer rank  
8 (171) 
Offer rank  
9 (171) 
Offer rank 
10 (171) 
Offer rank 
11 (171) 
Offer rank 
12 (171) 
10% 0.033 0.028 0.027 0.031 0.019 0.053 0.022 0.029 0.041 0.022 0.043 0.029 
20% 0.081 0.112 0.094 0.118 0.095 0.151 0.119 0.110 0.147 0.093 0.113 0.115 
30% 0.112 0.187 0.171 0.208 0.152 0.207 0.215 0.179 0.197 0.185 0.130 0.169 
40% 0.128 0.219 0.180 0.243 0.144 0.201 0.169 0.179 0.178 0.204 0.083 0.124 
50% 0.177 0.304 0.252 0.295 0.166 0.232 0.205 0.195 0.236 0.250 0.139 0.121 
60% 0.259 0.385 0.309 0.347 0.263 0.311 0.243 0.217 0.302 0.272 0.223 0.180 
70% 0.299 0.379 0.298 0.333 0.296 0.289 0.244 0.224 0.269 0.192 0.227 0.224 
80% 0.336 0.398 0.302 0.310 0.287 0.295 0.237 0.241 0.252 0.184 0.186 0.207 
90% 0.423 0.483 0.380 0.342 0.351 0.327 0.262 0.286 0.306 0.229 0.215 0.270 
100% 0.476 0.460 0.355 0.333 0.303 0.269 0.214 0.229 0.243 0.199 0.150 0.199 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank 13 
(171) 
Offer rank 
14 (171) 
Offer rank 
15 (171) 
Offer rank 
16 (171) 
Offer rank 
17 (171) 
Offer rank 
18 (171) 
Offer rank 
19 (171) 
Offer rank 
20 (171) 
Offer rank 
21 (171) 
Offer rank 
22 (171) 
Offer rank 
23 (171) 
Offer rank 
24 (171) 
10% 0.040 0.031 0.029 0.034 0.023 0.041 0.022 0.020 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.029 
20% 0.119 0.084 0.130 0.121 0.099 0.128 0.105 0.114 0.121 0.104 0.088 0.083 
30% 0.151 0.151 0.172 0.179 0.144 0.160 0.178 0.169 0.165 0.149 0.101 0.110 
40% 0.109 0.134 0.113 0.111 0.111 0.073 0.144 0.108 0.109 0.114 0.068 0.067 
50% 0.170 0.140 0.138 0.125 0.128 0.078 0.169 0.143 0.119 0.112 0.114 0.092 
60% 0.195 0.157 0.160 0.161 0.124 0.136 0.241 0.183 0.138 0.146 0.142 0.136 
70% 0.184 0.167 0.148 0.136 0.120 0.130 0.228 0.153 0.107 0.118 0.093 0.115 
80% 0.159 0.140 0.124 0.116 0.142 0.107 0.204 0.144 0.090 0.093 0.111 0.088 
90% 0.177 0.176 0.171 0.154 0.173 0.161 0.221 0.178 0.114 0.137 0.177 0.153 
100% 0.146 0.130 0.155 0.124 0.108 0.131 0.165 0.150 0.091 0.091 0.146 0.139 
230 
 
 
Table K19 
ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: NC (P1*D1*D2) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal individuated standard offers at that rank.  
 
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Optimal offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (171) 
Offer rank  
3 (171) 
Offer rank  
4 (171) 
 Offer rank 5 
(171) 
Offer rank  
6 (171) 
Offer rank  
7 (171) 
Offer rank  
8 (171) 
Offer rank  
9 (171) 
Offer rank 
10 (171) 
Offer rank 
11 (171) 
Offer rank 
12 (171) 
10% 0.026 0.026 0.040 0.020 0.025 0.036 0.031 0.024 0.044 0.022 0.029 0.020 
20% 0.063 0.086 0.131 0.084 0.082 0.132 0.126 0.100 0.138 0.082 0.097 0.085 
30% 0.116 0.163 0.188 0.156 0.154 0.200 0.198 0.165 0.183 0.137 0.162 0.126 
40% 0.136 0.178 0.198 0.199 0.152 0.178 0.217 0.180 0.167 0.144 0.148 0.114 
50% 0.176 0.230 0.232 0.253 0.167 0.196 0.214 0.201 0.143 0.199 0.158 0.124 
60% 0.255 0.237 0.260 0.273 0.238 0.205 0.229 0.227 0.164 0.214 0.159 0.171 
70% 0.273 0.254 0.262 0.269 0.239 0.236 0.213 0.207 0.187 0.204 0.179 0.142 
80% 0.311 0.270 0.251 0.283 0.254 0.211 0.235 0.206 0.219 0.208 0.209 0.168 
90% 0.368 0.319 0.289 0.355 0.278 0.237 0.286 0.250 0.272 0.225 0.240 0.202 
100% 0.396 0.313 0.260 0.327 0.276 0.223 0.279 0.229 0.241 0.223 0.261 0.194 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank 13 
(171) 
Offer rank 
14 (171) 
Offer rank 
15 (171) 
Offer rank 
16 (171) 
Offer rank 
17 (171) 
Offer rank 
18 (171) 
Offer rank 
19 (171) 
Offer rank 
20 (171) 
Offer rank 
21 (171) 
Offer rank 
22 (171) 
Offer rank 
23 (171) 
Offer rank 
24 (171) 
10% 0.042 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.019 0.042 0.036 0.015 0.028 0.021 0.015 0.016 
20% 0.132 0.073 0.081 0.121 0.088 0.136 0.095 0.068 0.102 0.082 0.077 0.072 
30% 0.187 0.136 0.139 0.169 0.154 0.203 0.140 0.142 0.165 0.146 0.134 0.109 
40% 0.168 0.135 0.148 0.171 0.134 0.175 0.147 0.123 0.122 0.126 0.120 0.092 
50% 0.201 0.111 0.182 0.175 0.139 0.178 0.172 0.164 0.114 0.191 0.100 0.079 
60% 0.204 0.137 0.211 0.194 0.179 0.175 0.200 0.165 0.131 0.212 0.116 0.098 
70% 0.203 0.153 0.206 0.167 0.174 0.153 0.188 0.167 0.166 0.213 0.126 0.113 
80% 0.228 0.138 0.222 0.190 0.205 0.192 0.204 0.201 0.209 0.238 0.135 0.139 
90% 0.239 0.176 0.266 0.232 0.242 0.220 0.235 0.232 0.251 0.225 0.185 0.195 
100% 0.225 0.143 0.216 0.181 0.185 0.176 0.214 0.193 0.229 0.220 0.177 0.181 
231 
 
 
Table K20 
ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: NC (P1*D1+P2) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal individuated standard offers at that rank.  
 
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Optimal offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (171) 
Offer rank  
3 (171) 
Offer rank  
4 (171) 
 Offer rank 5 
(171) 
Offer rank  
6 (171) 
Offer rank  
7 (171) 
Offer rank  
8 (171) 
Offer rank  
9 (171) 
Offer rank 
10 (171) 
Offer rank 
11 (171) 
Offer rank 
12 (171) 
10% 0.030 0.026 0.025 0.030 0.042 0.043 0.016 0.022 0.031 0.047 0.035 0.033 
20% 0.090 0.108 0.113 0.127 0.093 0.147 0.104 0.101 0.134 0.154 0.103 0.131 
30% 0.166 0.162 0.164 0.195 0.154 0.187 0.187 0.154 0.213 0.207 0.167 0.180 
40% 0.208 0.177 0.143 0.195 0.139 0.162 0.201 0.152 0.175 0.165 0.155 0.155 
50% 0.256 0.205 0.179 0.230 0.188 0.173 0.227 0.172 0.212 0.163 0.180 0.194 
60% 0.314 0.242 0.222 0.268 0.256 0.241 0.275 0.216 0.265 0.216 0.195 0.221 
70% 0.336 0.278 0.245 0.275 0.264 0.227 0.269 0.218 0.238 0.219 0.197 0.201 
80% 0.366 0.295 0.247 0.296 0.250 0.224 0.226 0.224 0.234 0.226 0.234 0.220 
90% 0.442 0.349 0.303 0.369 0.301 0.285 0.251 0.268 0.278 0.277 0.281 0.269 
100% 0.474 0.371 0.293 0.363 0.269 0.247 0.204 0.225 0.218 0.228 0.205 0.184 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank  
13 (171) 
Offer rank 
14 (171) 
Offer rank 
15 (171) 
Offer rank 
16 (171) 
Offer rank 
17 (171) 
Offer rank 
18 (171) 
Offer rank 
19 (171) 
Offer rank 
20 (171) 
Offer rank 
21 (171) 
Offer rank 
22 (171) 
Offer rank 
23 (171) 
Offer rank 
24 (171) 
10% 0.020 0.030 0.031 0.026 0.014 0.036 0.044 0.028 0.053 0.017 0.018 0.039 
20% 0.110 0.094 0.113 0.115 0.075 0.112 0.140 0.105 0.128 0.072 0.075 0.084 
30% 0.141 0.150 0.142 0.155 0.102 0.131 0.157 0.111 0.174 0.123 0.118 0.087 
40% 0.127 0.152 0.139 0.121 0.077 0.091 0.100 0.107 0.137 0.126 0.100 0.075 
50% 0.136 0.182 0.165 0.139 0.099 0.145 0.108 0.092 0.155 0.127 0.104 0.089 
60% 0.167 0.209 0.213 0.154 0.121 0.193 0.151 0.119 0.157 0.157 0.110 0.109 
70% 0.176 0.174 0.178 0.114 0.120 0.166 0.149 0.087 0.124 0.137 0.107 0.096 
80% 0.170 0.182 0.170 0.092 0.104 0.147 0.168 0.099 0.114 0.117 0.094 0.127 
90% 0.213 0.204 0.200 0.155 0.169 0.178 0.183 0.150 0.141 0.129 0.146 0.195 
100% 0.167 0.156 0.169 0.126 0.098 0.140 0.140 0.109 0.099 0.110 0.121 0.166 
232 
 
 
Table K21 
ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: PC (P1*D1) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal common standard offers at that rank.  
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Cheapest 
common 
standard offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (19) 
Offer rank  
3 (34) 
Offer rank  
4 (33) 
Offer rank  
5 (47) 
Offer rank  
6 (43) 
Offer rank  
7 (44) 
Offer rank  
8 (57) 
Offer rank  
9 (52) 
Offer rank 
10 (56) 
Offer rank 
11 (47) 
Offer rank 
12 (58) 
10% 0.044 0.194 0.055 0.036 0.047 0.139 0.031 0.083 0.043 0.051 0.060 0.091 
20% 0.200 0.386 0.191 0.195 0.236 0.388 0.181 0.221 0.163 0.194 0.253 0.326 
30% 0.426 0.502 0.169 0.195 0.357 0.455 0.324 0.235 0.322 0.268 0.325 0.356 
40% 0.554 0.274 0.088 0.029 0.247 0.222 0.121 0.135 0.244 0.147 0.114 0.178 
50% 0.590 0.123 0.067 0.010 0.204 0.192 0.051 0.081 0.116 0.086 0.070 0.093 
60% 0.596 0.132 0.088 0.139 0.165 0.147 0.075 0.059 0.155 0.125 0.085 0.065 
70% 0.569 0.148 0.069 0.133 0.135 0.114 0.068 0.048 0.113 0.095 0.052 0.039 
80% 0.560 0.105 0.089 0.163 0.157 0.070 0.071 0.043 0.068 0.106 0.043 0.052 
90% 0.577 0.111 0.140 0.195 0.167 0.113 0.055 0.076 0.077 0.093 0.043 0.057 
100% 0.529 0.105 0.125 0.194 0.163 0.116 0.058 0.045 0.027 0.036 0.043 0.046 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank  
13 (70) 
Offer rank 
14 (56) 
Offer rank 
15 (58) 
Offer rank 
16 (66) 
Offer rank 
17 (68) 
Offer rank 
18 (65) 
Offer rank 
19 (51) 
Offer rank 
20 (54) 
Offer rank 
21 (59) 
Offer rank 
22 (48) 
Offer rank 
23 (57) 
Offer rank 
24 (55) 
10% 0.099 0.099 0.090 0.062 0.062 0.098 0.050 0.095 0.044 0.073 0.064 0.039 
20% 0.270 0.336 0.218 0.270 0.261 0.262 0.232 0.290 0.248 0.233 0.219 0.149 
30% 0.270 0.274 0.312 0.293 0.346 0.301 0.270 0.280 0.291 0.221 0.250 0.189 
40% 0.132 0.104 0.140 0.104 0.191 0.135 0.146 0.122 0.108 0.091 0.140 0.146 
50% 0.080 0.080 0.100 0.055 0.123 0.108 0.080 0.040 0.092 0.041 0.087 0.140 
60% 0.088 0.046 0.075 0.053 0.107 0.077 0.051 0.037 0.079 0.030 0.050 0.113 
70% 0.083 0.030 0.041 0.058 0.097 0.052 0.072 0.037 0.036 0.013 0.044 0.105 
80% 0.066 0.029 0.034 0.069 0.089 0.065 0.098 0.090 0.034 0.000 0.033 0.093 
90% 0.076 0.052 0.025 0.078 0.064 0.091 0.082 0.081 0.034 0.016 0.062 0.107 
100% 0.029 0.006 0.019 0.043 0.042 0.053 0.059 0.060 0.039 0.008 0.033 0.064 
233 
 
 
 
Table K22 
ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: PC (P1*D1*D2) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal common standard offers at that rank.  
Clicking 
time interval 
Cheapest 
common 
standard offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (17) 
Offer rank  
3 (36) 
Offer rank  
4 (37) 
Offer rank  
5 (38) 
Offer rank  
6 (45) 
Offer rank  
7 (51) 
Offer rank  
8 (47) 
Offer rank  
9 (65) 
Offer rank 
10 (56) 
Offer rank 
11 (60) 
Offer rank 
12 (55) 
10% 0.047 0.137 0.063 0.104 0.123 0.042 0.024 0.110 0.054 0.055 0.041 0.060 
20% 0.216 0.317 0.319 0.303 0.323 0.196 0.161 0.259 0.235 0.211 0.143 0.222 
30% 0.399 0.408 0.357 0.387 0.323 0.273 0.253 0.319 0.269 0.285 0.236 0.300 
40% 0.499 0.127 0.286 0.263 0.169 0.144 0.212 0.227 0.166 0.133 0.171 0.198 
50% 0.563 0.069 0.217 0.149 0.156 0.143 0.175 0.160 0.147 0.096 0.109 0.128 
60% 0.596 0.059 0.149 0.125 0.100 0.135 0.113 0.116 0.140 0.062 0.114 0.092 
70% 0.552 0.102 0.139 0.110 0.061 0.123 0.092 0.111 0.096 0.055 0.108 0.085 
80% 0.552 0.076 0.144 0.140 0.054 0.189 0.128 0.126 0.083 0.055 0.106 0.047 
90% 0.567 0.081 0.123 0.162 0.070 0.190 0.115 0.113 0.088 0.040 0.089 0.031 
100% 0.523 0.118 0.090 0.133 0.076 0.171 0.081 0.106 0.053 0.050 0.075 0.025 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank  
13 (60) 
Offer rank 
14 (55) 
Offer rank 
15 (54) 
Offer rank 
16 (59) 
Offer rank 
17 (58) 
Offer rank 
18 (69) 
Offer rank 
19 (51) 
Offer rank 
20 (51) 
Offer rank 
21 (60) 
Offer rank 
22 (62) 
Offer rank 
23 (60) 
Offer rank 
24 (51) 
10% 0.046 0.057 0.035 0.073 0.090 0.069 0.044 0.039 0.108 0.078 0.105 0.010 
20% 0.188 0.229 0.167 0.201 0.236 0.230 0.158 0.178 0.284 0.255 0.298 0.056 
30% 0.218 0.265 0.233 0.245 0.242 0.223 0.204 0.265 0.343 0.254 0.312 0.186 
40% 0.092 0.166 0.082 0.198 0.170 0.130 0.125 0.171 0.195 0.206 0.190 0.189 
50% 0.077 0.105 0.072 0.120 0.120 0.117 0.131 0.094 0.106 0.139 0.121 0.188 
60% 0.079 0.060 0.073 0.079 0.100 0.082 0.128 0.075 0.107 0.157 0.082 0.134 
70% 0.059 0.064 0.044 0.063 0.067 0.066 0.114 0.022 0.092 0.151 0.047 0.116 
80% 0.115 0.073 0.034 0.078 0.068 0.082 0.111 0.021 0.085 0.105 0.034 0.108 
90% 0.109 0.061 0.053 0.112 0.065 0.076 0.096 0.027 0.092 0.109 0.028 0.137 
100% 0.093 0.064 0.046 0.075 0.041 0.059 0.078 0.020 0.083 0.099 0.028 0.105 
234 
 
Table K23 
ProbabilityInBasket of common standard offers with different ranks: PC (P1*D1+P2) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal common standard offers at that rank.  
 
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Cheapest 
common 
standard offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (16) 
Offer rank  
3 (34) 
Offer rank  
4 (34) 
Offer rank  
5 (39) 
Offer rank  
6 (52) 
Offer rank  
7 (57) 
Offer rank  
8 (43) 
Offer rank  
9 (64) 
Offer rank 
10 (63) 
Offer rank 
11 (59) 
Offer rank 
12 (50) 
10% 0.053 0.122 0.084 0.029 0.044 0.038 0.100 0.122 0.123 0.055 0.030 0.087 
20% 0.205 0.250 0.257 0.139 0.334 0.196 0.331 0.249 0.321 0.275 0.187 0.292 
30% 0.449 0.227 0.352 0.234 0.360 0.233 0.347 0.300 0.315 0.356 0.233 0.318 
40% 0.571 0.088 0.153 0.104 0.231 0.092 0.131 0.157 0.106 0.168 0.086 0.161 
50% 0.601 0.164 0.129 0.048 0.233 0.099 0.084 0.117 0.061 0.151 0.032 0.091 
60% 0.577 0.219 0.088 0.069 0.231 0.085 0.071 0.060 0.038 0.127 0.024 0.106 
70% 0.492 0.225 0.081 0.089 0.162 0.092 0.092 0.026 0.063 0.087 0.027 0.073 
80% 0.471 0.125 0.059 0.061 0.167 0.096 0.086 0.023 0.058 0.081 0.036 0.087 
90% 0.457 0.125 0.040 0.099 0.176 0.096 0.088 0.034 0.065 0.088 0.068 0.103 
100% 0.372 0.125 0.029 0.105 0.144 0.073 0.078 0.034 0.094 0.104 0.041 0.090 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank  
13 (63) 
Offer rank 
14 (65) 
Offer rank 
15 (57) 
Offer rank 
16 (54) 
Offer rank 
17 (57) 
Offer rank 
18 (60) 
Offer rank 
19 (59) 
Offer rank 
20 (57) 
Offer rank 
21 (49) 
Offer rank 
22 (57) 
Offer rank 
23 (56) 
Offer rank 
24 (52) 
10% 0.097 0.044 0.091 0.101 0.048 0.058 0.053 0.100 0.069 0.118 0.071 0.051 
20% 0.270 0.204 0.262 0.276 0.165 0.210 0.234 0.232 0.253 0.276 0.215 0.168 
30% 0.336 0.303 0.345 0.271 0.264 0.214 0.301 0.305 0.243 0.240 0.235 0.224 
40% 0.150 0.127 0.164 0.088 0.118 0.127 0.142 0.130 0.133 0.089 0.105 0.101 
50% 0.115 0.075 0.090 0.064 0.060 0.110 0.065 0.089 0.115 0.034 0.072 0.088 
60% 0.078 0.042 0.055 0.074 0.035 0.101 0.121 0.071 0.143 0.036 0.090 0.077 
70% 0.055 0.062 0.053 0.048 0.053 0.100 0.123 0.062 0.133 0.035 0.067 0.043 
80% 0.033 0.083 0.055 0.033 0.061 0.088 0.090 0.086 0.109 0.024 0.063 0.033 
90% 0.045 0.065 0.053 0.025 0.103 0.073 0.096 0.092 0.122 0.033 0.071 0.058 
100% 0.036 0.048 0.039 0.046 0.103 0.083 0.093 0.070 0.122 0.018 0.058 0.058 
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Table K24 
ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: PC (P1*D1) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal individuated standard offers at that rank.  
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Cheapest 
individuated 
standard offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (73) 
Offer rank  
3 (93) 
Offer rank  
4 (117) 
Offer rank  
5 (112) 
Offer rank  
6 (123) 
Offer rank  
7 (121) 
Offer rank  
8 (113) 
Offer rank  
9 (117) 
Offer rank 
10 (115) 
Offer rank 
11 (124) 
Offer rank 
12 (112) 
10% 0.021 0.017 0.000 0.026 0.026 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.016 0.018 
20% 0.050 0.058 0.013 0.086 0.072 0.032 0.042 0.059 0.060 0.045 0.050 0.052 
30% 0.085 0.055 0.027 0.107 0.085 0.051 0.087 0.078 0.124 0.057 0.091 0.069 
40% 0.135 0.070 0.053 0.120 0.097 0.091 0.148 0.086 0.155 0.041 0.105 0.060 
50% 0.198 0.134 0.149 0.221 0.161 0.211 0.242 0.161 0.258 0.123 0.167 0.126 
60% 0.250 0.184 0.239 0.318 0.242 0.251 0.291 0.240 0.264 0.188 0.223 0.179 
70% 0.248 0.234 0.240 0.317 0.274 0.221 0.256 0.212 0.263 0.165 0.205 0.172 
80% 0.304 0.304 0.237 0.361 0.360 0.300 0.268 0.222 0.315 0.233 0.254 0.184 
90% 0.432 0.407 0.353 0.436 0.420 0.350 0.314 0.330 0.336 0.292 0.237 0.220 
100% 0.494 0.361 0.319 0.401 0.341 0.296 0.274 0.286 0.270 0.208 0.205 0.137 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank  
13 (101) 
Offer rank 
14 (115) 
Offer rank 
15 (113) 
Offer rank 
16 (105) 
Offer rank 
17 (103) 
Offer rank 
18 (106) 
Offer rank 
19 (120) 
Offer rank 
20 (117) 
Offer rank 
21 (112) 
Offer rank 
22 (123) 
Offer rank 
23 (114) 
Offer rank 
24 (116) 
10% 0.010 0.016 0.018 0.005 0.023 0.009 0.014 0.033 0.009 0.032 0.024 0.012 
20% 0.038 0.055 0.065 0.016 0.055 0.039 0.051 0.066 0.045 0.061 0.069 0.026 
30% 0.036 0.077 0.087 0.057 0.052 0.057 0.056 0.073 0.057 0.068 0.075 0.024 
40% 0.073 0.089 0.104 0.081 0.053 0.075 0.059 0.071 0.061 0.071 0.086 0.043 
50% 0.179 0.153 0.161 0.139 0.156 0.131 0.171 0.130 0.132 0.139 0.157 0.073 
60% 0.249 0.204 0.205 0.189 0.202 0.165 0.212 0.182 0.134 0.173 0.202 0.107 
70% 0.231 0.146 0.148 0.128 0.155 0.156 0.149 0.148 0.121 0.134 0.161 0.088 
80% 0.209 0.277 0.169 0.171 0.200 0.186 0.184 0.193 0.176 0.164 0.138 0.128 
90% 0.256 0.344 0.222 0.229 0.222 0.201 0.189 0.219 0.273 0.165 0.183 0.239 
100% 0.203 0.224 0.208 0.184 0.127 0.143 0.151 0.148 0.187 0.117 0.153 0.176 
236 
 
 
 
Table K25 
ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: PC (P1*D1*D2) task 
 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal individuated standard offers at that rank. 
Clicking 
time interval 
Cheapest 
individuated 
standard offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (74) 
Offer rank  
3 (99) 
Offer rank  
4 (113) 
Offer rank  
5 (121) 
Offer rank  
6 (113) 
Offer rank  
7 (116) 
Offer rank  
8 (121) 
Offer rank  
9 (106) 
Offer rank 
10 (115) 
Offer rank 
11 (111) 
Offer rank 
12 (114) 
10% 0.008 0.013 0.027 0.010 0.026 0.020 0.015 0.005 0.016 0.015 0.001 0.009 
20% 0.034 0.042 0.059 0.038 0.078 0.052 0.045 0.018 0.052 0.053 0.017 0.052 
30% 0.043 0.049 0.067 0.087 0.079 0.075 0.067 0.048 0.075 0.055 0.032 0.071 
40% 0.062 0.054 0.083 0.099 0.079 0.129 0.100 0.089 0.096 0.092 0.051 0.093 
50% 0.131 0.107 0.153 0.159 0.128 0.237 0.178 0.117 0.149 0.123 0.099 0.144 
60% 0.159 0.210 0.245 0.245 0.155 0.311 0.228 0.154 0.203 0.199 0.130 0.165 
70% 0.139 0.268 0.244 0.272 0.179 0.333 0.214 0.191 0.176 0.215 0.126 0.155 
80% 0.173 0.352 0.329 0.334 0.215 0.367 0.303 0.206 0.243 0.260 0.149 0.222 
90  0.257 0.423 0.406 0.402 0.294 0.418 0.347 0.264 0.304 0.311 0.215 0.286 
100% 0.304 0.400 0.349 0.372 0.290 0.392 0.325 0.250 0.224 0.308 0.195 0.262 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank  
13 (111) 
Offer rank 
14 (116) 
Offer rank 
15 (117) 
Offer rank 
16 (112) 
Offer rank 
17 (113) 
Offer rank 
18 (102) 
Offer rank 
19 (120) 
Offer rank 
20 (120) 
Offer rank 
21 (111) 
Offer rank 
22 (109) 
Offer rank 
23 (111) 
Offer rank 
24 (120) 
10% 0.012 0.001 0.011 0.026 0.009 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.031 0.024 0.013 0.018 
20% 0.042 0.037 0.038 0.077 0.044 0.039 0.049 0.056 0.048 0.045 0.040 0.043 
30% 0.062 0.073 0.042 0.059 0.075 0.048 0.072 0.089 0.049 0.039 0.066 0.041 
40% 0.127 0.072 0.077 0.079 0.120 0.040 0.071 0.111 0.064 0.081 0.079 0.020 
50% 0.180 0.155 0.156 0.159 0.182 0.085 0.136 0.168 0.106 0.134 0.127 0.064 
60% 0.226 0.197 0.175 0.198 0.248 0.184 0.208 0.196 0.194 0.150 0.203 0.141 
70% 0.212 0.146 0.142 0.181 0.211 0.180 0.179 0.172 0.165 0.148 0.159 0.172 
80% 0.220 0.154 0.175 0.240 0.261 0.145 0.223 0.180 0.124 0.179 0.152 0.206 
90% 0.238 0.196 0.261 0.280 0.335 0.220 0.268 0.221 0.152 0.221 0.210 0.222 
100% 0.222 0.175 0.246 0.223 0.319 0.197 0.239 0.196 0.194 0.184 0.224 0.210 
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Table K26 
ProbabilityInBasket of individuated standard offers with different ranks: PC (P1*D1+P2) task 
 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the total numbers of optimal or suboptimal individuated standard offers at that rank. 
 
 
Clicking 
time interval 
Cheapest 
individuated 
standard offer 
(171) 
Offer rank  
2 (72) 
Offer rank  
3 (100) 
Offer rank  
4 (113) 
Offer rank  
5 (117) 
Offer rank  
6 (113) 
Offer rank  
7 (111) 
Offer rank  
8 (127) 
Offer rank  
9 (105) 
Offer rank 
10 (108) 
Offer rank 
11 (112) 
Offer rank 
12 (121) 
10% 0.007 0.007 0.015 0.018 0.006 0.021 0.006 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.006 0.010 
20% 0.033 0.052 0.038 0.052 0.036 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.048 0.079 0.047 0.024 
30% 0.065 0.104 0.056 0.071 0.064 0.030 0.055 0.046 0.060 0.092 0.075 0.037 
40% 0.090 0.161 0.090 0.083 0.070 0.060 0.103 0.062 0.091 0.097 0.099 0.040 
50% 0.150 0.220 0.178 0.168 0.145 0.156 0.166 0.145 0.161 0.138 0.173 0.151 
60% 0.216 0.305 0.269 0.233 0.231 0.247 0.237 0.212 0.218 0.200 0.239 0.220 
70% 0.264 0.331 0.271 0.236 0.261 0.242 0.247 0.218 0.214 0.211 0.217 0.159 
80% 0.361 0.368 0.345 0.289 0.284 0.265 0.290 0.287 0.276 0.259 0.275 0.185 
90% 0.434 0.443 0.451 0.331 0.351 0.344 0.306 0.342 0.306 0.330 0.288 0.230 
100% 0.420 0.457 0.448 0.238 0.284 0.291 0.211 0.263 0.239 0.270 0.177 0.183 
Clicking 
time interval 
Offer rank  
13 (108) 
Offer rank 
14 (106) 
Offer rank 
15 (114) 
Offer rank 
16 (117) 
Offer rank 
17 (114) 
Offer rank 
18 (111) 
Offer rank 
19 (112) 
Offer rank 
20 (114) 
Offer rank 
21 (122) 
Offer rank 
22 (114) 
Offer rank 
23 (115) 
Offer rank 
24 (119) 
10% 0.020 0.005 0.001 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.008 0.015 0.016 0.004 0.010 0.007 
20% 0.037 0.017 0.016 0.022 0.018 0.038 0.021 0.043 0.052 0.010 0.015 0.015 
30% 0.047 0.051 0.039 0.034 0.055 0.078 0.033 0.045 0.063 0.033 0.036 0.018 
40% 0.064 0.060 0.069 0.048 0.070 0.102 0.042 0.088 0.057 0.062 0.053 0.041 
50% 0.176 0.145 0.138 0.096 0.110 0.169 0.128 0.178 0.100 0.169 0.134 0.088 
60% 0.224 0.212 0.190 0.183 0.190 0.195 0.208 0.208 0.150 0.232 0.206 0.089 
70% 0.172 0.136 0.202 0.161 0.125 0.162 0.157 0.104 0.119 0.166 0.157 0.055 
80% 0.150 0.218 0.213 0.205 0.162 0.204 0.197 0.116 0.161 0.153 0.156 0.083 
90% 0.179 0.264 0.264 0.246 0.211 0.297 0.230 0.160 0.229 0.214 0.203 0.196 
100% 0.148 0.187 0.181 0.182 0.151 0.203 0.162 0.097 0.147 0.134 0.099 0.160 
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Table K27 
ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer, conditional on its standard: PC (P1*D1) 
Clicking time interval The optimal offer is a common standard 
offer (55)  
The optimal offer is a individuated 
standard offer (116) 
10% 0.029 0.024 
20% 0.174 0.066 
30% 0.455 0.091 
40% 0.582 0.135 
50% 0.645 0.227 
60% 0.650 0.305 
70% 0.627 0.246 
80% 0.629 0.258 
90% 0.663 0.368 
100% 0.631 0.384 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the number of observations 
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Table K28 
ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer, conditional on its standard: PC (P1*D1*D2) 
Clicking time interval The optimal offer is a common standard 
offer (56)  
The optimal offer is a individuated 
standard offer (115) 
10% 0.063 0.000 
20% 0.237 0.000 
30% 0.435 0.015 
40% 0.553 0.029 
50% 0.612 0.140 
60% 0.614 0.154 
70% 0.606 0.157 
80% 0.612 0.218 
90% 0.631 0.335 
100% 0.637 0.342 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the number of observations 
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Table K29 
ProbabilityInBasket for the optimal offer, conditional on its standard: PC (P1*D1+P2) 
 
Clicking time interval The optimal offer is a common standard 
offer (60) 
The optimal offer is a individuated 
standard offer (111) 
10% 0.036 0.008 
20% 0.200 0.030 
30% 0.579 0.046 
40% 0.687 0.059 
50% 0.678 0.128 
60% 0.596 0.199 
70% 0.492 0.224 
80% 0.442 0.326 
90% 0.400 0.435 
100% 0.350 0.432 
*Numbers in the parentheses are the number of observations 
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Table K30  
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time interval, kept the optimal offer in the 
shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: AC (P1) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal 
offer in the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  9 9 0 100% 
30%  24 24 0 100% 
40%  28 28 0 100% 
50%  37 37 0 100% 
60%  51 51 0 100% 
70%  65 65 0 100% 
80%  71 70 1 98.6% 
90%  90 90 0 100% 
100%  124 124 0 100% 
Last click89 157 N/A N/A N/A 
*171 observations   
*153 (89.47%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer  
 
                                                          
89 In the present table as well as the following 12 tables, the row “Last click” shows the number of participants who had the optimal offer in the shopping basket while 
clicking the “Buy offer xx” button (xx can be a letter from A to X, depending which offer a participant finally decided to buy). This number usually is higher than the number 
of participants who had the optimal offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of 90%-100% time interval, because some participants may put the optimal offer in the 
shopping basket “within”, but not “at the beginning of”, the last time interval. 
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Table K31 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time interval, kept the optimal offer in the 
shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: AC (P1*D1) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  10 8 2 80% 
30%  21 21 0 100% 
40%  27 27 0 100% 
50%  33 33 0 100% 
60%  49 48 1 98.00% 
70%  70 70 0 100% 
80%  87 87 0 100% 
90%  102 102 0 100% 
100%  128 127 1 99.22% 
Last click 154 N/A N/A N/A 
*171 observations   
*147 (85.96%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer  
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Table K32 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time interval, kept the optimal offer in the 
shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: AC (P1*D1*D2) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  3 3 0 100% 
30%  16 16 0 100% 
40%  24 24 0 100% 
50%  30 30 0 100% 
60%  39 39 0 100% 
70%  55 55 0 100% 
80%  68 68 0 100% 
90%  86 85 1 98.84% 
100%  120 119 1 99.16% 
Last click 148 N/A N/A N/A 
*171 observations   
*140 (81.87%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer  
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Table K33 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time interval, kept the optimal offer in the 
shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: AC (P1*D1+P2) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  5 5 0 
100.00% 
30%  15 15 0 
100.00% 
40%  25 25 0 
100.00% 
50%  31 31 0 
100.00% 
60%  51 50 1 
98.04% 
70%  57 56 1 
98.25% 
80%  68 67 1 
98.53% 
90%  93 92 1 
98.92% 
100%  128 126 2 
98.44% 
Last click 149 N/A N/A N/A 
*171 observations   
*145 (84.80%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer  
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Table K34 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time interval, kept the optimal offer in the 
shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: NC (P1*D1) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  12 12 0 
100.00% 
30%  18 14 4 
77.78% 
40%  21 17 4 
80.95% 
50%  23 22 1 
95.65% 
60%  36 34 2 94.44% 
70%  50 42 8 
84.00% 
80%  53 48 5 
90.57% 
90%  65 65 0 
100.00% 
100%  82 73 9 
89.02% 
Last click 79 N/A N/A N/A 
*171 observations   
*45 (26.32%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer  
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Table K35 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time interval, kept the optimal offer in the 
shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: NC (P1*D1*D2) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  8 8 0 
100.00% 
30%  17 16 1 
94.12% 
40%  22 18 4 
81.82% 
50%  25 23 2 
92.00% 
60%  35 34 1 
97.14% 
70%  45 41 4 
91.11% 
80%  49 47 2 
95.92% 
90%  57 54 3 
94.74% 
100%  71 60 11 
84.51% 
Last click 64 N/A N/A N/A 
*171 observations   
*35 (20.47%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer  
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Table K36 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time interval, kept the optimal offer in the 
shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: NC (P1*D1+P2) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal 
offer in the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  10 10 0 
100.00% 
30%  25 23 2 
92.00% 
40%  32 26 6 
81.25% 
50%  41 38 3 
92.68% 
60%  50 49 1 
98.00% 
70%  56 52 4 
92.86% 
80%  60 55 5 
91.67% 
90%  67 65 2 
97.01% 
100%  85 68 17 
80.00% 
Last click 73 N/A N/A N/A 
*171 observations   
*47 (27.49%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer 
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Table K37 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer which is a common standard offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time 
interval, kept the optimal offer in the shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: 
PC (P1*D1) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  5 5 0 
100.00% 
30%  20 19 1 
95.00% 
40%  29 28 1 
96.55% 
50%  33 33 0 
100.00% 
60%  37 35 2 
94.59% 
70%  34 32 2 
94.12% 
80%  35 33 2 
94.29% 
90%  36 35 1 
97.22% 
100%  37 32 5 
86.49% 
Last click 33 N/A N/A N/A 
*55 observations   
*23 (41.82%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer when it was a common standard offer 
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Table K38 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer which is an individuated standard offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time 
interval, kept the optimal offer in the shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: 
PC (P1*D1) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  3 3 0 
100.00% 
30%  8 7 1 
87.50% 
40%  12 11 1 
91.67% 
50%  19 18 1 
94.74% 
60%  23 21 2 
91.30% 
70%  26 25 1 
96.15% 
80%  32 30 2 
93.75% 
90%  44 44 0 
100.00% 
100%  61 55 6 
90.16% 
Last click 64 N/A N/A N/A 
*116 observations   
*40 (34.48%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer when it was an individuated standard offer 
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Table K39 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer which is a common standard offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time 
interval, kept the optimal offer in the shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: 
PC (P1*D1*D2) task 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  8 8 0 
100.00% 
30%  20 19 1 
95.00% 
40%  27 25 2 
92.59% 
50%  33 32 1 
96.97% 
60%  34 33 1 
97.06% 
70%  35 33 2 
94.29% 
80%  35 34 1 
97.14% 
90%  34 33 1 
97.06% 
100%  36 35 1 
97.22% 
Last click 35 N/A N/A N/A 
*56 observations   
*20 (35.71%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer when it was a common standard offer 
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Table K40 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer which is an individuated standard offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time 
interval, kept the optimal offer in the shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: 
PC (P1*D1*D2) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  3 3 0 
100.00% 
30%  6 5 1 
83.33% 
40%  7 6 1 
85.71% 
50%  11 10 1 
90.91% 
60%  18 13 5 
72.22% 
70%  16 11 5 
68.75% 
80%  14 12 2 
85.71% 
90%  19 18 1 
94.74% 
100%  33 25 8 
75.76% 
Last click 33 N/A N/A N/A 
*115 observations   
*13 (11.30%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer when it was an individuated standard offer 
 
252 
 
Table K41 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer which is a common standard offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time 
interval, kept the optimal offer in the shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during clicking time interval: PC 
(P1*D1+P2) task 
 
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  4 4 0 
100.00% 
30%  27 27 0 
100.00% 
40%  40 38 2 
95.00% 
50%  42 38 4 
90.48% 
60%  39 32 7 
82.05% 
70%  32 25 7 
78.13% 
80%  26 25 1 
96.15% 
90%  26 22 4 
84.62% 
100%  22 20 2 
90.91% 
Last click 20 N/A N/A N/A 
*60 observations   
*10 (16.67%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer when it was a common standard offer 
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Table K42 
The number of participants, who had the optimal offer which is an individuated standard offer in the shopping basket at the beginning of a time 
interval, kept the optimal offer in the shopping basket, and moved the optimal offer out of the shopping basket during a clicking time interval: 
PC (P1*D1+P2) task 
  
Clicking time interval Number of participants 
who had the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket at 
the beginning of the time 
interval 
Number of participants 
who kept the optimal offer 
in the shopping basket 
during the time interval 
Number of participants 
who moved the optimal 
offer out of the shopping 
basket during the time 
interval 
Percentage of participants 
who did not move the 
optimal offer out of the 
shopping basket 
20%  2 2 0 
100.00% 
30%  7 7 0 
100.00% 
40%  10 9 1 
90.00% 
50%  13 13 0 
100.00% 
60%  22 20 2 
90.91% 
70%  26 24 2 
92.31% 
80%  36 35 1 
97.22% 
90%  45 40 5 
88.89% 
100%  48 38 10 
79.17% 
Last click 43 N/A N/A N/A 
*111 observations   
*27 (24.32%) participants ended up choosing the optimal offer when it was an individuated standard offer 
